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EASTERN RELIGIONS AND WESTERN THOUGHT*

By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY
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AS JEREMIAS REMARKED in the Vorwort to his well-known *Altorientalische Geisteskultur*, "Die Menschheitsbildung ist ein einheitliches Ganzes, und in den verschiedenen Kulturen findet man die Dialekte der einen Geissessprache." From this point of view, Sir S. Radhakrishnan's volume of lectures, here under discussion, may be described as a collation, in the Dictionary sense of "a bringing together for purposes of verification" (Webster): understanding by "verification" (Skr. *satyam karaṇa*, Pali *saccikiriya*) by no means a merely literary confrontation of parallel texts, but such a "making come true" as bestows upon the Comprehensor power to "move mountains." What Radhakrishnan says of Orphic, Pythagorean, and Indian, and by implication of all metaphysics, that "We can use the one system to interpret the other. . . . The varied dialects are but a single speech of the soul" (pp. 143, 250)—though the *Philosophia Perennis* (Skr. *Sanātana Dharma*) is not a "system," but a doctrine—enunciates the indispensable technique of the science of Comparative Religion, for which, apart from the satisfaction of a *turpis curiositas*, the vain pursuit of knowledge for its own sake,¹ one cannot imagine any other utility than that of the demonstration of the common metaphysical principles upon which all religions

* With reference to the volume by Sir S. Radhakrishnan published under this title by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939, pp. xiii + 394. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, formerly President of the Andhra University at Walthair, the author of a standard work on Indian Philosophy and of many treatises on Indian religion, now occupies the Spalding chair of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford, where the lectures were delivered, and that of Philosophy in the Benares Hindu University. Attention may also be called to his recently published lecture *Gautama the Buddha*, given before the British Academy in 1938, a discussion of the Buddha as a "master-mind," in which the author affirms the positive content of Buddhist teaching.

1. "Knowledge is not only useless, we can not even obtain full possession of it unless it can somehow be made serviceable, unless it proves fruitful" (W. F. Albright in *Journal American Oriental Society*, LVI, 137. This "does not mean that knowledge should be utilitarian in the shortsighted meaning which this word usually has"). "The Hindus have never cared about knowledge unless they conceived that it would lead to some useful end. It is we who should be called 'impractical'" (Franklin Edgerton, *ibid.*, p. 526). "Indian philosophy viewed as a whole is fundamentally the Philosophy of life and practice whereas western Philosophy is largely table Philosophy for printers and publishers and readers studying at leisure" (S. N. Das Gupta, First Indian Cultural Conference, 1936, *Proceedings and Addresses*).

rest, and apart from which religions would represent, not the Truth, but only what men have believed; it is, in fact, precisely "not the Truth, but what men have believed" that is studied in the philosophical departments of modern universities. It need hardly be said that in speaking of the universality of Truth, nothing could be further from our purpose than to advocate any kind of eclecticism; for although all roads may lead to one Supernal Sun, no man can readily set forth upon any that does not start from somewhere in his own neighborhood.

It may be because of the semi-popular character of these lectures, which are addressed to a philosophically rather than metaphysically minded audience, that Radhakrishnan does not push his parallels as far as he might, and this is to be regretted, because it is not merely the bare fact of a general consensus, with respect for example to the doctrine of a single essence and two natures, or that of the progenitive power of the Spirit, but the minute and often verbal agreement of the formulae in matters of detail that offers convincing evidence of the catholicity and single origin of the universal and unanimous tradition of the *Philosophia Perennis*. When Radhakrishnan quotes "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit" (John, 3:8), he cites *Itivuttaka* 100 (a vague parallel) and neglects the fundamental Vedāntic and Buddhist doctrine of man's "two selves" (*dvayātmā*), of which the one (the psycho-physical individuality) is reborn of woman in procreative reincarnation, and the other and very Self is reborn of the divine womb in solar regeneration, as is explicit in *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa* 1. 17 and elsewhere; a doctrine that is presupposed by the basic question asked in the Upaniṣads and again in Pali Buddhism, "By which self is the *summum bonum* attainable?"

Dionysius' "undivided in things divided," etc., quoted on page 242, is a literal equivalent of *Bhagavad Gītā* XIII, 16, *avibhaktam ca bhūteṣu vibhaktam-iva ca sthitam*, "both undivided, and as it was divided as He is hypostasised in beings," cf. *Kātha Upaniṣad* v, 13, "Stable amongst the unstable . . ., the One amongst the many," and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* x, 5. 2. 16, "One and many: for He is One as Person there, and manifoldly immanent here in his children" (cf. Hermes xvi. 3: *ἓν ὄντα καὶ τὰ πάντα*); the Supernal Sun and his rays (his "children," *Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, II. 9. 10) being One Light,

the light of the Spirit, and "Light of lights," expressions that are common to Christian and Sankrit scripture.²

The words of Philo are cited (page 196, note 1), to the effect that the Uncreated is hidden from sight "by the piercing splendor and the rushing torrent of rays," and it is overlooked that this is the equivalent *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* I. 3, 6, where the Sundoor (Janua Coeli) is "all covered over by rays," that in the many related texts it is made clear that these rays, the attributes of divinity, must be withdrawn or dispersed before the open door can be seen, and that these formulations are those of the positive and negative theology explicit in *Maitrī Upaniṣad* IV. 6, "These (aspects of Brahman) one should contemplate and laud, but then deny," and common to Eastern and Western theological method.

Radhakrishnan quotes the magnificent text of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV. 3. 21, rendering "when the individual soul (*puruṣa*) is embraced by the all-embracing spirit (*prajñenātmanā*), he attains his proper form in which his desire is fulfilled . . . he is without desire"; as to which we must say in the first place that in English as in Greek, the "soul" is, for sufficient reasons, "she," and that if we render *puruṣa* by "individual soul" we must say "she attains"; in the second place that *prajñena-* does not mean "all-embracing" but rather "providential," "all-seeing, or "omniscient" (*prajñā* is the etymological and semantic equivalent of "prognosis"),³ and that *prajñātman* is in fact the Supernal Sun, the Divine Eros, as is explicit in *Aitareya Aranyaka* III. 2. 3. He is the "lover in union with whom the individual essence, "as when a man is united to a darling bride, is neither aware of a within nor a without." He it is that answers the question, "What is love?" with "Thou shalt know when thou becomest me" (Jalālu'd-dīn Rūmī, *Mathnawī*, Bk. II.) And finally, that the opportunity is missed

2. Cf. "Witelo" (Al-Hazen), "Prima substantiarum est lux . . . Unumquodque quantum habet de luce, tantum retinet esse divini" (*Lib. de intelligentiis*, VI. VIII): "the life was the light of men . . . the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (John, I:4, 9); "Light is the progenitive power" (*Taittirīya Saṃhitā* VII. 1. 1. 1 and *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* VIII. 7. 1. 16); and Rūmī, "Thy light is at once joined to all things and apart from all" (Nicholson, *Shams-i-Tabriz*, Ode IX).

3. Much in the same way *ānanda*, which means "beatitude," and generally of such a sort as is described in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, is rendered by "freedom" (p. 28). It is true that beatitude and freedom coincide in *divinis*, as do omniscient (Skr. *sarvajña*) and all-embracing (Skr. *viśvavyacas*): but this does not justify the substitution of one meaning for another in the translation of a given term.

to point out that this description of the *ātmā mithuna* of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII. 25. 2 enunciates the principle of all Indian "erotic mysticism" and is in complete accord with the Christian principle that "All creation is feminine to God." The exact equivalent of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text can be cited in Eckhart's "In the embrace of this sovran one which naughts the separated self of things, being is one without distinction," cf. John Donne's "Nor ever chaste unless Thou ravish me."

It may be pointed out, too, in connection with this text, "her desire is fulfilled . . . , she is without desire" (*āptakāmam . . . akāmam*), what is so often overlooked in the discussion of the "renunciation of desire," that to be without desire and to possess one's desire are one and the same thing and inconceivable apart; and that as Eckhart says, so long as we have not a thing, we *desire* it, but when we possess it, we *love* it—desire implying a duality, and love union. The mention of Eckhart leads us to say that we find it strange that he is mentioned only once in the whole volume, and Dante only twice. It is just possible that we have overlooked some other references; for the Index is inadequate, "Buddhism," for example, having only two references, to which should be added pages 107, 177-187 and 374.

By these remarks we do not mean to say that Radhakrishnan has failed to bring together a very illuminating body of parallels, or to demonstrate that the texts of any one "dialect of the language of the spirit" can be used in the exegesis of those of another, without respect to date or place. It is a brilliant remark that "The two familiar criticisms that for Hindu thought the world is an illusion (*māyā*), that it is divine (pantheism) cancel each other" (p. 30). Radhakrishnan himself denies rightly that *māyā* implies that the world is an illusion or non-existent absolutely, though for the Hindu, as for the Christian Platonist, whatever reality the world possesses is rather formal than phenomenal.⁴ *Māyā*,⁵ from root *mā*, to measure, implies that the

4. It is noteworthy that in discussing this very question of the reality of the world Sextus Empiricus makes use of the familiar Indian parable of the snake and the rope, and goes on to argue that the Sceptics by no means "abolish phenomena" but only "question whether the underlying object is such as it appears," saying that "our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance" (*Pyrrhonism*, I. 227-228).

5. It would be incorrect to say "The world is *māyā*"; the world, all that is mobile or immobile, is *māyā-maya*, that is to say that its "material" cause is *māyā*, a maternal potentiality of definition, from whom all things "milk" their specific

universe is the realm of continuous quantity, and as such to be distinguished from as yet unmeasured on the one hand and from the immeasurable on the other. Skr. *mātrā* corresponds etymologically to "matter," and in meaning also to μέτρον as the word is used by Heracleitus and Plato, but neither to the "primary matter" of ontology nor to the "solid matter" of the man in the street. For the concept of things that occupy space Sanskrit has *nāma-rūpa*, literally, "name and appearance," or "form and phenomenon," that which can be designated and observed. The creation of the world by the Divine Architect is a delimitation: Blake's "Ancient of Days" (the Creator extending from the Sun a pair of compasses), and its prototypes (in which "l'Univers . . . surgit aussi sous le compas conduit par Dieu"), are effectively illustrations of the Vedic "He with his ray hath measured out the boundaries of Heaven and Earth" (RV. VIII. 25. 18); which leads us to remark, in passing, that a comparison of "Eastern Religions with Western Thought" could also have been made in terms of iconography. *Māyā* is not, then, delusion (*moha*), though it may be the occasion of delusion, whenever we forget that "All is not gold that glitters." The Indian is also the Christian doctrine that "Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I. 13. 12 ad 2), whence Eckhart's "To find Nature as she is in herself, all forms must be shattered." In saying that he was "afraid that Wordsworth was fond of nature," Blake was attributing to him an idolatry, in the Ṣūfī sense of the worship of the outward form. That the veil of *māyā* is to be rent, or as it is otherwise expressed, the axe of gnosis laid to the trunk of the Tree of Life, is because our goal is the immeasurable, as *summum bonum* (Skr. *apara lābha, sakalam bhadram*); in the meantime the metrical Universe is a theophany, the Tree an epiphany.

The Professor has done well to emphasize the essentially other-worldly character of Christianity: "My kingdom is not of this world." For it is precisely the "other-worldliness" (*lokottaratā*) of the Upaniṣads and Buddhism that makes them least acceptable to the modern, the Renaissance man whose values are essentially aesthetic, the rationalist for whom "such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless"

qualities and "get their number." *Māyā* = "Natura naturans, Creatrix Universalis, Deus"; *Māya* is one of the names of the Magna Mater; cf. μήτις, σοφία, as persons. See also my "Nirmāṇa-kāya" in JRAS. 1938.

(Keith, *Aitareya Aranyaka*, p. 42). The Upaniṣads are not ethical treatises, precisely because their "supreme end is release from the constitutive conditions of actuality," in other words because they are metaphysical and not in the narrower sense of the world religious texts. Ethics, from this point of view, is not an essential, but an accessory science (*upaveda*), and this is in perfect agreement with the Thomist doctrine that prudence is essential to the active life, but only dispositive to the contemplative, and with the Martha and Mary story, where it is said that "that good part (of audition as distinguished from service) shall not be taken away from her." To pretend that the "doctrine" of communism is "the highest form which religion has yet taken" (Dr. Needham, quoted p. 73, note 1) is a pathetic fallacy, though the logical consequence of the sentimental developments that have corrupted modern Christianity—"logical," because in reversing the traditional doctrine of the superiority of the contemplative to the active life, the relative values of prudence and gnosis are simultaneously inverted. To say that "If Gandhi and Tagore today adopt a (primarily) ethical view of life, it is certainly to be traced to their contact with the (modern) Christian West" (p. 68) is true, but only true with my addition of the words in brackets. We can agree, on the other hand, that "It is a one-sided view of contemplation that makes it *exclusive* of moral activity (p. 108, italics mine): it is only when man's last end has been attained, that for Christianity and Hinduism alike, the relativity of good and evil (and all other "pairs of opposites") has no longer any practical significance.

What is perhaps the most disturbing element in the pronouncements of one who occupies the position of the spiritual ambassador of India is the fact that he himself has manifestly, whether by training or temperament or both, essentially a European rather than an Indian mentality. He accepts without hesitation the current academic notion of a human "progress," with the correlative "development" of "systems" of "religious philosophy," not realising what India has known so well, that there are things to which the historical method, valid only for the classification of facts and not for the elucidation of principles, does not apply; he certainly does not realise with Evola that "il passaggio dalla mitologia tradizionale alla 'religione' è una decadenza umanistica" (*Rivolta contra il Mondo Moderno*, 1934, p. 374, note 12), nor would he recognize the deduction that a single page of

a *Purāṇa* is worth all the writings of Tagore, a fact that would be obvious to any orthodox Hindu. It is clear that Radhakrishnan would reject the whole idea of a superhuman origin of the orthodox tradition, together with the corresponding Christian concept of revelation, and that for this reason it does not occur to him to correlate the doctrine of the "eternity of the Vedas," or the Buddhist doctrine of the "timelessness of the Dhamma," with the Christian dogma of the eternity of the Divine Word and of the writings in the Book of Life (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I-II-91. 1 ad 2), an eternity that must not be confused with the possible date of a given text, for as St. Thomas remarks, "the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads." Radhakrishnan is thoroughly un-Indian (as well as un-Christian) when he speaks of "our strong dislike of monasticism," as well as in a casual disparagement of dogmas and rites⁶ and enthusiasm for what he calls an "open religion," as if to imply that the mysteries can be communicated in the same way as a profane science. When he says that "in the mystery religions the common facts of daily life are endowed with sacramental significance" (p. 221), he scarcely seems to realise that this is not merely true of the mystery religions thought of as something peculiar or abnormal, but of all traditional societies,⁷ in which, for example, the practice of the arts is always a rite, and one may say that there are *none* of the functions of life, even the humblest, without significance or, in the proper sense of the word, profane.

To say that "For the first time in the history of thought, the Upanishads indicate a religious view which has for its integral elements: the supremacy of the Absolute spirit," etc. (p. 133), is to give a modern Western interpretation of Indian tradition. For the Hindu, the "supremacy of the Absolute spirit" is stated unequivocally in Rigveda 1. 115. 1, "The Sun is the *Atman* of all that is mobile or immobile," and throughout the Brāhmaṇas, those magnificent texts of which Max Müller spoke as "mere twaddle," and to which Lanman referred as "arid, puerile, and inane"; the distinction of Upaniṣad from Veda is that of *jñāna* (gnosis) from *karma* (ritual activity) and (to quote a

6. "Riti, i quali contengono il segreto di una certa trasformazione e dominazione raggiunte nell'ordine di detto substrato vitale" (Evola, *loc. cit.*, p. 53).

7. In which "Metaphysics, ritual, law, government, art, social relations, even dress and the conventions of politeness, fit together like a jigsaw" (Marco Pallis, *Peaks and Lamas*, 1939, p. 380).

Western scholar) "for the least part chronological" (Bloomfield in JAOS. 15. 155). Far nearer, indeed, to the Indian position and the facts is Edgerton's, who remarks that "Every idea contained in at least the older Upanishads, with almost no exceptions, is not new to the Upanishads but can be found set forth, or at least very clearly foreshadowed in the older Vedic texts" (JAOS. 36. 197).

Nowhere does Radhakrishnan betray more clearly his own Westernization, and at the same time Hindu scripture, that when he speaks of the Gāyatrī (the most universal and perhaps the most remarkable of Vedic incantations), as having "started as a primitive form of sun-worship," though "refined in content very early" (p. 137, note 1). That the Vedic incantations and sacrifices represent a primitive "worship of the powers of nature" is a favorite dogma of the Orientalist and anthropologist. We, on the contrary, deny absolutely that the Vedic formulae could have been invented, or rather "heard," without a full understanding of their meaning: we maintain with Andrae that primitive symbolism is rooted in the highest, and never "blind," and hold with Dante that "No object of sense in the whole world is more worthy to be made a type of God than the sun" (*Convito*, III. 12)—"that brilliant likeness of the Divine Goodness, our great sun" (Dionysius, *De div. nom.* iv. 1). It is in the very same way that the modern scholar, whether Western or Westernized, in his profane ignorance of the fact that "water" is the recognized metaphysical symbol of *potentiality*, can believe that in speaking of "water" as the primal principle, the Vedas, and likewise the oldest Greek philosophers, are referring to the water that consists of two parts hydrogen and one of oxygen. To all these scholars, whose incurably external methods of approach have persuaded them that primitive man worshiped the "powers of nature" as such, Plutarch's jibe is applicable, that there are men whose intelligence (διάνοια) has been so far led astray by their powers of perception (αἰσθήσεις) that they can no longer distinguish Apollo from Helios, the reality (τὸ ὄν) from the manifestation (τὸ φαινόμενον) (*Moralia*, 400 D, cf. 383 D).⁸

In the same way, incidental allusions are made to "rebirth," always with reference to "reincarnation" as misunderstood at the present day and by modern scholars, and never with reference to Indian

8. Cf. Plato, *Lysis* 898 D, "the body of Helios is seen by all, his soul by none," and *Atharva Veda* x. 8. 14, "Him all men see, not all know with the mind."

definitions, e.g., that of *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* vii. 13 where the Gods explain to man in categorical terms that "procreation is rebirth" (*punar janma*), nor with reference to the fact that in other senses than this of metempsychosis and metempsychosis, viz., that of "becoming" (*bhava*) envisaged as continuous and recurrent mutation (*punar bhava*), man dies and is reborn daily and hourly in this present life⁹—a doctrine for which the closest parallels can be adduced from Plato and Plutarch, nor, finally, to the fact that these deaths and births (without exception, from the Hindu point of view, every death implies a birth, *mors janua vitae* on every level of reference) must be distinguished from initiatory death and second birth, and from actual death and regeneration. Nor is the doctrine of *karma* (the operation of "mediate causes") disentangled from the un-Indian notion of the reincarnation of the very person of a man on this terrestrial globe, a thing very different both from a hereditary metempsychosis and from the doctrine of a transmigration from one state of being to another. In this way the opportunity is missed to point out that one of the supposedly Indian heresies (from a Christian point of view), that of "reincarnation," is not, in fact, a doctrine that was ever officially taught in the Hindu or Buddhist scriptures, and the comparison with Christianity is therefore inadequate.

The discussion of caste in the same way ignores the Hindu doctrine, and rests instead on the shifting ground of modern sociological theory. The curious statement that "When birth acquired greater importance, classes degenerated into castes" (p. 371) completely overlooks the metaphysical basis of the "importance" of heredity, the by no means only Indian doctrine of procreative rebirth, according to which the son is literally a *reproduction* of the father, and therefore inherits his character and role, his responsibilities and status (it is of course one of the "two selves" of the man that is reproduced, viz., that which is represented by the psycho-physical person—the other and spiritual or

9. It is constantly overlooked that the majority of references to *punar janma* and *punar mṛtyu*, repeated birth and repeated death, refer to this present life, e.g., *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* ii. 3. 3. 9, where man is daily restored to life at dawn and in the performance of the morning sacrifice "is completely saved from recurrent death" (or as it would be stated in Christian terms, "from the infection of death") (*ati ha vai punar mṛtyun mucyate*). In the same way a recurrent birth and death are characteristic of any future life that is still a becoming (*bhava*). Liberation (*mokṣa*) is from the corruptibility that attaches to any kind of "living," and as Eckhart expresses it, "The kingdom of God is for none but the thoroughly dead."

very person either transmigrates or is regenerated at death); a doctrine that automatically involves the proposition that the family line ceases to exist as soon as the family vocation is abandoned (vocation in a traditional society not being, as it is with us, a matter of choice, but a necessity by nature, in the sense that "fate lies in the created causes themselves"—St. Thomas Aquinas—and that "to flee from that destiny and decree is like fleeing from one's own essence"—Rūmī). This is a principle that holds good equally for any human "line" and in the *genealogia regni Dei*, and it is also from this point of view that we have to understand the "consubstantiality" of Father and Son *in divinis*.¹⁰

The hereditary principle defined above rather explains, than accounts for the origin of, caste. As to this, we can agree, from the traditional point of view, that "caste" represents a "degeneration," though

10. Cf. Augustine, *Contra V Haereses*, 5, "I made myself a mother of whom to be born"; *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* VII. 13 where it is "because the father is born again (*jāyate punaḥ*) of his wife (*jāyā*) that she is so called. . . . She is his second mother"; Wolfram von Eschenbach, *Parzival* II. 807, where the pregnant Herzeleide says of her husband Camuret, "Now am I both his mother and wife"; Shakespeare (XIIIth sonnet) ". . . then you were yourself again after your self's decease, when your sweet issue your sweet form should bear . . . so should that beauty which you hold in lease find no determination"; and the inscription referent to the Madonna on the tomb of St. Junien (Haute-Vienne), *Me Christi matrem prodo gerendo patrem*.

There is this distinction to be remarked, that while in man it is an existence that is transmitted, *in divinis* there is no distinction of essence from existence; thus man begets man, but the Father a man-God. In human propagation, it is a human constitution that the man as such transmits by the act of kind, but his is not the quickening power (*Spiritus est qui vivificat: caro non prodest quicquam*, John, 6. 63): the spiritual nature, of which the semen is the vehicle, manifests itself when the conditions are presented for the realization of any of its possibilities, a manifestation that is temporal from the creature's point of view, but intemporal from that of the Spirit; the said conditions being merely the occasion, and not the cause of the manifestation. Explicit statements to these effects could be cited alike from Hindu and Christian sources.

It need hardly be said that there is no conflict between the "facts" or "laws" of science and the traditional vitalism; the questions, How is propagation effected? proper to science, and What is the principle of life? proper to metaphysics, are by no means mutually exclusive. Tradition is therefore in no way "opposed" to science, although independent of science, and severely critical of the accumulation of facts without a relation of these facts to any unifying principle. The weakness of the modern "intellectual" position is its inability to entertain at one and the same time empirical and transcendental "explanations" of experience: the Hindu can be a complete astronomer in the modern sense, and *also* take part in traditional rites designed to release the Sun or Moon from the jaws of the Dragon at times of eclipse; the Roman Catholic may be well aware that in the Eucharist there is no replacement of a carbohydrate by a protein, and yet accept the doctrine of transubstantiation in theory and practice; the facts of science can only convince the metaphysician that "God moves in an even more mysterious way than had been hitherto supposed." In any case "a mouse is miracle enough."

not at all in the sense that Radhakrishnan uses the term. It is literally a de-generation from a state superior to caste, represented in Deity, for whom no task is too high or too mean, and imitated by the Sannyāsin, whose status is super-social: but, on the other hand, there are social conditions, notably that of a proletariat, where there may be classes, but where there is no status, which are beneath caste, and which represent a degeneration much further advanced; this last is

the pure and "inorganic" multiplicity of a kind of social atomism, and can logically only lead to the exercise of a purely mechanical activity in which nothing properly human subsists. . . . If we view the history of humanity as taught by traditional doctrines in conformity with cyclical laws, we must say that in the beginning man had the full possession of his state of existence and with it he naturally had the possibilities corresponding to all the functions prior to any distinction of these. The division of these functions came about in a subsequent phase, representing a state already inferior to the "primordial state," in which, however, every human being, while having as yet only some definite possibilities, still spontaneously had the effective consciousness of them. It is only in a period of greater obscurity that this consciousness became lost, . . . so that a man can adopt any profession or even change it at will as if this profession were something purely exterior to him (Guénon in JISOA. VI).¹¹

The effect of our "civilization" upon any traditional society is to destroy the basis of hereditary vocation on which such societies are ordered: and we may say that thus to rob the man of his vocation, though it be done in the name of "liberty" (taken in vain, for what choice of vocation, Plato's τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, κατὰ φύσιν, has man in

11. The primary Indian word for "caste" is *varṇa*, "color." Color is the final term of light, the actuality of some one or other of its possibilities of manifestation (Bonaventura, 1 *Sent. d.* 17 p. 1 a *unic. q.* 1); it is by their color that things are phenomenal (Skr. *rūpa* is both color and form, cf. TS. III. 3. 5. 1 *rūpanu asi varṇo nāma*); of which phenomenal things, as Ulrich of Strassburg states in traditional terms, "the diversity is occasioned by the diversity of the things that receive the light" (*De pulchro*). *Varṇ* as verb is accordingly both to "color" and to "describe," respectively with pigments or in words. "Color" is, then, the *characteristic* symptom of individuality: those things are colorless which are either in potentiality and not yet individual, or are superior to individuality; while those things are colored, i.e., have a cast(e), which are distinguishable from one another by contrast. So that, as Rūmī says, "It is only when colorlessness (*bi-rangī*, Skr. *avarṇa*) became the prisoner of color (i.e., when manifestation took place) that a Moses came into conflict with a Moses. When you return to the colorlessness that once was yours (i.e., in the "primordial state"), Moses and Pharoah (Buddha and Māra, Christ and Antichrist) are at peace with one another" (*Mathnavī*, I. 2467-8). The modern contempt of hierarchy by no means implies such a return; the way lies *through*, and does not circumvent the characterization implied by color (= caste).

societies determined, not by principles, but by economic necessity?), is to rob the man of his "living," not only in the economic sense, but in the sense that "man shall not live by bread alone"; since it is precisely in such societies that the professions themselves, being in every sense of the word *natural*, that is to say innately appropriate, provide the most effective support for initiatory teaching.

It must be remembered, also, that from the Hindu point of view, caste is not an exclusively human characteristic. As remarked by Pramanathanath Mukhopadhyaya (in *The Aryan Path*, May 1933, perhaps the best discussion of caste that exists in English),¹² "When the *Gita* says that the four Varnas have been organised by the Divine Being Himself, in accordance with 'moments' of character and conduct, what is really meant is this primordial differentiation of the four fundamental and universal types of modes of being and functioning. Hindu scriptures arrange plants and animals and even stocks and stones according to these radical types. It is a Cosmic Pattern." In any case, the Hindu doctrine of the origin of caste is stated in the Vedic *Puruṣa Sūkta*, and if some other, however apparently plausible, theory of the origin of caste is discussed, it is no longer "Eastern Religion," that is being compared with "Western Thought," but "Western Thought" with "Western Thought." It seems to us that Radhakrishnan has forgotten what it is to be a Hindu, and has become an "Orientalist," and that this is unfair to a majority of his readers, who cannot go directly to the sources for themselves. In this connection, we cannot refrain from expressing our surprise that Radhakrishnan nowhere refers to René Guénon, who, at the same time that he is equipped with an encyclopedic knowledge of Greek, Christian, and Islamic metaphysics, is perhaps the only author who, using a European language, has described the essentials of Hinduism without distortion; we can only allude here to his *Orient et Occident* (of which an English version has just appeared), and *La crise du Monde Moderne*, the Sorbonne lecture *La Métaphysique orientale*, and his many contributions to *Études Traditionnelles*.

In a discussion of the "Four Ends of Life" (*kāma, artha, dharma, mokṣa* as collectively *puruṣārtha*), p. 351, we feel that Radhakrishnan has missed an opportunity to support his thesis of the connection be-

12. See also Evola, *loc. cit.*, p. 1 and ch. 15, and A. M. Hocart, *Les Castes* (Paris, 1939).

tween Pythagorean and Indian thought, in rendering *artha* by "interest" and *dharma* by "ethical living"; for, as in the distinction of *artha-sāstra* from *dharma-sāstra*, and that of *attha* from *dhamma* in canonical Pali texts,¹³ it is *artha* that implies that which has to do with conduct, and *dharma* that which has to do with the eternal aspects of the truth. *Artha* represents the domain of ethics, *dharma* that of principles: *artha* and *dharma* are the "letter and the spirit" in the original, Pauline, sense of the words as expounded by St. Augustine (*De lit. et spir.*), i.e., that of the moral law on the one hand, and that of spiritual understanding on the other. As to the relation between these two, we may observe in parenthesis, that in our sentimental age, ethics is no longer a matter of "principles," but of feelings: good and bad conduct are equally "unprincipled." What we see has been overlooked in the present connection, however, is that *kāma*, *artha*, and *dharma* represent the "lives" of pleasure, activity, and contemplation, which were so familiar to the Middle Ages, or in other words the "Apolaustic, Practical, and Theoretic" lives of Aristotle, which Professor Burnet, quoted on p. 141, refers back to Pythagoras. Over against these three types of preoccupation, respectively *tāmasik*, *rājasik*, and *sāttvik*, stands a fourth conception, that of "liberation" (*mokṣa*), related to the other three as infinite to finite, superhuman to human. From the Hindu point of view, this Liberation is the real purpose of life, the use of life; the human preoccupations being either distractions from, or means to the attainment of this final end, according to the degree of our understanding of life, that is to the extent that the "facts" are envisaged in relation to the principles which they "represent" (for in Hinduism as in Christianity, "the invisible things of Him are known by the things which were made," the world is a theophany). And, as to the apparent opposition of the three to the fourth end, it is not that the three are not contained in the latter, more eminently, but that empirically we do not know them as they subsist therein, transformed. For example, it is not that our desires are essentially evil or false (the Middle Ages accepted the Aristotelian view that no man can desire evil *as such*), but that they are false accidentally, in so far as we pursue them one by one and as ends in

13. Cf. my discussion of *attha* and *dhamma* in "Some Pali words," HJAS. iv (1939), pp. 124-127, and especially their distinction in *Jātaka* vi. 251-52. Cf. "*dharma*" in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* I. 21.

themselves, in so far as our "discrimination is only by means of hunger and thirst" (estimative knowledge): the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* II. 3. 3, distinguishes in these terms, and almost exactly as Boethius draws the distinction in *Contra Evtychen*, between the animal man and the person (*puruṣa*, not merely as "Mann" but as "Mensch") who "knows what is and is not mundane, and by the mortal seeks the immortal." Our desires are essentially "real" (*satya*), but "overlaid by what is unreal" (*anṛta*, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII. 3); there can be no permanent satisfaction of any one desire or any severalty of desires, but only of all desires in simultaneity, in Liberation, in the Spirit or spiritual Self (*ātman*) that cannot be thought of as an *object* of desire, yet where, as Dante expresses it, "Perfect, whole and ripe is each desire; in it alone is every part, there where it ever was, for it is not in space nor hath it poles" (*Paradiso* XXII. 64-67). "Where are both desires and the consummation of desires, where the desires of him who desires are posset" (*Rigveda* IX. 113. 10, 11).

In the latter, and perhaps the best part of his book, Radhakrishnan discusses at some length, and very ably, the problem of "tolerance." From missionary sources he cites some fantastic pronouncements, with which may be contrasted his citation of "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte" (*Math.* 23. 15), and his own definition of destructive proselytism as "spiritual vandalism." To Karl Barth's statement that "there is little in either Hinduism or Islam which can resist the irreligious influences of economic and psychological determination" (the dictum of an obvious ignoramus) we should answer with Guénon that

devant l'aggravation d'un désordre¹⁴ qui se généralise de plus en plus, il y a lieu de faire appel à l'union de toutes les forces spirituelles qui exercent encore un action dans le monde extérieur, en Occident aussi bien qu'en Orient; et, du côté occidental, nous n'en voyons pas d'autres que l'Église catholique. Si celle-ci pouvait entrer par là en contact avec les représentants des traditions orientales . . . on ne tarderait d'envisager l'accord sur les principes, accord dont la condition nécessaire et suffisante serait que les représentants de l'Occident redeviennent vraiment conscients de ces prin-

14. "L'unique cause de ce désordre, c'est l'ignorance des principes; qu'on restaure la connaissance intellectuelle pure et tout le reste pourra redevenir normal; on pourra remettre l'ordre dans tous les domaines. Pour cela, il faut d'abord chercher la métaphysique vraie où elle existe encore, c'est-à-dire en orient" (*Orient et Occident*, p. 171).

cipes, comme le sont toujours ceux de l'Orient. . . . Il ne peut y avoir à cela qu'un seul obstacle: c'est le prosélytisme occidental (*La Crise du Monde Moderne*, Ch. ix).

In this connection it may be noted that St. Augustine's magnificent words, "That which is called the Christian religion existed among the ancients, and never did not exist, from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh, at which time the true religion which already existed began to be called Christianity" are cited only from the *Lib. Retractorum*, bk. 1 (more exactly, bk. 1, ch. 13) where they are, unfortunately, recanted, rather than from the *Lib. de vera religione*, ch. 10, where they originally stood as a positive affirmation. The fact is, of course, that while there is and can be only one Truth (expressed, as far as expression is possible, in the *Philosophia Perennis*, the intellectual birthright of all humanity), there must be many religions, for the simple reason, rightly cited by Radhakrishnan from St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 318), that nothing can be known except in accordance with the mode of the knower. It follows, as Gandhi has said to the missionaries, that "it is no part of your call, I assure you, to tear up the lives of the peoples of the East by the roots": nor have we any right to feel what was said by one Christian chaplain to another of another sect, that "You and I are serving the same Master: you in your way, and I in His," a point of view that finds expression again in the well-known Santiniketan inscription, "In this place no image is to be adored, and no man's faith is to be despised"; for which we can well believe that Rabindranath Tagore was responsible. (Where I am forbidden to adore an image, my faith is assuredly despised.) With how much greater understanding Ibn al-'Arabī writes, "My heart has become capable of every form: it is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks, and a temple for idols, and the pilgrim's Ka'ba, and the table of the Tora and the book of the Koran. I follow the religion of Love, whichever way his camels take. My religion and my faith is the true religion" (Nicholson, *Mystics of Islam*, p. 105). It was not without reason that Jahangir equated the "science of the Vedānta with the science of Sufism" (*Memoirs*, tr. p. 340). Modern tolerance is to a very large extent a symptom of indifference to spiritual truth or error, or of the conviction that the truth can never be known: modern intolerance has mostly to do with matters of supposed "fact," such as the existence of "pure races." Hindu and Islamic tolerance

is supported by the recognition of one transcendent truth (*atīkrāntam satyam*), a veritably "catholic" truth, variously expressed.

The essential distinction of the East from the (modern) West, and one that involves all other differences, is that the East referred to in Radhakrishnan's book has still preserved and is still conscious of the metaphysical bases of its life, while the modern West is almost completely ignorant of traditional metaphysics (which it confuses with "philosophy," as does Radhakrishnan himself), and is at the same time actively and consciously anti-traditional. In other words, the Eastern societies are ordered in such a way as to offer every kind of support to whomsoever is seeking for spiritual freedom (*Skr. mumukṣu*), while Western civilization, if it is not already such as to inhibit any verification whatever, at any rate places almost insurmountable obstacles in the way of those whose concern is with anything other than the "facts" of science (it may be noted, incidentally, that "fact" and "fiction" alike represent, not the "truth," but what we "make of" appearances). "Civilization is not worth saving if it continues on its present foundations . . . the tragedy moves on" (pp. 257, 383).¹⁵ The outcome can be viewed by the Comprehensor, for whom the human state is only one amongst others, and only of immediate importance because it is temporarily our own, with equanimity: there is nothing, indeed, that the Comprehensor, who is devoid of motives, can be affected by, whether it befalls himself or others (an unreal distinction, from this point of view). At the same time the practical question remains, whether or not the West can recover its balance ("the polar balance of physical and metaphysical," Andrae) before it is too late, and for how long, as things are now moving, this polar balance can be preserved in the East.¹⁶ It is with the Comprehensors, an élite, that the answer rests: and as the Indian puts it, "only the right question evokes the right answer." If we put the right questions, the answers will be that we have desired peace, but not the things that make for peace; that we have desired art, but not the *scientia*

15. "The prostitution of scientific truth may lead to world catastrophe. . . . Deliverance from this unfolding catastrophe calls as yet for no new formula of higher truth . . . responsibility for this problem in a peculiar sense lies within the domain of Oriental studies" (Leroy Waterman in *Journal American Oriental Society* LVIII, 410-412).

16. Attention may be called to the excellent discussions of this question with reference to Tibet in *Peaks and Lamas*, by Marco Pallis (London, 1939 and New York, 1940).

without which *ars nihil*; that we have desired morality, but have "thought for ourselves." As Radhakrishnan himself expresses it, "While resolved to renounce nothing, this generation wishes to enjoy the fruits of renunciation" (p. 384). "Except ye be converted (i.e., turned round, cf. Skr. *nivṛtta*) . . . ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Math. 18: 3). It would be harder for us, such as we are in ourselves at the present day "by temperament and training," to enter the kingdom of heaven than for the camel to pass through the eye of the needle (i.e., for the psycho-physical vehicle to pass through the Sun-door, *Janua Coeli*). This is by no means a doctrine of despair, but much rather merely a statement of the task to be accomplished, that of re-minding (*μετανοεῖν*) the modern man, who has "forgotten who he is," that he is more than "an animal, reasoning and mortal": *Quid est ergo, quod debet homo inquirere in hac vita? Hoc est ut sciat se ipsum.*

THE DIFFUSION OF THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE CABALA IN ENGLISH LITERATURE*

By JOSEPH L. BLAU

I

LITERATURE is an extremely valuable tool of historical research because of its responsiveness to the "winds of doctrine," to the intellectual climate of its age. Like a weather-vane, literature shifts its direction as often as a new idea or pattern of ideas comes into favor. This is true even when literature is narrowly defined as *belles lettres*; it is, however, even more noticeable when literature is conceived as including the entire body of written contributions to culture.

For the purpose of this study, a broad definition of literature is most valuable. Inasmuch as there is no precise point at which literature, in the narrow sense, begins, and mere writing ends, any distinction we might make would be subjective. In avoiding subjectivity here, anything published in the English language will be considered as English literature.

We are going to observe how the study of literature can lead to conclusions about religion; more specifically, we will trace the fate of the attempt made by some Christian thinkers of the Renaissance to build a new defense of Christianity on the basis of Hebrew Cabalistic teachings. We will follow the course of Cabalistic thought among the Christians from its beginnings in inspiration to its conclusions in cliché, from a shining new truth to a somewhat shopworn theosophical truism.

II

It is essential to develop a clear-cut definition of Cabalism for this study. The association of Cabalism with the lunatic fringe of theosophical thought, and its disrepute among the rationalistic Jewish

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historians of the nineteenth century, have combined to prevent such a clear definition from being formulated, until very recently.¹

First, we must dispel one cloud which has been used to befog the issue. Indefinable as any form of mystical thought must seem to its adherents, it is possible for the historian, who has the advantage of perspective, to define any given form of mysticism without doing violence to the beliefs of the mystics. To the general aids to definition which have been stated frequently, I should like to add the precautionary statement that mystical belief arising within any religious tradition tends to develop in the same directions as the religion itself.² We will not find in Jewish mysticism any sense of the "itinerary of the mind to God" which has been declared a characteristic of Christian mysticism. We will find that Jewish mysticism is concerned primarily with the nature of God and His creation, the sanctity of Scriptures, and the conditions of immortality.

The heart of Jewish mysticism is the effort to reconcile the contradiction between an impersonal God and His personal manifestations. The natural mythology of the Jew shows us a God who is Immanent; prophetic theology, as stabilized into dogmatic formulation by the Pharisees, presents a God supremely Eminent. The somewhat naïve Palestinian mind found no difficulty in reconciling a God who was transcendent with a God who concerned Himself in Jewish affairs. The concept of the Jews as a Chosen People, the descriptions of Abraham as the Friend of God, and of Moses seeing God face to face while the people waited at the foot of the mountain, show what simple devices were used in early Palestinian approaches to the problem. Even in the relatively sophisticated setting of the Book of Job, God appears both transcendent and immanent. Not until the Jew was placed in a philosophically keener environment did the reconciliation of the two concepts of God by reason rather than faith become necessary.

From the time of Philo of Alexandria, who, though Jewish to the

1. Cf. Gerhard G. Scholem, "Philosophy and Jewish Mysticism," in *The Review of Religion*, 11 (1937-38), 385-402. I have followed Scholem's definition closely. The remainder of this introductory discussion is based on the more fully elaborated survey in my forthcoming book, *The Diffusion of the Christian Interpretation of the Cabala*.

2. Aldous Huxley caught this truth in his essay, "Francis and Grigory," in the volume *Do What You Will*, p. 154: "That the Khlysty were *Christian* heretics is unfortunate. For it meant that all their thinking was done in terms of the orthodoxy from which they differed."

core, was trained in Greek philosophy, these reconciliations have been elaborated along the lines of various theories of emanation. These differ greatly in detail, but are similar in their general patterns. Emanation theory is central to Cabalistic thought in the form of the doctrine of the Sephiroth. As the first element in our definition of Cabalism, therefore, we must place the reconciliation of the transcendent and immanent aspects of God by means of the doctrine of the Sephiroth.

Further, to the Jew, any form of religious life has to be based on the absolute sanctity of the Scriptures. But it is obvious to even the casual reader that the Scriptures contain much material which can by no stretch of the imagination be considered sacred. It is also true, though less obvious, that many laws badly needed in the Jewish communities of the Middle Ages were not provided by the Scriptural codes which had been compiled for use in agricultural Palestine. To make the Scriptures at once more sacred and more effective, the doctrine of literal inspiration of the Scriptures was supplemented by various techniques for deriving from Scriptural words or phrases the new laws which were needed in the Middle Ages. It was thus that the Talmud had grown out of the reinterpretation of the Scriptures in Babylonia and in Palestine.

The Cabalists, maintaining staunchly the Divine inspiration of Scriptures, claimed a dual revelation. At one and the same time, they averred, Moses received the text of Scripture and a technique for interpreting the text. So exhaustive was this technique that by its aid not merely was every word of Scripture fruitful; every syllable, every letter, every punctuation mark, every accent, every elongation or prolongation introduced by the scribes for the creation of a beautiful manuscript was assigned both sanctity and meaning. The second element, then, in our definition of Cabalism is the doctrine that there are two senses of the literally inspired Scriptures, one external and one internal, and that the transition from one to the other can be accomplished by means of the techniques which to so many people spell the whole of Cabalism.

The doctrine of redemption through Messiah, son of David, should be listed as the third important doctrine of Cabalism. Like the two doctrines which have already been discussed, this was held by Jews

long before there was Cabalism. The Cabalists, however, introduced a new and somewhat bitter note, understandable in the light of the oppression under which the Jews were suffering. The Messianic era became not so much a period when the Lion would lie down with the Lamb as a period when all of the enemies of the Jews would be finally vanquished and put to shame. In some senses, the Cabalistic doctrine of redemption is the logical extension of the doctrine of the Jews as the Chosen People.

When the three doctrines of *creation* by emanation, *government* by the implications of a literally inspired Scripture, and *redemption* through a Messiah were united into a coherent system, Cabalism, the source of medieval and modern Jewish mysticism, was born. Whatever the ultimate origin of each of these three doctrines, as Cabalism has been defined here, and as it has existed among the Jews, it is a strictly Jewish system of thought.

III

Within this strictly Jewish system, however, there existed potentially a non-Jewish, and, in some respects, an anti-Jewish system of thought. By relatively simple touches, each of the three major doctrines of Cabalism can be transmuted into a doctrine of Christian Cabalism. For several centuries after Jewish thinkers in Spain and Southern France had developed the Cabalistic system, while Christian thought was limited by the structure developed most fully by Thomas Aquinas, there was little possibility of Christian discovery of the Cabala.

With the beginning of the Renaissance, however, with the expansion in man's horizon which served as prelude to our modern era, new tendencies in thought became evident. The Renaissance, like our own age, was eclectic; the men of the Renaissance refused to limit themselves to any one system of thought, no matter *how* sanctioned or *by whom*. Rather did they insist, as Francis Bacon did in England, that all knowledge was their province. As men of action in the Renaissance explored the earth, to discover new countries, as they explored the skies, to discover a new universe, they explored the world of ideas, to discover new systems. And as they made the new countries into temporal empires, making the ends of the earth their own, they made

the new systems into intellectual empires, making all thought their own. Out of this intellectual ferment arose the Christian discoverers and interpreters of the Cabala.

The system of Thomas Aquinas was based upon the philosophy of Aristotle; among the re-awakened interests of the Renaissance was the study of the philosophy of Plato. The easily recognizable contradictions of these two systems led many to seek a method of reconciling them. Such a reconciliation was a virtual necessity, because Platonic thought appealed to the men of the Renaissance, as it does to most people today, but Aristotelian thought was officially sanctioned by the Church of which these men were more or less devout members.

Toward the end of the fifteenth century, Pico della Mirandola, one of those universal geniuses so common through his era, was led by his Hebrew teachers and friends to study the Cabala. In it he thought he had found the technique of reconciliation for which he and many of his fellows had been searching. By means of the Cabalistic doctrines, he could not only prove the fundamental unity of Platonic and Aristotelian thought; he could even present a new way of affirming the basic dogmas of the Christian religion.

All that had to be done was to substitute the Christian doctrine of the Messiah-Who-Had-Come for the Jewish doctrine of the Messiah-Who-Was-To-Come, to replace the vague future redeemer with Jesus, a concrete redeemer who had already been on earth. Now, there was no problem about the doctrine of literal inspiration of the Scriptures, since the Cabalistic technique for deriving the hidden meanings in the text were equally appropriate for the derivation of Christian implications. The Sephiroth, superficially, at least, presented more of a problem.

As originally stated, the doctrine of the Sephiroth was that the Supreme and One God, the boundless, the limitless, the Ain Soph, by a voluntary retraction or self-limitation, manifested himself in the highest of the Sephiroth, Keter, the Crown. This was not God; it was, however, a manifestation through which God could be seen "as in a glass, darkly."

From Keter, there were three emanations, thus producing a total of four Sephiroth, each of which represented a manifestation of God at a level of grossness further removed from God's sublimity and transcendent Being. Further regression produced the complete system

of ten emanations, of which the last was Malchuth, or the Kingdom. In later Cabalism, the entire group of ten emanations was repeated on four different levels,³ so that there were forty regressions from God to the World. When the Scriptures referred to God as transcendent, it was as the unknowable source of the entire series. When God apparently was treated as immanent, it was actually one of the lower manifestations which was known by man.

The Christian Cabalists, following Pico, made of the three highest Sephiroth, Crown, Wisdom, and Understanding, an added proof of the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Since Pico and the Christian Cabalists used Cabalistic ideas thus in defense of Christian dogma, they were ardent believers in the antiquity of Cabalistic revelation. They gave credence to any legendary or pseudonymous text which tended to throw the origin of Cabalism back into the remote past.

Beside Pico, the most important of the early Christian Cabalists were two Germans, John Reuchlin and Henry Cornelius Agrippa. Reuchlin was one of the leading humanists of the time, and a pioneer in the Christian study of the Hebrew language, which he taught. Through his influence, many of the soberer sort of men, who would not be impressed by the flashy and superficial work of Pico, were led to the serious consideration of Cabalism. His two books on the Cabala were widely read and often reprinted. Agrippa was not the least brilliant of that long list of European minds whose interests have been in the shadier disciplines of magic, alchemy, astrology, and theosophy, rather than in the sciences and the arts. His influence with others of his type assured Cabalistic ideas a wide circulation, and his books gave further currency to these ideas.

Pico, Reuchlin, and Agrippa started an intellectual fad. In their own lifetimes, they could see their ideas spread far and wide across Europe. Very early, partly through the direct influence of Pico on Dean Colet, while the latter was in Italy in the last decade of the fifteenth century, partly through the indirect influence of Reuchlin, whose books reached England early in the sixteenth century, the doctrines of Christian Cabalism were adopted by a few English writers, and Cabalistic ideas became current in England.

3. Many Cabalists did not limit the number of levels, or worlds, to four; cf. G. Scholem's Hebrew articles in *Tarbiz*, II and III (1931) for discussion of the development of the doctrine of multiple worlds.

IV

Thus far, in discussing Christian Cabalism, I have considered it as a phase of the broadening of man's mental horizon during the Renaissance. It has been seen, in Pico's work, as a movement toward the reconciliation of Platonic and Aristotelian thought within a Christian framework. In Reuchlin, it became, in addition, the repository of the lost doctrines of Pythagoras. In Agrippa, it became a form of natural magic.

One other general point remains to be made. Cabalism among the Christians was a factor in the development of the religious reformation out of which the Protestant churches arose. For the study of Cabalism, among Reuchlin's pupils particularly, was spurred by, and was a spur to the study of Hebrew. The increased study of Hebrew led to an increase in the study of the Scriptures in the original, and to a marked and valid dissatisfaction with the official Latin version of the Catholic Church.

So rapid was the development of the Protestant movement that it is obvious that no one cause can explain it. One of its pervasive themes, however, is the need for a Bible which is accurate and available to all. Chillingworth, the English Latitudinarian, or Broad Churchman, expressed this recurrent theme when he said, in the middle of the seventeenth century, "The Bible, the Bible, the Bible alone is the true religion of Protestants." To the extent that the study of the Hebrew Bible was stimulated by Christian study of the Cabala, Cabalism must be assigned a share in the evolution of Protestantism.

We need not, therefore, be surprised to learn that, although for Pico and his followers Cabalism provided a new basis for some of the doctrines of the Catholic Church, one of the most important works in the field of Christian Cabalism was compiled by a Protestant, a follower of Luther, John Pistorius.⁴

Pistorius' scheme was enormous, and although his project was never completed, the first volume was published and its influence was widespread. He contemplated nothing less than the publication of all

4. Johannes Pistorius Nidanus: *Artis Cabalisticæ, hoc est Reconditæ Theologiæ et Philosophiæ Scriptorum Tomus I in quo præter Pauli Ricii Theologicos et Philosophicos libros sunt Latini pene omnes et Hebræorum præstantissimi Scriptores qui artem commentariis suis illustraverunt. Opus omnibus Theologis et occultæ abstrusæque Philosophiæ studiosis pernecessarium et hactenus a clarissimis multis viris magno desiderio expectatum* (Basle, [1587]).

extant Cabalistic works. In the first volume, some of the works of the Christian Cabalists were contained; less than a century had passed since the exploratory work of Pico, and yet the works of the Christian Cabalists could not all be included in a massive folio of 1000 pages. Later volumes were to complete the presentation of the Christian works and then to proceed to the publication of Latin translations of the Hebrew Cabalistic books. The project could only have been conceived in a fantastic ignorance of the number of Hebrew works.

Volume One was, however, widely distributed, and widely read. In New York City, where, for the most part, one is extremely lucky to find single copies of sixteenth century Christian Cabalistic works, there are three copies of Pistorius' Anthology. In almost every seventeenth and eighteenth century catalogue of libraries containing any religious literature, Pistorius is to be found. A recent book on the sixteenth century German Lutheran, Philipp Nicolai,⁵ shows that a part of his doctrine of the creation was drawn from Pistorius' one volume. The only English writer of the seventeenth century for whose Cabalistic ideas definite sources are traceable is Sir Thomas Browne. One of these sources is Pistorius.⁶

I have placed a great deal of emphasis on Pistorius. Since his work was not original, it is possibly far more than he deserves. I have done so for two reasons: to illustrate further the wide diffusion of this phase of Jewish culture in its new Christian dress, and to indicate what I consider to be one of the most important sources of Cabalistic ideas in England. For among the works collected by Pistorius are Reuchlin's two works on the Cabala, and the most influential of Pico's Cabalistic ideas, in the form of selections from his 900 theses.

V

Although theosophically-minded scholars are addicted to the belief that knowledge of Cabalistic ideas was limited to a few great souls, Mahatmas of English literature,⁷ I maintain that some knowledge of the Cabala was one factor in the background of a great many educated

5. Martin Lindstrom, *Philipp Nicolais Kristendomstolkning* (Stockholm, 1937). Chapter III.

6. Joseph L. Blau, "Browne's Interest in Cabalism," in *PMLA*, XLIX (1934), 963-64.

7. E.g., Denis Saurat, *Literature and the Occult Tradition* (New York, 1930), and other works of the same author.

Englishmen of the later sixteenth and all through the seventeenth century. This knowledge is revealed in two ways. The simpler type consists of references indicating that the writer had heard of the Cabala. The type more difficult to discover, and rarer in occurrence, is that in which Cabala has made some difference in the thinking of the writer.

I have already mentioned that Dean Colet, while in Italy, learned something of the Cabala from his contact with Pico della Mirandola. The results of this appeared not in his English writings, but in his Latin work on the Hierarchies of Dionysius.⁸ His interest persisted, and some time later, we find Colet reproaching his friend, Erasmus, in a letter, for having sent a copy of Reuchlin's second book, *On the Cabalistic Art*, to John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, rather than to him.⁹

Fisher, in his English sermons,¹⁰ used Reuchlin's book to good advantage. In several places he selects ideas which he describes as Cabalistic to present to his auditors.¹¹ To Bishop Fisher, then, goes the credit for being the first writer in English to be touched by the Cabala.

A rather unusual piece of literature provides us with our next example of Cabalistic material in English. A Frenchman named Giles Du Guez was attached to the court of Henry VIII as French tutor to the Princess Mary. Among his other teaching devices was the preparation of a series of brief moral dialogues in French, with a literal English translation between the lines. As in all interlinear translations, one language or the other suffers. Here it is the English which

8. These treatises remained in manuscript until 1869, when they were published at London, with introduction, translation, and notes by J. H. Lupton.

9. Samuel Knight, *The Life of Dr. John Colet . . . and Several Original Papers relating to the said Life* (London, 1724), pp. 319-20. The letter reads, in part (the translation is my own): ". . . I'm mad at you for another reason, too; you sent Reuchlin's book on Cabala to Rochester, and not to me. Not that I wouldn't want it sent to him; but that I wish you had sent one to me at the same time. . . ."

"That book came into my hands first, and it was read by me before it was given to Rochester. I dare not evaluate the book. I know my own ignorance and how blind I am about matters so remote and powers of such strength. As I read, however, much of it seemed to me to be greater miracles of words than of deeds. . . . Erasmus, my friend, of books and of knowledge there is no end."

10. *The English Works of John Fisher Bishop of Rochester* (Born, 1459; Died, June 22, 1535). Now first collected by John E. B. Mayor. Part 1 (London, 1876). (Early English Text Society. Extra Series. No. xxvii).

11. E.g., pp. 332, 335-36.

is tortured. This volume contains a dialogue on the soul, in the course of which, after the assertion is made that God is "uncomprehensible," Giles says, from Reuchlin,

Trewly, madame, ye saye truthe, neverthelesse that the scripture wytnessed that Moyses by the graunt of God dyd merit to se his posterioritie, the which is to understande his workes, of the which knowlege the cabalystes doth make fyftie gates that they name of intelligence, sayeng that the sayd Moyse had nat but fourty and nyne, by cause that the first is to knowe God from the begynnyng which is impossible.¹²

Reuchlin had gone on to say that it was impossible for any man, even Moses, to know God from the beginning, but that to Jesus, who was both God and man, it was possible. Jesus, therefore, according to Reuchlin, was master of all fifty gates. The entire subject of the fifty gates of intelligence and the thirty-two paths of wisdom is a phase of the elaboration of the doctrine of the Sephiroth and received much attention from Reuchlin.

We have seen signs of Cabalism now in a teacher and a preacher; next we come to the philosophers. Everard Digby was an English writer whose major claim to attention was his opposition to the humanistic logic of Peter Ramus.¹³ In his original works, Digby presented a mystical philosophy based in large part on Reuchlin's Cabalistic books.¹⁴

In 1583, Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, published a book called *A Defensative against the Poyson of supposed Prophecies*. In one chapter of this book he describes the "Cabalistic arte" as a technique for deriving the

Secret Sence or Mystery of expounding Scripture . . . not to divine of things to come, but to interpret and expounde the letter of the law, where the meaning was ambiguous. . . . Another kinde of mystery they had likewise, which consisted either in resolving words of one sentence and

12. *An Introductorye for to lerne to speke French trewly, compyled for the right high, excellent and most vertuous lady, the Lady Mary of England, doughter to our most gracious soverayn lorde, Kyng Henry the Eight*. Published by F. Génin, *L'Eclaircissement de La Langue Francaise par Jean Palsgrave suivi de la Grammaire de Giles Du Guez* (Paris, 1852), pp. 1057-58.

13. Everard Digby, *De duplici Methodo Libri duo, unicum P. Rami methodum refutantes* (London, 1580).

14. Cf., Digby, *Theoria analytica viam ad Monarchiam Scientiarum demonstrans* (London, 1579); J. Freudenthal, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der englischen Philosophie,' in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, LV (1891), 452-77; and C. F. M. Remusat, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre* (Paris, 1875), I, 196.

letters of one word that were united; or uniting letters of one word, or words of one sentence that were dissevered.¹⁵

This description Northampton introduced to explain the valid uses of Cabalistic art. It serves, however, as an excellent illustration of the second doctrine in our definition of Cabala, that the Scripture should be taken as literally inspired, provided that the proper technique of interpretation is used. The noble Lord goes on to complain against an unwarranted use of Cabalistic arts, and thereby indicates to us the currency of Cabalistic ideas. He says:

I declaine against the follies of the foolish Jewes of this time, and some other giddy cock-braynes of our own, which by the resolution or transporting of letters, sillables, and sentences, are not ashamed to profess the finding out of secret destinies, that hang over all the States and Kingdoms within Europe.¹⁶

As a religious device, Northampton admits the value, and, by implication, accepts the results of Cabalistic techniques of interpreting the Scriptures; he balks, as we should, too, at magic, divination, and prophecy.

More specifically Christian is the Reverend Henry Smith, who declared, about 1590, that

Rabbi Hacadosh¹⁷ proveth by art cabalistical out of many places of Scripture not only that the mother of the Messiah shall be a Virgin, but also that her name shall be Mary. Like as the same Rabbi Hacadosh proveth by the same art out of many texts of Scripture that the Messiah's name at his coming shall be Jesus.¹⁸

No good Christian could conceivably balk at accepting such results; time and again Cabalistic techniques were used by Reuchlin to prove just such statements.¹⁹ It is small wonder that many who knew little of the Jews knew much of the Cabala.

In his book, *Literature and the Occult Tradition*, and in many

15. Northampton, *A Defensative against the Poyson of Supposed Prophecies* (London, 1620), pp. 94 a-b.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 94 b.

17. Considering the low estate of Hebrew studies, it should surprise none that the phrase, *Rabbenu Hakkadosh*, meaning our holy teacher, was interpreted as a proper name.

18. Henry Smith, "God's Arrow against Atheism and Irreligion," in *Works including Sermons, Treatises, Prayers and Poems* (Edinburgh, 1876). II, 381-82.

19. E.g., Johannes Reuchlin, *de Verbo Mirifico Libri Tres*, Book III, Chap. 20 (In Pistorius: *op cit.*, pp. 978-79).

articles, Professor Denis Saurat maintains that Edmund Spenser, author of the *Faerie Queene*, was influenced by the Cabala. This claim rests chiefly upon Spenser's personification of wisdom as Sapience (the Latin *Sapientia*) in the *Faerie Queene* and in some of his minor poems.²⁰ Wisdom, Chochma, is the second of the Sephiroth, and, in many of the Christian Cabalists, symbolized Jesus. I fear that, in his zeal for occultism, Professor Saurat has gone beyond the evidence.

The context in which Sapience occurs is invariably one involving Greek and Roman Gods and Demigods, nymphs, and other mythological creatures. No attempt is made to relate the figure of Sapience to the Christian tradition. There are, it is true, mystical passages in Spenser; these, however, are always described as parts of dreams, which is a device foreign to Cabalistic thinkers, and of frequent occurrence in medieval allegorical poetry. These very mystical passages are a strong argument against the attribution of Cabalism to Spenser's work. Perhaps the strongest argument is, however, the nature of Spenser's thought. If his expression of these thoughts does not belie his interests, it must be recognized that Spenser was little concerned with theology or philosophy, and much concerned with the political and social life of his day. Despite his talents, Spenser was chiefly concerned with temporal affairs rather than with general ideas.

Sir Philip Sidney and the great Elizabethan translator, Arthur Golding, produced an English version of the French work on the truth of the Christian religion by Philip de Mornay. Not only does this work contain many references, at second hand, to Hebrew Cabalistic works, but it also contains a complete section on "The Cabala by the report of Picus Earle of Mirandula."²¹

To complete the tale of the sixteenth century, one figure remains to be mentioned. Thomas Nashe, playwright, poet, picaresque novelist, and pamphleteer, knew of the Cabalistic arts, and did not approve of them. In his work called "Christ's Tears over Ierusalem," following closely the attitude of Agrippa's depressed and pessimistic tract on

20. Denis Saurat, "La Sapience de Spenser et la Schekhina de la Cabale," in *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, VI (1926), 5-15.

21. *A Worke Concerning the Trewnesse of the Christian Religion written in French . . . by Philip of Mornay*. (English translation by Sir Philip Sidney and Arthur Golding, London, 1604), pp. 533 ff. Cf. also pp. 71-73, 437, 474, 483, and the unpagged Preface to the Reader.

The Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences, Nashe declared that Jerusalem was unfit to judge of the Messiah, and that she had made of Scripture "a too-too compounding Cabalisticall substance" by encouraging and accepting too great a variety of commentaries.²²

Thus far, as we have seen, Cabala is part of the background of many writers in many different fields. It enters into the thought of these writers to varying degrees. The writers who have been described and quoted can hardly be called Cabalists; their acceptance of certain ideas out of Cabalism was an accident of their times, not an intrinsic part of the character of their thought.

VI

The highest point of Cabalistic influence upon the writers of England came during the seventeenth century. This was, in many ways, logical, because many of the problems which had been under consideration in Europe during the previous century did not become important in England until the seventeenth century. The full effect of the Renaissance did not reach England until the Elizabethan age, and persisted there until the Restoration.

In Cabalistic interest, the century begins with Robert Fludd whose so-called *Mosaicall Philosophy* is an amplification of Agrippa's Cabalism. Fludd was, in some respects, akin to Pico, in that he tried to reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies. His attempt to do this was based upon the identification of the ten spheres of Aristotelian cosmology with the ten Sephiroth, which are obviously Platonic—i.e., Neo-Platonic—in character. The false etymological relation between the Greek σφαῖρα and the Hebrew Sephirah caused others besides Fludd to go astray.²³

Since the Aristotelian spheres had already become part of the astrological tradition, Fludd's identification brought the Sephiroth directly into astrological theory and practice. Much of the attachment of the theosophically minded, particularly in eighteenth century Germany, to Cabalism is traceable to this relation with astrology.

22. Thomas Nashe, *Collected Works* (ed. McKerrow, London, 1904), II, 80.

23. Robert Fludd, *Mosaicall Philosophy, grounded upon the Essentiall Truth or Eternal Sapience* . . . (London, 1659); cf. also Fludd's Latin works, *Sophiae cum Moria Certamen* . . . , especially Book IV; and *Summum Bonum, Quod est Verum Subjectum Verae Magiae, Cabalae, Alchymiae* . . . , both published Frankfurt a.M., 1629.

Another whose Cabalistic thinking followed that of Agrippa was Thomas Vaughan, for whom Cabalism was a phase of alchemy. The ten Sephiroth he regarded as ten secret principles of alchemy, of which the first is a Spirit, the second, the Voice of that Spirit, and the third, another Spirit arising out of the union of the first Spirit and its Voice, the fourth is water, the fifth and sixth, fire and air.²⁴ When any non-Jewish occultist, theosophist, alchemist, astrologer, or magician used the Cabala, he outdistanced by far the Jewish believers. Vaughan's Spirit, Voice, and product Spirit, equated with the first, second, and third Sephiroth, are obviously related also to the Trinity, as well as to his alchemical speculations.

Somewhat more respectably placed in the philosophical tradition were the Cambridge Platonists, some of whom concerned themselves with the Cabalism of Pico as well as with his Platonism. The most important of these was Henry More. It is noteworthy that his first interest in the Cabala was that of a good Christian; he regarded Cabalism as a fitting instrument for the conversion of both Jews and Pagans. More published an exposition of his views on the Cabala in a work expounding the first three chapters of Genesis from three different points of view, literal, philosophical, and moral.²⁵ His philosophical Cabala is established on the basis of the symbolic values of the numbers up to 10 in creation. Thus creation is grounded in 10, which is the number of the Sephiroth.

Even the stern old Bishop, Jeremy Taylor, was interested in More's Cabalistic ideas. He urged More, through their mutual friend Anne, Viscountess Conway, to continue his studies.²⁶ Thus we can see that it is not only among believers in Cabalism that we may find evidence of the theological and philosophical interest in the Cabala. This interest was far more widespread than has been credited.

Ralph Cudworth, another of the Cambridge Platonists, in his book called *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, maintained that behind all superstition, idolatry, and paganism there lies hidden the doctrine of monotheism; civilized man, he says, has always worshipped

24. Cf. *The Works of Thomas Vaughan*, edited by A. E. Waite (London, 1919), p. 171.

25. Henry More, *A Conjectural Essay of Interpreting the Mind of Moses according to a Threefold Cabbala, viz., Literal, Philosophical, Mystical, or Divinely Moral* (London, 1662).

26. Marjorie Nicolson, *Conway Letters* (London, 1930), p. 218.

one God. The threefold nature of this one God he declares to have been a divine Cabal, or revelation. He cites from many authorities to establish his thesis, and shows considerable familiarity with Cabalistic literature.²⁷ Other lesser Cambridge Platonists, such as Anne Conway,²⁸ John Smith,²⁹ and George Keith were also interested in the Cabala. It has been shown that Keith was led to desert his Quaker affiliations by his reading of More's Cabalistic work.³⁰

A large part of the interest of this group in Cabalism was induced by the activities of that wandering scholar and physician, John Baptist Von Helmont, whose own Cabalistic ideas came chiefly from Agrippa. Through Von Helmont, then, the Cambridge Platonists may be considered as part of the tradition of Agrippa in Christian Cabalism.

Thus far, in treating the seventeenth century, I have referred only to writers who were deeply affected by Cabalism, and who might, with reservations, be described as Cabalists. A far larger group shows discernible traces of Cabalism, but does not seem to have been greatly affected by its ideas. Among writers of prose, Sir Thomas Browne, distinguished author of the *Religio Medici* and other works, should be mentioned first. He knew and described the system of the Sephiroth, and was familiar, too, with the number symbolism of Cabala, having derived most of his information from Pico and his followers.³¹ One recent biographer finds a great similarity between Browne's highly personal mysticism, as expressed in *Religio Medici*, and the general outlines of Cabalistic thought.³²

Francis Bacon uses the word Cabala in both a popular and a scholarly sense. In his *New Atlantis*, he tells us that the old Jew conceived "that Moses by a secret cabala ordained the laws of Bensalem

27. Cudworth, *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (London, 1820). Vol. IV, Chap. 1; cf. also Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

28. For an analysis of Anne Conway as a philosopher influenced by Cabalism; cf. Nicolson, *op. cit.*, *Introduction*, p. xxv; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 454, where the lady is shown to be a synthesist of Cartesianism and Cabalism in order "to find a way of thought which should make consistent the Christian religion and the new science of the century."

29. John Smith, "A Discourse Concerning the True Way of Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge," in E. T. Campagnac, *The Cambridge Platonists*. (Oxford, 1901), p. 97, etc.

30. M. Nicolson, "George Keith and the Cambridge Platonists," in *Philosophical Review*, xxxix (1930), especially p. 52.

31. Blau, "Browne's Interest in Cabalism," p. 964.

32. W. P. Dunn, *Sir Thomas Browne: A Study in Religious Philosophy* (Menasha, Wis., 1926), pp. 97 ff.

which they now use."³³ In *The Advancement of Learning*, however, the same author associates Cabala with a Paracelsan attempt to find "the truth of all natural philosophy in the scriptures"; this "philosophical or physical" interpretation, which has been "received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists" is "to be confined with a noli altum sapere, sed time."³⁴

Robert Burton had read practically everything, and he remembered all he had read. His *Anatomy of Melancholy* inevitably contains a few slight references to Cabalism.³⁵ Thomas Herbert, whose record of his travels in Persia is a classic of its type, occasionally uses the word Cabala as a synonym for secret tradition.³⁶ Henry Reynolds, the literary critic, author of *Mythomistes*, used, in that book, many Cabalistic ideas derived from Reuchlin.³⁷

John Owen, the well-known divine, often selected to serve as official apologist and refuter of heresy,³⁸ assails Cabalistic speculations as vain. In many, he says, skill and knowledge in the interpretation of the Scripture

hath been accompanied with a noxious profane curiosity. Every tittle and apex shall give them occasion for fruitless conjectures, as vain, for the most part, as those of the cabalistical Jews.³⁹

Other evidences of information about the Cabala among the clergy can be found in the work of John Brinsley⁴⁰ and Archbishop John Tillotson.⁴¹

33. Francis Bacon, *The New Atlantis*. Printed with Bacon's *Sylva Sylvarum* (London, 1631), pp. 24-25.

34. Bacon, *Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning*. . . (Oxford, 1640), p. 474.

35. Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (edited by Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith, New York, 1938), p. 381, etc.

36. Thomas Herbert, *Travels in Persia 1627-1629* (New York, 1929), pp. 134, 191.

37. Henry Reynolds, *Mythomistes*, in Joel Spingarn, *Critical Essays of the 17th Century* (Oxford, 1908-9). I, 141-79.

38. E.g., his "refutation" of the views expressed in the anti-trinitarian catechism of John Biddle, published at the request of the Council of State, *Vindiciae Evangelicae Or the Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined in the Consideration and Confutation of a Catechism written by J. Biddle, M.A.* (London, 1655).

39. Owen, *The Causes, Ways and Means of Understanding the Mind of God, as revealed in his word* . . . in *Works of John Owen, D. D.*, edited by Thomas Russell (London, 1826), III, 491.

40. John Brinsley, *The Christians Cabala, or, Sure Tradition: Necessary to be Known and Believed, By all that will be Saved* . . . (London, 1662), pp. 13-14.

41. John Tillotson, "The Rule of Faith," in *Works* (London, 1696), pp. 750-53.

Thomas Godwyn, too, of the scholarly writers on religious subjects refers to the Cabala in his *Moses and Aaron*. He recognizes the various forms of alphabetical transposition and other techniques of scriptural interpretation.⁴² Other scholars wrote in Latin, so that we must exclude them from this survey even though their position in English letters was established by other works.⁴³

Of the poets, all the "metaphysical" poets seem to be in the line of Cabalism. Donne, Herbert, Henry Vaughan, Crashaw, and Traherne all show signs of what may be Cabalistic influence. But it is hard to make categorical statements about them for, as Marjorie Nicolson said,

Cabbalism as a form of thought permeates much seventeenth century literature; it is as impossible to separate it sharply from other ideas of a particular author as it is to define exactly the particular brand of Platonism he held. By the seventeenth century, Cabbalism had become so fused and intermingled with other ways of thinking that we look for it less in defined doctrine and creed than in an attitude toward a question.⁴⁴

Now, if this "attitude" of which Professor Nicolson speaks is to be distinguished from the general trend of Platonic mysticism, it can only be on the basis of the emphasis on ethical conduct as a guide along the paths toward a transcendent God. This is a common attitude in the metaphysical poets; perhaps it is not strange that it is most strongly emphasized in Henry Vaughan, brother of that Thomas Vaughan whose Cabalistic work has already been discussed.

Thomas Vaughan, in his prose, related the Sephirotic system to Jacob's ladder;⁴⁵ Jacob's ladder is a favorite image in the verses of Henry Vaughan. Henry often compares himself with Jacob dreaming

42. Thomas Godwyn, *Moses and Aaron: Civil and Ecclesiastical Rites used by the Ancient Hebrews* (9th ed., London, 1667), p. 169.

43. E.g., John Selden, *De Jure Naturali et Gentium Juxta Disciplinam Ebraeorum Libri Septem* (Strassburg, 1665), p. 327; and John Spencer (Dean of Ely Cathedral and Prefect of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge), *De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus et Earum Rationibus*. . . (The Hague, 1686), I, 164. Here, too, should be mentioned Thomas Burnet, *Archaeologiae Philosophicae, sive Doctrina Antiqua de Rerum Originibus* (2d ed., London, 1728), in which an entire critical chapter is devoted to the Cabala.

44. Nicolson, "Milton and the *Conjectura Cabalistica*," in *Philological Quarterly*, VI (1927), 1 f.

45. E.g., Vaughan, *Works*, pp. 169-70. "Here we find two extremes—Jacob is one, at the foot of the ladder, and God is the other, Who stands above it. . . . The rounds or steps in the ladder signify the middle nature, by which Jacob is united to God."

and seeing the ladder stretching to heaven. He seems, too, to be referring directly to the Ain Soph of the Cabalists when he says:

There is in god, some say,
A deep, but dazzling darkness; as men here
Say it is late and dusky, because they
See not all clear.
Oh for that night! where I in him
Might live invisible and dim!⁴⁶

These indications of Cabalistic knowledge and influence on poets and writers of prose tend to prove that the ideas of the Cabalists were widely diffused in seventeenth century England. Possibly, however, the clearest evidence of this diffusion is that, in *Hudibras*, Samuel Butler satirizes the Cabala. Ralph, he says

became infallible,
As three or four legg'd oracle,
The ancient cup a modern chair;
Spoke truth point blank, though unaware.
For mystic learning wondrous able
In magic talisman or Cabal,
Whose primitive tradition reaches,
As far as Adam's first green breeches.

and so on, bringing Agrippa and Fludd, Jakob Boehme, and the Rosicrucians into the satire.⁴⁷

Thus far, I have not discussed John Milton's relation to Cabalistic ideas, although this relation was the starting point of my own investigation. For, in all of the books of Professor Denis Saurat, Milton is described as a Cabalist.⁴⁸ The basis of this description is a false analysis of the nature of the Cabala. Professor Saurat gained his picture of the Cabala from modern occultism—from the Eliphas Levi type of Theosophy which takes all the astrological, Masonic, Rosi-

46. Henry Vaughan, *Sacred Poems and Pious Ejaculations* (London, 1891). From "The Night," p. 213. For the Jacob images at their finest, cf. "Jacob's Pillar and Pillow," pp. 219-221. Vaughan also speaks of the Holy Scriptures, p. 88, in these words:

"In thee the hidden stone, the Manna lies;
Thou are the great Elixir, rare and choice;
The Key that opens to all Mysteries,
The Word in Character, God in the Voice."

47. Samuel Butler, *Hudibras* (New York, 1881), pp. 59-62.

48. Especially in Saurat, *Milton, Man and Thinker* (New York, 1925).

crucian, alchemical, and magical strains in European thought and bundles them all together in a package labeled Cabala.⁴⁹

In Saurat's definition, therefore, we find that Cabalism is a metaphysics of light.⁵⁰ For clarification of this statement, we are referred to a passage in one of the minor tractates of the Zohar, where the antagonism between light and darkness is developed. Light and darkness are then amplified into the bisexual character of the universe. From the further development of this concept, Cabalism emerges as a sort of latter-day sun worship.

Next, Saurat goes through Milton's major poems, and tortures a great many of the lines into revealing one type of light-consciousness or another. The conclusion he reaches is that Milton was a Cabalist.

In my opinion, this conclusion is not justified by the evidence. Milton was not a Cabalist. He did, however, know the Cabala of his time; he had, as Dean Nicolson proved, read More's *Conjectures on the Cabala*.⁵¹ He had probably read Pico's *Heptaplus*, a mystical, and, in part, Cabalistic treatise on the seven days of creation, in preparation for the writing of *Paradise Lost*. Most important, Cabalism was in the air.

For example, Milton is using a thought of the Christian Cabalists when he describes Jesus as "the greater man," at the very beginning of the poem; it is a commonplace of the Christian Cabala that Jesus was the Greater Adam. In other places, Milton's description of God resembles closely that "deep but dazzling darkness" of Henry Vaughan.

Perhaps the most clearly Cabalistic of the ideas used by Milton is that of creation by God's voluntary self-limitation. For, if God is omnipresent, either the world is fashioned of God's own substance, which is pantheism, or there must be a retraction of God's substance,

49. In particular, he is dependent upon the inexact translation of the *Zohar* into French by Jean de Pauly. For those unacquainted with the Aramaic of the original, the inaccuracies and theosophical presuppositions of the de Pauly translation can be checked against the excellent recent translation of the main sections of the *Zohar* by Sperling and Simons, published in London by the Soncino Press. Unfortunately, the version of the minor tractates, on which Saurat bases most of his theory, in *The Kabbalah Unveiled*, by the Theosophist, MacGregor Mathers, is, if anything, worse in English than in de Pauly's version.

50. This is precisely what Cabalism is said to be, in a weird, theosophical, pseudo-scientific work by S. Pancoast, *The Kabbala: or, the True Science of Light; An Introduction to the Philosophy and Theosophy of the Ancient Sages* (New York, 1883).

51. Cf. Nicolson, "Milton and the *Conjectura Cabbalistica*."

which must be voluntary and self-imposed, since there is no greater power than God. The alternative is to deny the omnipresence of God by introducing a dualism of spiritual and material substance. As the Church and the Synagogue chose the alternative of dualism, as Spinoza chose that of pantheism, Milton and the Cabalists chose the retraction theory.

All of this, however, does no more than to indicate that Milton is to be classed as one of the many writers of his time to be touched by the prevailing wind. For, in his most personal, detailed theological work, *The Treatise of Christian Doctrine*, there is no trace of Cabalism; if he had been a Cabalist it would have been revealed here. When, however, in his poems on Biblical themes, Milton has to express himself in the language of poetry, in figures of speech, in rhetorical devices, the implications and suggestions drawn from the intellectual climate creep in without hindrance. There is much that suggests Cabalism in Milton's poems, but until the *Treatise of Christian Doctrine* is proved to be a Cabalistic document, Milton cannot be called a Cabalist.

VII

England's seventeenth century Renaissance was followed by a period of rigorous classicism of thought and expression, out of which has emerged an age of science, in which many of the problems to which Cabalism offered one possible solution are outmoded. The climate of ideas has changed, and Cabalism as a living force has disappeared. After the seventeenth century, one looks for Cabalism in isolated individuals rather than in the group.

So, for example, at the close of the eighteenth century in England, there stands the superb and original genius of Blake, to whose work no definite origins can be assigned, but in whose work all mystical trends can be found. When Blake deals with creation in *The Book of Urizen*, the themes of Cabalistic theories of creation are there, just as there is Cabalism in the symbolism of "The Four Zoas." Yet I hesitate to call Blake a Cabalist, because there are so many other elements in his thinking.

Perhaps a great deal can be explained by Blake's enormous regard for Swedenborg. Abelson has proved that there was at least a parallelism between some of Swedenborg's ideas and those Cabalistic ideas

presented in the Zohar.⁵² Thus there exists a strong possibility that those elements in Blake which are Cabalistic may have entered his thought thus indirectly, through Swedenborg.

Another anomaly in the nineteenth century is to be found in the *Festus* of Philip Bailey, a work much regarded in its own time, but forgotten today. Bailey is one of the most matter-of-fact of poets. Mystical flights are foreign to him; much of the theological background of this rewriting of the legend of Faust is Calvinistic. Yet in the midst of this dry Calvinism, we find an enumeration of the Sephiroth:

The crown, the wisdom, the intelligence,
Kindness, and strength and beauty, splendour, worth,
Original and rule. . . .⁵³

Bailey does not describe; he lists. Yet even to find the names in the middle of a page written by this Presbyterian lawyer is a reflection of the persistence of Cabalistic ideas. Here, too, in the use of the definite article before the names of the first three Sephiroth, there is an indication of the distinction Christian Cabalists have always made between these first three Sephiroth, those which could be identified with and personified in the Trinity, and the remaining seven Sephiroth, which are left to stand as indefinite abstractions.

Some few years later, the relation between Cabala and magic was treated by the Reverend Richard Harris Barham, who wrote charmingly under the pen-name of Thomas Ingoldsby, Esq. He suggested that there are three words of power of which one is ABRACADABRA,

For I'm told that most Cabalists use that identical
Word, written thus, in what they call "a Pentacle."⁵⁴

So casual a mention as this has no value except as it shows the name of Cabala being kept alive.

52. Joshua Abelson, "Swedenborg and the Zohar," in *Jewish Chronicle Supplement* (May, 1924), pp. vii-viii. I am indebted to Dr. Marguerite Block for the information that there was a converted Jew who taught the Zohar at the University of Upsala at the time when Swedenborg was in attendance there.

53. Philip James Bailey, *Festus. A Poem* (Boston, 1857), p. 23. This book was originally published in Scotland in 1839; the edition used is the 17th American edition. This may be some indication of the popularity that this almost-forgotten Calvinistic version of the Faust legend enjoyed.

54. Barham, *The Ingoldsby Legends* (Oxford, 1905). From "A Lay of St. Dunstan," p. 137.

It remained for George Eliot to present, not the Cabala but the Cabalist to literature.⁵⁵ Her sensitive intuition pierced the strange exterior of the Jew to discover the soul of the Cabalist, Mordecai, who is the true protagonist of her novel, *Daniel Deronda*. She saw that the essence of the Cabala was the love of God and of his creatures which Deronda learned from his strange teacher. But she can hardly be placed in the tradition of Christian interpreters of the Cabala.

If there are any further survivals of Cabalism in English literature, it is in the unrecognizable form imposed upon Cabalistic ideas by Theosophists and such kindred occultists. W. B. Yeats, for example, claimed to have studied the Cabala. Perhaps what he studied was called Cabala by those from whom he learned it, but there is no trace of Cabalistic thought in his vague mysticism.

So, too, in the works of Madame Blavatsky the word Cabala is used, but its meaning has been forgotten. Anna Kingsford talks of Cabala; Edward Maitland writes of Cabala; Wynn Westcott writes that he has taught Cabalistic doctrines which were never before committed to writing. These modern Theosophists have invented a substance to fill out the word they borrowed from the Jews.

VIII

This study has shown few actual Cabalists among the writers of English literature, but many writers to whom Cabalism was familiar. It is, therefore, less a study in influence than a study in cultural diffusion. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the great intellectual problem of England was the replacement of the Thomistic system. Many were the systems of thought which were tried. Each of these had its brief day of glory, its fanatical expositors, its opponents, its satirists, and its ultimate defeat, as it became evident that these religious systems did not provide what was needed. Each of these systems stands as evidence that the currency of ideas is independent of the ease and rapidity of communication; each reveals the astonishing phenomenon of cultural diffusion.

For Cabalism, specifically, it can be said in summary, that Fludd, Thomas Vaughan, and Henry More were the only Christian Cabalists who wrote in English. But since, thanks to Pico and Reuchlin, Agrippa and Pistorius, Christian Cabalism pervaded the atmosphere of Europe,

55. Cf. her *Daniel Deronda*.

many English writers were touched by its ideas. For a time, indeed, Cabalistic ideas became a part of every Platonic system.

We have seen that the diffusion of Cabalistic ideas nourished the study of Hebrew, and thus served, positively, as a medium for the diffusion of other aspects of Jewish culture. We have seen how the study of Hebrew served as a step in the advancement of the cause of Protestantism. Finally, we have seen that, except in the Theosophical tradition, Cabala dropped out of English literature like a lead plummet, when it became evident that the problems of religion which it might have solved were not the basic problems of the age. Cabala, with its deductive reasoning from assumed premises, was of little avail against the experimental school of thought which started to gather force at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and which has only recently been made to serve a religious end.

Cabalism was an intellectual fad, a day's fashion. Like other fashions, it became outmoded and passed from men's minds. Yet while it possessed men's minds, it did help to familiarize the world with the Jew. Last year's fashions in ideas died with the situations which brought about their use, but in dying helped to build the intellectual life of the future.

KHOMYAKOV AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

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WESTERN THEOLOGIANS have usually treated the subject of the Church from their own angle. They have taken either the Catholic or Protestant points of view, and, if they have had occasion to refer to the Orthodox Church and its attitude on the subject, they have assumed that it coincided closely with one or the other conception, or have tried to invent a compromise between them. To far too many people the Orthodox Church is merely the Roman Catholic Church without the pope, and there has been no attempt to study exactly what the Orthodox themselves have thought. This is the more pardonable, because there is relatively little information available, and the Orthodox have often failed to make their position clear. It may be well, therefore, to glance at the writings of Aleksyey Stepanovich Khomyakov (1804-1860), for he was, in a real sense, one of the first theoreticians of modern Russian Orthodox theology.

The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of intense intellectual activity in Russia. The first passion for Western civilization and forms had passed, and more serious questions as to the significance of Russia and of Europe were being considered. A large number of educated Russians had taken part in the Napoleonic Wars and had acquired a firsthand knowledge of life as it was lived abroad. As a result, they were questioning the Russian mode of life and seeking to adapt what was good from the rest of Europe. Many of these men were little interested in religion and were ready to listen to the agnostic and atheistic theories of the West.

On the other hand, the Orthodox Church, in the persons of some of its leaders, was trying, despite the rigid governmental control, to throw off some of the handicaps that had been imposed by the low level of theological education during the preceding centuries. The influence of scholasticism, which had reached its height at the Council of Jerusalem in 1672, was breaking, and a renewed study of the Church Fathers was taking its place.

At the same time, there was a growing propaganda in St. Peters-

burg on the part of the Roman Catholics, especially the Jesuits, who for a while maintained a fashionable school in the capital. Such men as Joseph de Maistre visited Russia and lamented that Russia was not Catholic and sharing in the achievements of Catholic civilization. They did win over some of the members of the aristocracy such as Prince I. Gagarin, who later joined the Jesuit order.

Curiously enough, the outstanding example of the Westerners who denounced the civilization of Russia and glorified the culture of the West and the Roman Catholic Church, Peter Yakovlevich Chaadayev, a one-time Guards officer, never joined the Roman Catholic Church. In his *Philosophical Letters*, which appeared in 1836, he set forth the supremacy of the Western Church in no unsparing terms and created such a storm that he was ordered to undergo an examination as to his sanity, after which he made a partial retraction the next year in the *Apology of an Insane Man*.

All these currents must be understood to provide the setting for the Orthodox reaction of the Slavophiles who defended the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian mode of life in general, and blamed the bulk of the evils of the day on the reforms of Peter the Great and the introduction of Western influence. Undoubtedly, the influence of Schelling and other German philosophers played a role in the development of Slavophilism, but many of the leaders were deep students of the Church Fathers and drew their inspiration from them.

Khomyakov was a graduate of the University of Moscow and later was an officer of the Horse Guards. Yet, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1828, his life was uneventful. He took care of his estates, studied, traveled, and appeared constantly in the intellectual gatherings of the day, where he was known as an excellent debater and a skilled antagonist in disputes. He was one of the most highly educated and cultured men of the day, and his ability was admitted even by his opponents.

He was also sincerely devout and, as was unusual for men of his class, he kept all the fasts of the Church. We know, however, very little about his inner life or the process of his intellectual and spiritual growth. He appears before us in his writings in his full stature, and for further information we are dependent upon some passing remarks by his friend, Yury Th. Samarin.

Of his writings there is only one which expresses his general views

on the Church in a systematic way. That is his *Attempt at a Catechetical Exposition of the Church*, commonly referred to as *On the Church*, although there is reason to believe that Khomyakov wished the title *One Church*. It was probably written in the forties and was his first theological work. It was, however, first printed after his death, although he showed it during his lifetime to some of his friends.

Khomyakov begins his treatise with the statement of the principle that underlies all of his thought:

The unity of the Church follows necessarily from the unity of God, for the Church is not a multitude of persons in their personal separation, but the unity of the Divine grace, living in the multitude of reasonable created beings subject to grace.

Grace is given to the disobedient, who do not use it (who bury the talent), but they are not in the Church. The unity of the Church is not assumed, not metaphorical, but true and existing, as the unity of the many members in the living body.

The church is one, in spite of its evident division for a man who is still living on the earth. Only in relation to man, is it possible to acknowledge the division of the Church into the visible and the invisible; its unity is one and unconditional. He who is living on the earth, he who has completed the earthly course, he who is not created for the earthly path (as the angels), he who has not yet begun the earthly path (future generations), all are united in one Church—in one Divine grace; for the still unmanifested creation of God is manifest to Him, and God hears the prayers and knows the faith of him whom He has not yet called from non-being into being. The Church, the Body of Christ, is manifested and fulfilled in time, without changing its fundamental unity and its inner life of grace. Therefore, when we say, "the visible and invisible Church," we speak only in relation to man.

The visible or earthly Church lives in complete communion and unity with the whole body of the Church, the head of which is Christ. It has Christ abiding in itself and the grace of the Holy Spirit in all their living fulness, but not in the fulness of their manifestations; for it acts and knows not fully, but so much as is agreeable to God.

Since the earthly and visible Church is not yet the fulness and completion of the whole church, to which the Lord has assigned to appear at the final judgment of all creation, it acts and knows only in its limits, without judging the rest of humanity (according to the words of the Apostle Paul to the Corinthians) and only acknowledging as separated, i.e., not belonging to it, those who have separated themselves from it. The rest of humanity, whether strange to the Church, or bound to it by bonds which God has not deigned to reveal to it, it leaves to the judgment of the great day. The earthly Church judges only itself, by the grace of the spirit and by the freedom given to it through Christ, calling all the rest of humanity

to unity and to the Divine adoption in Christ; but over those who do not hear its call, it passes no judgment, knowing the command of its Savior and Head, "Not to judge another servant" (*One Church*, II, 3 f.).

This passage must be taken in its full significance, if we are to understand the arguments of Khomyakov. Like most of the Orthodox Fathers of the Church, he accepts as a real and almost tangible fact the unity of the Church visible and invisible. The earthly Church as a part of the complete Church shares with the larger body "inner sanctity, which does not permit any admixture of falsehood, for the spirit of truth lives in it; and in external changelessness, for Christ, its Guardian and Head, is unchanging" (*op. cit.*, p. 4).

It is on this basis that Khomyakov seeks to build his entire argument as to the Church. His task is to combine this hypothesis with the visible Church as it appears to the world. He admits frankly that these principles are unintelligible to those who are not members of the Church, for they see

an external change of rite as a change of the Spirit Itself Which is glorified in the rite (as for example, in the transition of the Old Testament Church into that of the New Testament, or in the change of rites and ecclesiastical institutions from the apostolic times. . . . The Church and its members know, by the inner knowledge of the faith, the unity and unchangeableness of its spirit, which is the spirit of God. The external and uncalled people see and know the change of the external rite by external knowledge, which does not attain the internal, as the very unchangeableness of God seems to them changeable, in the changes of His creations (*op. cit.*, p. 4).

For a still closer definition of the qualities of the Church, Khomyakov quotes the Nicene Creed, One, Holy, *sobornaya* (Catholic and universal) Apostolic (*op. cit.*, p. 5). As a result of these qualities, it must not be supposed that

any one community of Christians could express the teachings of the Church or give to the church teaching a dogmatical interpretation without the consent of the other communities; still less is it supposed that any community or pastor could prescribe its interpretation to others. The grace of faith is inseparable from sanctity of life, and no community and no pastor can be acknowledged as the guardians of the whole faith, as no pastor, no community can be considered representatives of the whole sanctity of the Church. On the other hand, every Christian community, without ascribing to itself the rights of dogmatic interpretation or teaching has fully

the right to change its rites, to introduce new ones, without leading into error, other communities (*op. cit.*, p. 6).

The Holy Spirit, living in the Church, guiding it and enlightening it, appears in it in diverse forms, in writing, in tradition, and in action; for the Church which does the works of God, is the same Church which guards the tradition and wrote the writings. It is not the persons or the multitude of persons in the Church which guard the tradition and write, but the Spirit of God, living in the whole body of the Church. Therefore it is impossible and wrong to seek in the writings the basis of tradition or in tradition the proofs of the writings, or in the acts justification for the writings and the tradition. He who is living outside the Church cannot understand the writings, the tradition, or the acts. For him who is within the Church and is participant in the spirit of the Church, their unity is evident by the grace which dwells in it (*op. cit.*, pp. 6 f.).

The external unity is a unity manifested in the communion of the sacraments; the inner unity is a unity of the spirit. Many have been saved (e.g., some martyrs) who have never shared one of the sacraments of the Church (even Baptism), but no one can be saved who has not shared the inner sanctity of the Church, its Faith, Hope, and Love; for not acts save, but Faith (*op. cit.*, p. 18).

It is necessary to understand that not faith and not hope and not love, saves (for does faith in reason save, or hope in the world, of love for the flesh?) but the object of faith saves. If you believe in Christ, you are saved by Christ in Faith; if you believe in the Church, you are saved by the Church; if you believe in the sacraments of Christ, you are saved by them; for Christ is our God, in the Church and in the sacraments. The Old Testament Church was saved by Faith in the coming Redeemer. Abraham was saved by the same Christ as we. He had Christ in hope and not in joy. Therefore he who wishes baptism is baptized in desire; he who has received baptism has baptism in joy. One and the same faith save both in baptism (*op. cit.*, p. 20).

Christ does all good in us (*op. cit.*, p. 25).

By the will of God, after many schisms and the defection of the Roman patriarchate, the Church was preserved in the Greek dioceses and patriarchates, and they only can consider themselves fully Christian who maintain unity with the eastern patriarchates or enter into this unity. For there is one God and one Church, and there is in it no division or diversity of thought (*op. cit.*, p. 26).

This is an outline of the thought of Khomyakov, who amplifies many details in his polemical writings, especially *Some Words of an Orthodox Christian on Western Confessions of Faith with Regard to the Pamphlet of M. Laurentie* (1853), *Some Words of an Orthodox*

Christian on Western Confessions of Faith with Regard to a Circular Letter of the Archbishop of Paris (1855), and *Some Words of an Orthodox Christian on Western Confessions of Faith with Regard to Various Latin and Protestant Works on the Articles of Faith* (1858). These were published in French without the name of Khomyakov, under the pen-name, The Unknown. There is also his correspondence with William Palmer between the years 1844 and 1854, in which Khomyakov and Palmer discussed various aspects of the Anglican and Orthodox Churches. The series ends when Palmer entered the Roman Catholic Church. These were written in English. There are some minor writings, such as his letter to the Archbishop of Utrecht, and a letter to the editor of *L'Union Chrétienne* on the words *Katholichesky* and *Soborny*.

All these works refer quite definitely to his views of the Church and amplify and explain much that he presents summarily in his Russian sketch. They, therefore, allow us to fill out the material which he has already given us and to see that in his works he ascribes to all of his words their maximum significance.

Thus, the Church is the Body of Christ, and it is impossible for a Christian in the full sense of the word to be outside the Church. It is also, in the fullest sense, the Orthodox Church, because that alone through the centuries has maintained the faith as given to the Apostles and is guided by the Holy Spirit. Khomyakov passes no definitive verdict on other groups except in so far as they are outside the Church. He appeals to the Archbishop of Utrecht as an Old Catholic to take the final step toward reconciliation with the Church by formally bringing his flock into communion with the Orthodox Church.

The Holy Spirit, as It guides the man into truth in the Church, leaves him free, but the man himself, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, cannot, in so far as he is a Christian, want anything outside the Church, nor can he use his free reason to disagree with the Church, for in such a case he would be invoking the Holy Spirit to guide him into error. And this is, of course, inconceivable.

Starting with such a basis, Khomyakov sees in free investigation something which is quite different from that which is claimed by the Protestants. There is, in both Orthodoxy and Protestantism, a willingness to recognize the value of free investigation, but the Orthodox believe that

the attempt to penetrate the realm of faith and its mysteries, by carrying before oneself only the candle of reason, is, in the eyes of a Christian, not only criminal but also foolish boldness. Only the light that comes down from heaven and penetrates the whole soul of man can indicate his path; only the power, given by the Divine Spirit, can elevate him to those heights where Deity appears (*Few Words of an Orthodox Christian on Western Confessions of Faith in Regard to the Pamphlet of M. Lorange*, p. 57).

Under these conditions the Holy Spirit has, through the Church, a distinct role in all free investigation, and, as the Church is the free union of the faithful and the Body of Christ, the final decision must be reached through the Church. But Khomyakov emphasizes the fact that this is not to be expressed through any specific verdict of any part of the Church. He goes further, and explicitly repudiates the Roman Catholic division of the Church into the teaching and the learning Church. It is all one, and each man contributes to the whole what the Holy Spirit has given him. In the words of Bishop Inno-kenty, Apostle to the Aleutian Islands, "The bishop is at one and the same time the teacher and the pupil of his entire flock" (*op. cit.*, p. 61). In other words,

The martyr dying for the truth, the judge, judging in truth (not for the sake of people but for the sake of God), the ploughman in his modest toil, constantly lifting his thoughts to his Creator, live and die for the instruction of their brothers, and if there is need, the Spirit of God will place in their lips words of wisdom which no scholar or theologian will find.

Freedom and unity—these are the two distinguishing marks of the Church, and a thinking and intelligent Faith will include both aspects of the Divine truth. No man can ever be sure that he will interpret correctly the ideas of the Holy Spirit. He can never attain to a perfect knowledge, but, in so far as he seriously attempts to act and think in accordance with his lights, he will not be guilty of a sin, and the Holy Spirit will wipe out his errors.

The real gist of the faith is the Nicene Creed, as it was left by the Council of Constantinople, naturally without the Filioque clause, and Khomyakov sees in the insertion of this clause the definite beginning of the schism between the Church and a part of it. When the Pope saw fit to insert the phrase in the Creed on his own authority, he was deliberately and definitely breaking the unity that had previously existed in the Church. By that act, "a whole patriarchate and a whole,

broad world fell away from unity" (p. 49). It was the emphasizing of local tradition in an act of self-will. That destruction of unity had to be justified, and in that justification were born papal infallibility and all the later Roman developments. The Pope had appealed to human reason against the Holy Spirit and tradition. That is exactly what the Protestants did later, and the action of Luther differs in subject matter, but does not differ in essence from the action of the Pope, for the Pope is the first Protestant. Rationalism and self-will created a kingdom of this world in the place of the Christian Church. Khomyakov quotes Newman to the effect that "To believe in a Church is to believe in the Pope" (*op. cit.*, p. 69), and he regards this statement as a definite example of the difference in spirit that the West has introduced in dividing itself from the Orthodox.

The East cannot admit that any man is infallible at any time, for no man can realize and manifest the whole wisdom of the Church or the entire holiness of it. All the papal claims, therefore, are to be rejected in so far as they encourage the organization of a church-state, with its officials, its princes, and all the other paraphernalia of a state.

There is not in the Church this purely hierarchical system, and the final decisions of the Church in all important matters are not to be formulated by the decrees of any one man or council. There can be no external test as to the authenticity of any council. Human weakness might lead to error, and this might seem to involve the Church, but the Holy Spirit is still there to make the necessary corrections. And, therefore, the judgment of the faithful over a period of time will definitely reflect and be stirred by the Holy Spirit to correct anything that is amiss. Hence it can come about that councils which seemed to have all the earmarks of being ecumenical were later soundly repudiated by the Holy Spirit working through the Church. The same can happen in interpretations of the Bible or of canon law.

It is this characteristic that is summed up in the word, *sobornaya* (conciliar), which takes the place of Catholic in the Slavonic Nicene Creed. Khomyakov points out that this word goes back to the time of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and that it is the true equivalent of the Greek word for Catholic (cf. the essay, *On the Meaning of the Words, Katholichesky and Soborny* (pp. 305 ff.)). We may note here also in Slavonic usage the differentiation between the two words *Katholichesky* and *Katolichesky*. The former comes directly from the

Greek and is always used in the sense of Catholic in the English version of the creed. The second, which comes through Polish, regularly means Roman Catholic, and careful writers such as Khomyakov make a distinction which it is difficult to express in English.

In the manifestation of self-will which commenced with the Filioque clause and ended with the declaration of papal infallibility, Khomyakov sees the vital essence of Protestantism, the desire to set up the superiority of individual judgment, whether it be the judgment of a patriarch, a bishop, or a layman; and he sees in the movement of the Reformation a necessary corrective to the exorbitant and exaggerated claims of the papacy, although he regrets that the Reformers did not see fit to merge their individuality in the Church and come back to the original Faith. He is, however, far more tolerant of Protestantism than he is of the Roman Catholic system.

In all these writings, Khomyakov takes a very high view of the Church to which alone he ascribes Christian freedom and Christian unity. At times his very absorption in the reality of the bond between the visible and invisible Church, and his insistence upon the spiritual and underlying significance of the Church, leads him into awkward positions. This is noticeably the case in his correspondence with Palmer, when he is trying to defend or pass over the different rules of the Greek and Russian Churches in regard to the baptism of converts (*op. cit.*, p. 393). Palmer had objected to a difference in the one Orthodox Church (pp. 493 f.), and we must admit that, at this moment, many of his arguments seem clearer than are the answers of Khomyakov.

Florovsky perhaps puts the situation very well:

In the representation of Khomyakov, the self-sufficiency of the Church is shown with such subduing obviousness that its historical activity remains in the shadow. But this least of all indicates "fleshlessness" or "bloodlessness" of theological content. The historical dynamism in the theological structures of Khomyakov is insufficiently felt, not from his serenity of life but from his mystical "over-fullness" and "super-being,"—"not of this world" (*Puti russkago bogosloviya*, p. 273).

That is a true criticism. The teachings of Khomyakov on the Church leave aside all reference to the Church as it is seen in the visible world. The author is interested only in the deep and underlying significance that it must have, if it is to be the Body of Christ,

a free unity of all those people who are being guided by the Holy Spirit Which dwells steadily within the Church and the holiness of Which is the holiness of the Church. Khomyakov clearly differentiates between the Church as it must appear in the sight of God and as it may appear to the limited vision of man. He realizes this contradiction, but to him the real and spiritual values are all that count, and there is no modern thinker who has, with more pains and care, put his finger on the underlying meaning of the Church than did Aleksyey Stepanovich Khomyakov, whose writings are having a steadily increasing influence upon the students and scholars of Orthodox theology, especially in its Russian branch.

COMMUNICATIONS

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

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WHAT IS THE RELATION between Christianity and social philosophy? Does Christianity imply a particular social philosophy in the sense of a general theory of social structure and social change, or is it compatible with any form of social theory? Do the different forms of Christianity have special affinities with particular social philosophies, and if so, how is the fact to be explained? Does the Christian faith have a distinctive content from which a particular social philosophy can be deduced, or should it be regarded simply as a point of view which at most suggests certain social attitudes? These are some of the questions dealt with in the papers and discussions of the philosophy section of the sixteenth annual conference and "Week of Work" of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, which met at Keuka College, Keuka Park, New York, August 28 to September 3, 1941. The method of approach selected was that of examining some of the typical positions currently maintained. Obviously not all even of the more important points of view could be represented in the four papers read and discussed on successive days (for example, there was no paper dealing with the Catholic standpoint), but many of them were upheld in the discussions which formed a large part of each session.

Professor H. Richard Niebuhr of Yale University, who was present as a guest and consultant, presented the opening paper, "A Protestant Critique of Social Philosophy and Ethics." He maintained that Christianity in essence is a simple and radical monotheism and that no specific social philosophy or system of ethics can be derived from it directly. The social philosophies and ethical standards associated with it in different periods, as in the Catholic Middle Ages or in early Protestantism, derived their content from social and economic conditions rather than from the Christian faith. If this were not so, Christianity could not have continued as a vital force under different

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forms of society, nor could a Christian social thinker formulate a social philosophy, which must be based on general experience. What the Christian faith properly does is to provide a point of view from which the inevitably relativistic aspects of any particular social theory can be laid bare and thereby in some degree transcended. This it does in three ways: It enables one to discover and negate the idolatrous element which practically every philosophy contains, its tendency to absolutize something finite such as the individual, the church, reason, or pleasure. It inhibits a thinker who accepts its standpoint from using his philosophy defensively or for purposes of self-justification, and impels him to employ his theories critically and to identify himself with his own society. But while he is in this society and shares its burdens, he is not wholly of it, for he is impelled by a sense of mission or vocation to use his philosophy practically and to contribute to the solution of its problems.

The second paper, by Professor Laurence Sears, of Ohio Wesleyan University, dealt with the topic, "The Meaning of History," from the viewpoint of empirical pragmatic naturalism. He began by vigorously defending the view that pragmatic naturalism has a legitimate place within the Christian tradition as a modern expression of its historic ethical emphasis. The key to its distinctive position is found in its repudiation of the traditional dualisms of mind and nature and the natural and supernatural, a repudiation which is made in the interest of sharpening the antithesis of good and evil and providing solid ground for human ethical responsibility. There is no super-human and all-embracing purpose, but the world is a natural sphere in which human purposes are significant. The world is not found good by dialectic, but may be made good by human activity. Mind and self emerge in the process of social interaction and communication. Meaning is prospective and refers to the expectations aroused in a given individual in the light of his attitudes and values. History then does not have one meaning, but as many as there are justified expectations. The meaning which it can have for men is a product of human purposes working with objective conditions.

Dr. H. Martyn Estall, of Queen's University, presented the third paper, "The Social Philosophy of the Christian Left." Religion, he declared is *about* human relationships; true religion is wholly con-

cerned with the effort to achieve human community. This position derives its understanding of the real character of human community from the central core of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Community is a tissue of personal relationships, wherein the dignity and worth of human personality are cherished, wherein men can and do love one another. It derives from Marxism its understanding of the conditions for the realization within history of such a community. It sees in Fascism a phenomenon of the self-destruction of capitalism, a nihilistic interlude which should deter us from easy optimism concerning the inevitability of socialism. In the presence of this enemy, the intention to realize community, common to Christianity and socialism, needs to be seen as one intention, having its origins in a common tradition and directed towards a common democratic fulfillment. Communists deny that the intention to realize human community is religious, holding that as it becomes so it becomes unreal. The issue is whether religion can only appear within the ideology of a class-structured society. The Christian Left denies that this is the case and maintains that the ethical religion of the Hebrew prophets and of Jesus developed the reflective and creative possibilities in the sense of community without breaking its inner bonds or its secure grounding in common practice. Bergson's theory of two types of religion, the static and the dynamic, is largely sound, but the prophet rather than the mystic is the source of dynamic religion and its ethics of the open society.

The final paper in the series was on "Social Philosophy and a Critical Liberal Protestantism," by Professor Howard B. Jefferson, of Colgate University. The point of view which he outlined is one which seeks a fresh synthesis of experimentalism and tradition. The liberal Christian will accept the experimental and pragmatic method of inquiry, though he need not fully accept the naturalism usually associated with it. He may accept the empirical view of values and their social origins. But while the pragmatic humanist puts his trust ultimately in this method, the theist holds that his final trust must be in God. God is known by acts of faith whose content comes from Christ and the Christian tradition, and his will is not to be identified with human purposes. This point of view does not give a complete social philosophy, but it is not purely critical and negative, for it

provides us both with a method of criticizing social ideals and of making Christian social decisions.

The discussions which followed each paper were directed for the most part toward the particular positions which had just been set forth, and it is impossible here to summarize them adequately. Nevertheless, certain fundamental questions came persistently to the fore. Questions of a methodological and epistemological character, and questions which are basically theological, claimed the center of attention to such a degree that the more concrete issues of social philosophy were somewhat slighted. One of the most fundamental divisions of opinion was between those who believe that the Christian faith or the Christian tradition supplies specific insights of which social philosophy must be expected to take account, and those who maintain that a social philosophy must be built on purely empirical foundations. The elements of empiricism and relativism in Professor Niebuhr's position here brought him into surprisingly close agreement with several who upheld a naturalistic viewpoint which he was by no means willing to share. Discussion of this issue brought to the fore the contention that every position is conditioned by an ultimate decision concerning the context of meaning within which one's method and one's categories are to be applied. It was held that no philosophy can get along without ultimate presuppositions which rest upon choices and decisions, that the effort to get along without such presuppositions equally involves similar choices, and that therefore the philosopher should avow his faith and take responsibility for it. Professor Niebuhr in his closing remarks stressed a number of factors which he holds inevitably make our positions and points of view relative. We cannot escape carrying on our discourse within and for a particular community; we are bound to use language, categories, and modes of thinking which are inescapably relative; we are bound by our basic religious position or faith. But though we cannot escape from relativity, we can and must seek to be objective, to look resolutely upon social reality from our particular standpoint. We should be uncompromisingly empirical in dealing with practical problems, but we should remember that the practical problems are not the final problems. A few persons objected to these qualifications upon a thorough-going empiricism, while others felt that reason critically and cautiously employed offers, if not a

complete escape from relativity, at least an approach to an objective synthesis.

The foregoing summary reports the papers and discussion in one of the four groups. In one of the three other groups, discussion was directed to the problem of "The Dilemma and Resources of the Protestant Tradition." Professor James H. Nichols, of Macalester College, and Professor E. Harris Harbison, of Princeton University, served as co-chairmen for this group. Papers were presented by Dr. Harbison, Professors Roy W. Battenhouse and George N. Mayhew, of Vanderbilt University School of Religion, Professor Virginia Corwin, of Western Reserve University, and Professor Amos N. Wilder, of Andover-Newton Theological School.

A group of psychologists met under the chairmanship of Dr. Martha Jaeger Glickman, of New York City, with Dr. Erich Fromm, also of New York, as consultant, to consider "Unconscious Factors Underlying Group Behavior."

The fourth group examined different proposals for "The Curriculum in the Liberal Arts College." Mr. William H. Seaman, of Oberlin College, was chairman of the group, and Professor R. Freeman Butts, of Teachers College, Columbia University, served as consultant, presenting one of the papers. Other papers were read by President Mildred H. McAfee, of Wellesley College, Professor Esther Lloyd-Jones, of Teachers College, and Professor Robert B. MacLeod, of Swarthmore College.

Evening lectures included a report of present conditions in Europe, by Mr. Patrick Murphy Malin, President of the National Council and American Director of the International Migration Service, a lecture on Protestantism and American economic man, by Professor Liston Pope, of Yale University, two lectures by Dr. Erich Fromm on unconscious factors underlying the development of authoritarian and democratic ideologies, and reports by Professor Clarence P. Shedd, of Yale University, and Professor Harrison S. Elliott, of Union Theological Seminary, on their recent surveys of the status of religion in the state universities and other centers of higher education.

THE FOX IN JEWISH TRADITION

By PAUL ROMANOFF

Curator of Museum, Jewish Theological Seminary of America

In the March, 1941 issue of *The Review of Religion*, Rachel Wischnitzer-Bernstein presented a fascinating theory based upon the two Hebrew illuminations appearing in two manuscripts of prayer books for the High Holidays, in each of which appears a fox. This fox, according to the theory, represents the "Messianic Fox" in Jewish tradition. This implies that the Messiah is symbolized by a fox. The two illuminations, as well as others, are regarded by the author as having eschatological meaning, and depicting messianic ideas.

May we mention at the outset that there is no such Messianic animal known in Jewish tradition and, hence, not in Jewish art. The fox throughout Jewish literature is the animal symbolizing destruction, ruin, and devastation (cf. Judg. 15:4; Cant. 2:15; Neh. 4:3; Ezek. 13:4; Lam. 5:18). Its characteristics are craftiness, slyness, and deceit. These traits of the fox are also found in non-Jewish folklore. It is the animal of ill-omen, the witch and devil often taking the form of a fox.

The simile in Lam. 5:18 gave rise to the story in the Talmud about Rabbi Akiba and his colleagues, cited by Mrs. Wischnitzer. This talmudic motif represents the fox as an animal that visits and dwells in devastated places. It is the very symbol of desolation, and merely to add color to the story of R. Akiba and his friends, the fox was introduced.

The symbol of the fox in Jewish tradition is found even in modern Palestinian folk-songs of the Halutzim-Pioneers. In applying the biblical idea to modern song, they begin with the following words: "There are foxes (in Palestine), my dear child"; "Foxes are whining," etc.

The two instances presented by the author where foxes appear are not the only ones in Jewish illuminations. As a matter of fact, in an illumination reproduced by Rachel Wischnitzer (*Gestalten und Symbole*, Fig. 43) of a Mahzor of Worms, dated 1272, there is a part of a piyyut for Pentecost, beginning with the words: "The Loving Hind. . . ." The illumination above this text is a scene of dogs pursuing an animal resembling a fox, which seeks safety by running up a

mountain. The hind here is symbolic of the Torah (Law), and has no connection with the Messiah. The motif seems to have been taken from a hunting scene prevalent in illuminated art, such as fox hunting, for instance.

On an illumination of a Passover Haggadah of the fourteenth century (Brit. Museum, Add. 14761; see: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Eschkol, Berlin, vol. 7, frontispiece), is presented a Seder scene with the Hebrew legend: "This is the bread of affliction," on the upper part of the miniature. On the lower border are painted two animals facing each other, and strongly resembling foxes. It would be presumptuous to consider these two foxes as Messianic symbols.

It would be contrary to the spirit of the Talmud and Jewish tradition to regard the fox mentioned in the talmudic story as a "Pious Fox," and still less as a "Messianic Fox," and "the controversial animal in our miniature" as "the herald of the restoration of the Temple." Likewise, it seems strange to regard the chair in the upper medallion of Plate 1 as that of the eschatological King David, and to associate the fox in the illumination with the fox in the story of the Talmud, seeing in it "the jubilant grotesque complete the messianic allegory."

It is evident that the fox as a Messianic symbol or Messianic har-binger must be eliminated. The presence of the animal still needs explanation, however. Thus, an interesting question in Jewish illuminated art has been raised: What is the significance of the animals appearing there, and do they have symbolic meaning? If so, they require study as to which of them belong to Jewish folk-lore and which ones were copied from or inspired by non-Jewish art. This study should be made upon examination of Jewish, Christian, and Oriental illuminations. Particular animal motifs should be likewise presented in their relation to the other animals found in the same illuminations.

The illuminations on Plate 1 of the Hebrew prayer book for the High Holidays (Breslau State and University Library Cod. Or. 1, 1, fol. 89v), written in Germany in the fourteenth century and reproduced by the author, show a portal with a round arch. Four medallions form the bases and capitals of the columns, and a fifth medallion the keystone of the arch. A door on either side of each column suggests an open gate. In each of the four medallions is a figure: an angel, a winged lion, winged bull or ox, and an eagle. In the fifth medallion is a chair. The architecture of the portal and medallions shows distinct

non-Jewish traces, and that the design was influenced by an illumination on a Gospel. As the medallions in the Hebrew manuscript show, the Evangelical symbols of an angel (man), lion, ox, and eagle originally represented St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke, and St. John respectively. They ran clockwise as they appear in many Christian illuminations.

Because they bear resemblance to the four creatures in the vision of Ezekiel (chs. 1 and 10), which inspired the author of Revelation and which in turn inspired the Evangelical representations, these four medallions were reproduced in the Hebrew MS. The portion of the prayer, in the Hebrew prayer book where the illustrations appear, is an appeal to God to open the Gates of Mercy. Therefore, a similar design of an Evangelium could have been chosen for the motif.

The medallion at the keystone of the arch is a well-known motif in Christian illuminations designated for the Godhead, representing Jesus sitting on a throne or a throne alone, or picturing just his head. In the Hebrew prayer book, however, the Jewish copyist-illuminator drew only the throne, an empty golden chair set in heaven, as is suggested by the blue background dotted with stars.

In the attempt to establish her theory of the existence of a "Messianic fox," Mrs. Wischnitzer employs another passage in the Talmud concerning the "Heaven" in Daniel 7:9, according to which she sees the chair in the upper medallion designated "for the eschatological King David, the Messiah ben David." The passage in the Talmud, however, was regarding the term "chair" in Daniel 7:9, which appears both in singular and plural forms. Rabbi Akiba ventured that the plural form may suggest two chairs, one for God and the other one for David, or one for Judgment and the second for Righteousness, an opinion sternly objected to by his colleagues, and contrary to Ps. 89:14 and 97:2. It is very doubtful whether the illuminator took such a casual remark seriously.

The Jewish illuminator, copying the Evangelical motif, had in mind the four creatures in Ezekiel. The chair, in the keystone medallion, is obviously a symbol for God. In the Old Testament, God is pictured sitting on His throne (Ps. 11:4; 103:19; 47:8; Isa. 66:1; 1 Kings 22:19; 11 Chron. 18:18). In rabbinic literature this idea is often represented by the "Kissē ha Kabod," the "Seat (Throne) of Glory." So we find in the liturgical passages for the High Holidays

which are included in the prayer book, expressions taken from the Bible and rabbinic literature, such as: "God sitteth on the throne of His holiness . . . when he cometh to judge the earth"; (cf. also Ps. 9:4 and 7; Joel 4:12) "The habitation of His throne is righteousness and judgement," (cf. Ps. 97:2); or, "King who setteth his Throne for judgement." In Neilah service is the appeal, "May the cry of those who praise Thee rise to *Thy Throne of Glory*." In the third century in Palestine, the Armora Levy (Yoma 86 a) remarked: "Repentance is so great that it reaches the *"Throne of Glory."* This chair in the medallion is the "Throne of Glory" (of God) to which prayers are directed.

To treat Jewish symbolism from a non-Jewish approach would mean to apply an entirely different theory to it. For, if we want to find the correct meaning of the Jewish symbols, we have to see them the way the Jewish illustrators saw them, namely from the Jewish point of view and tradition.

The problem before us is an analysis of the architectural, decorative, human, and animal elements in Jewish art, their interrelationship and relation to the subject matter and texts, and whether or not they form an integral artistic composition. These, in addition, have to be examined in the light of Jewish tradition, a fact not to be overlooked.¹

A REPLY TO DR. ROMANOFF

By RACHEL WISCHNITZER-BERNSTEIN

I am grateful to my friend, Paul Romanoff, for having raised a few points regarding the interpretation of the fox in my article in the March issue of *The Review of Religion*. A debate will certainly help to clarify the problem. Dr. Romanoff points to the biblical conception of the fox, and also to the meaning the fox usually has in

1. Since writing this criticism of Mrs. Wischnitzer's theories, I have had the opportunity of reading the proof of her "Reply." Not wishing to burden the reader with further discussion, I still claim the privilege of holding to my original argument that no mystical reversal of the fox symbolism occurred in Jewish tradition. In those "messianic" utterances where the fox appears as part of the motif, the animal is used negatively, and this can be inferred even from those works of N. N. Glatzer and Joseph Klausner referred to in the "Reply."

folklore. He has apparently overlooked the fact that on page 261 I have quoted Ezek. 13:4 and Lam. 15:18, and have referred on page 258 also to the fox "who has stolen the goose," a motive of folklore, in a Hebrew illuminated manuscript from Cologne. Other examples could be quoted, but it was not with these iconographical subjects that my article was concerned. I do not quite see the point in the reference to the hunted animal in the Worms Prayerbook. Dr. Romanoff seems to agree with me that it is a hind. The fox is always recognizable by his tufty tail.

The purpose of my article was to trace the evolution of a symbol. That the mystical reversion of the fox, originally a symbol of desolation, into an augury of bliss took place in the period of the oppressive Roman rule is significant enough. The religious leaders of the Jews at that time elaborated a conception of history according to which the cumulative disasters (destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, failure of the movement of liberation) experienced by the Jewish people forecast the Restoration of Israel and the triumph of the righteous. N. N. Glatzer¹ points to the fox legend as illustrative of this talmudic conception. Joseph Klausner² considers the story of the fox walking upon the ruins of the Temple and Rabbi Akiba laughing at this sight as one of the few "messianic utterances" attributed to the tannaitic sage. I cannot therefore follow Dr. Romanoff, who maintains that "there is no such messianic animal in Jewish tradition and hence in Jewish art."

The implication that "the Messiah is symbolised by a fox" is obviously a misconstruction. The fox is, in the talmudic legend and the two mediaeval miniatures, an element of the messianic allegory of the Restored Temple. To maintain that the fox was introduced into the legend "merely to add color to the story" were to disregard not only the later talmudic interpretation, but the biblical conception of the fox as well, and thus to reduce a clearly defined and familiar symbol to the role of a meaningless decorative device.

That the authors of the prayerbook were conversant with the later version of the fox-motive may be gathered from the text of the prayerbook for the New Year, where the image of the foxes spoiling

1. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichtslehre der Tannaiten* (1933), p. 29.

2. *Die Messianischen Vorstellungen des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten* (1903), p. 7.

the vine (Cant. 2:15) is used to evoke the Egyptian bondage. Israel is identified there with the vine. The image of bondage and oppression culminates in the vision of the liberation of Israel. This association with the idea of Salvation is typical of the fox-motive in its later conception.

Turning now to the fox in the illustration of the prayerbook for the Day of Atonement, I should deem it advisable not to refer to Cant. 2:15 nor to Judg. 15:4, as these quotations introduce elements foreign to our pictures—the vine and Samson's stratagem. Even Neh. 4:3 is somewhat misleading, as the passage refers to the opposition met at the rebuilding of the Temple, an episode hardly worth recalling in the vision of the Temple's glory.

I am now able to contribute another picture of the fox illustrative of my interpretation. It is to be found in the wall decoration of the Polish eighteenth century synagogue at Kamionka Strumilowa.³ In the lower register of the wall paintings there is pictured a portal above which is seen Jerusalem portrayed as a walled city, with the temple in the center of elaborate buildings. In the foreground outside the wall, a flock of sheep is pictured on a mountain peak bordered with trees on either side. Beyond the trees are shown two foxes arranged as counterparts, each one holding a sheep in his mouth. The picture reveals several layers of thought. There is the folklore fox attacking sheep. There is—if we take into account that lost sheep are being identified with Israel (Jer. 50:6)—the fox, an enemy of Israel. There is, finally, the fox associated with the temple, not with the temple in ruins, which would point to the biblical conception, but with the radiant Temple in the restored Jerusalem.

In contradistinction to the eighteenth century painting, with its realistic view of a town, the medieval miniatures afford only a symbolical indication of the temple city, or the temple itself, in the image of a gate,⁴ but a gate adorned with "the four living creatures" pointing to the temple vision of Ezek. 1. I have emphasized in my article that the four figures have become, in Christian art, symbols of the Evangelists, whereas in Jewish art they have retained their original meaning as symbols suggestive of the presence of God. It

3. Reproduced in Marvin Lowenthal, *A World Passed By* (2nd Ed. 1938), p. 413.

4. On the significance of the gate, cf. Julian Morgenstern, "The Gates of Righteousness," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, VI, 1929.

would be in keeping with this original vision to interpret the empty chair in the clipeus of the keystone of the arched portal in the Breslau manuscript as the throne of God who is supposed, according to the Prayerbook, to sit again amidst his people in the Restored Temple in Jerusalem. The image is thus—and this I would like to emphasise—messianic, no matter for whom the throne is meant to be kept: for God or the Messiah. It is derived, of course, iconographically from the “empty throne” known from the representation on the triumphal arch in Santa Maria Maggiore and other early Christian churches, but if we admit this relationship we have, also, to point out clearly what this relationship implies. In Christian tradition the empty throne is supposed to be the seat of Jesus, not of God, and whenever an enthroned figure is shown in company of the symbols of the Evangelists it is Jesus, whereas God, if represented, appears as a half-figure above, a vision vaguely suggestive of the Revelation of St. John to be traced to Dan. 7:9. Now Dan. 7:9 was the source of Rabbi Akiba’s speculations about the throne of the Messiah. It will not be denied that there is a line of Jewish tradition portraying the throne of David in terms of the “throne of fire” of God,⁵ and associating the image of the enthroned David with the Day of Judgment. Louis Ginzberg⁶ remarks: “As early an authority as Rabbi Akiba, Sanh. 38 b and parallel passages, speaks of the throne upon which David will sit on the Day of Judgment. . . . There can be no doubt that these legends about David are connected with the view that he is the promised Messiah.”

Other discoveries of the throne motive in Jewish art will show whether and how far later typological speculations have influenced the original conception. The medieval illustration of the Prayerbook, the Passover Haggadah, and the Hebrew Bible offers ample evidence of modifications due to the evolution and migration of symbols.

5. Cf. Assara Haruga Malchut, quoted from *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 2, col. 1158, s. v. Apokalyptik.

6. *Legends of the Jews*, vi, 272, note 128.

BOOK REVIEWS

Biography of the Gods. By A. EUSTACE HAYDON. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941, xiii + 352 pp. \$2.50.

There has long been a need for just this kind of book. There are, of course, many histories of religion in which the origin and the nature of the various gods is discussed in some detail, but usually the amount of material on any one God is not very extensive, because the author has discussed not only the God but the whole religion involved, its creeds, institutions, and literature, in a single volume.

This book, on the other hand, is not a history of religion. It does not deal with institutions of religion, except as they are related to the Gods of the various religions. That is to say, this book is what its title surely indicates, the life story of the gods, how they first emerged, how they developed through the centuries, and how, in the case of many of them, they declined and disappeared.

The book begins naturally enough with a chapter on the birth of the gods which deals mainly with the deities of primitive people. A second chapter discusses what causes the Gods to change; the third treats of the gods who died and the deities of the no longer existing religions. Then follow in succession separate chapters on the gods of Zoroastrianism, of India, of Buddhism, of China, of Japan, of Israel, of Christianity, and of Islam. A final chapter deals with the twilight of the gods.

It is a workmanlike job which the author does. Every page gives evidence of painstaking scholarly effort, yet the book is written so interestingly that the non-technical student will have little difficulty in following it. The literary style is altogether delightful, and the warm human understanding which Professor Haydon brings to the portrayal of the gods, as they answer to the deep seated needs of humanity, makes the reading of the book a pleasing experience.

Naturally, not everyone will agree with the author in his detailed statements concerning the development of the various gods. When specialists working in the various culture areas disagree so widely among themselves, it would be strange if complete agreement should appear. Nevertheless, Dr. Haydon has ably presented his material, and his treatment of the historical development of the several divine

figures will generally be found to be supported by well-known authorities.

But if this is true with reference to his study of specific deities, it is not equally true of the general conclusions at which the author arrives in his final chapter, nor of the presuppositions with which he approaches his task. Here many will register most emphatic dissent. For it should be said that one may agree substantially with his conclusions concerning particular gods and disagree completely with his general philosophical position with reference to the existence and reality of God. Throughout much of the book the author is an historian, a painstaking, objective historian, but now and again, and especially at the end, he ceases to be the historian and becomes a philosopher. It is with his philosophy rather than his history that perhaps the majority of his readers will find fault, for they will not be convinced that the history so interestingly set forth leads logically or necessarily to the conclusion he draws, namely that there is no reality back of the various ideas men have held concerning God.

The author is quite convinced that this is true. He can write with great assurance: "It took long to realize that when thought pushed beyond the folk gods it faced the blank unknown, that all the reality there was to the gods was embodied in the ideas of them." But clearly such a profound philosophical question as the nature of ultimate reality is not decided on the basis of history.

Dr. Haydon, as every one knows who has read his other books, or heard him lecture, comes to his subject with great learning, but also with a definite set of presuppositions. He is one of the leading humanists in America. Bringing such a point of view to the study, it would have been strange, indeed, if he had not come out where he did. Readers with a different philosophical background will have to be forgiven if, while following him faithfully in most that he has written, they write non sequitur to his philosophical deductions. Sometimes the reviewer, who has, in at least two of his own books, stated definitely in the preface his peculiar religious viewpoint, has considered starting one more movement, a movement to induce writers to state their particular biases in the preface—or, in keeping with the widely prevalent alphabetical habit of our age, a kind of M.I.W.S.T.P.B.P.

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Sikh Ceremonies. Compiled by SIRDAR SIR JOGENDRA SINGH, with an Introduction by RAJA SIR DALJEET SINGH. Bombay: International Book House, 1941, xx + 96 pp. 2s. 8d.

Here is a new book, small, but important, dealing with the latest of the separate religious systems which originated in India, and which are still surviving in that land. A larger number of religions have arisen and died than have arisen and lived. Among the entire list of eleven historic religions of culture which have managed to live for more than a hundred years, there exists no more recent system than Sikhism. During these past four hundred years since the great missionizing work of Guru Nanak, whom his followers venerate as nothing less than divine, there has emerged no American, no European, no African, no other Asiatic wise enough or holy enough or skilful enough to initiate a powerfully cohesive religious community which has an adoring personal devotion to its founder, an especially revered Sacred Scripture, an established worship and a central shrine, and which has managed to survive even as long as a century.

Accordingly, it is a welcome contribution to general historic knowledge, as well as a contribution within the field of religious life and influence, to put into the hands of English readers this authentic, comprehensive presentation of Sikhism and its actual cultus. The Introduction to this new little volume, in its very first sentence, claims that

Sikh religion is little known and yet, in its simplicity and directness, is perhaps the most pragmatic of all religions (p. v).

Both the introducer of the book and its author are zealous proponents of Sikhism; and both of them have received an honorary Knighthood of the British Realm. The author, it may be mentioned, has for several terms in office been a Minister in the Cabinet of the Governor of the Punjab; he is an extensive land-holder, and has also been active along literary and religious lines. Now he has prepared a handbook of the chief ceremonies practised in his Sikh religion—namely, installation of the Sacred Scripture, child-naming and initiation, baptism, early morning devotions (Japji), general prayers, evening prayers, marriage and funeral-services. Along with a brief description thereof, the author has presented an original translation of the present-day liturgies, most of them being excerpts from the Sacred Scripture of Sikhism.

That document has not been translated complete into any language outside of its native India. This fact is in marked contrast with "the injunction of Guru Arjan [compiler of the earlier portion of the Granth] to translate it into Indian and foreign languages,—so that it might spread over the whole world, as oil spreads over water" (M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vol. 1, p. viii, where the text in Gurmukhi characters is presented. The same command is quoted again by Macauliffe in his vol. III, page 60).

The revered Granth was composed mostly in the Gurmukhi language of North India. But that sizeable document contains some sections composed in six other languages of India, namely, Hindi, Marathi, Persian, medieval Prakrit, and old Punjabi, besides several subordinate dialects. Thus the Sacred Scripture of Sikhism constitutes a literary composite in a larger variety of languages than is the case with any other religion in the history of civilization. Even in a comparison covering the last thirty-two years, the person who has made the most laborious effort to make the Granth available to English readers, M. A. Macauliffe, estimated in the year 1909 that there were not ten living persons able intelligently to read the entire Granth in its original text.

Of these ["Granthis," or specialists on the Granth] few or none is capable of giving an English interpretation. . . . The Granth Saheb thus becomes the most difficult work, sacred or profane, that exists (Vol. 1, pp. v, vi).

An outstanding feature of the Sikh religion is its emphasis on monotheism. This was a theological doctrine which the founder carried over from part of his own inherited ancient Hinduism and also from the chief surrounding rival, Muhammadanism. The Introduction to the book now under review propounds "Belief in One God" as the first, and presumably the most important, among

some of the cardinal beliefs of Sikhism. . . . Sikhism teaches that there is an only God, without a second. He alone is true, self-existent, unchanging, the creator, the all-pervading, permanent within the impermanent, undying and unborn (p. x).

The Lord Himself pervades everything. Within and without is one God (p. 17).

In innumerable other passages in the Granth, as well as in the selections presented in the new book, there are repeated affirmations of

the fundamental doctrine of monotheism. Yet Sikhism's monotheism, while unqualified as regards an ultimate unity in the Deity, is perceptibly tinged with the diversified pantheism of Vedantic Hinduism.

As regards the essence of actual religious experience, Sikhism teaches that it consists in an adoring devotion by the human individual directed towards the Supreme Being and in the consequently resurging thrill of a vivid experience of union with God:

The disciple! In his heart God dwells (p. xx).

They who adore Thee every day without fail,—such saints shall attain salvation, and taste the fruit of union with God (p. 77).

The devotees of God . . . become one with immortal, all-pervading God (p. 89).

The omnipotence of the one supreme Deity is a recurring theme:

Those devotees are blessed who find favour with Thee, my all-powerful God (p. 68).

Whatever pleaseth Thee,—the same taketh place. . . . Whatsoever Thou willest,—the same happeneth (p. 69).

Thou art the Creator. All things happen as ordained by Thee (p. 70).

He Who is Omnipotent, the Supreme Lord,—why shouldst thou forget Him! (p. 78).

Prayer is a practical aspect of the religious life which is repeatedly enjoined in the Sikh Scriptures:

A Sikh is required to recite the prescribed prayers morning and evening and at bed-time (p. vi).

Sikhism started, and still persists, as an individualistic mystical experience of rapturous devotion to the divine transcendence. Yet in the latter part of its history the Sikh community developed a marked militaristic tendency. The minority community did, quite naturally, resort to active self-defense against the forcefulness of the powerful Muhammadan invaders of India, and also against the subtler absorptiveness of the huge encompassing Hindu community. The sixth Sikh Pontiff, Guru Har Govind (A.D. 1606-1638), by assuming a sword as badge of his leadership, accentuated the change which had been taking place in his community subsequent to the quietistic, peace-loving first Guru. The tenth Pontiff, Guru Govind Singh, carried the militaristic tendencies still further. Not only did he assume for himself, but he also required all Sikhs alike to assume, an additional surname, "Singh," meaning "Lion," to symbolize the fearless and

strong family-bond of their religious community. Thus were they more closely welded together into one valiant family of the Pure (Khalsa), and thereafter were known both literally and figuratively as the "Lions of the Punjab." He also instituted a new baptismal rite whereby the initiates should drink, as well as be sprinkled with, sweetened water which had been stirred in an iron basin with a sharp sword; this holy water, nectar, "amrit," is supposed to confer ceremonial purity and courage, and also immunity in battle.

Trust in the protection of the powerful God is daily reaffirmed in the liturgy of the "Evening Prayer":

O Thou, the Wielder of the sword! All those who take protection in Thee,—their enemies suffer death. . . . O Thou Wielder of the sword! I take refuge in Thee. Thyself, with Thy own hand, protect me everywhere! Protect me from the hosts of evil! (p. 75).

They are fortunate who, with the name of God on their lips, are ready to give battle to the evil ones (p. 77).

In the "Kirtan Soihla," or "Bed-time Prayer" of Sikhism, there may be found elements which would be entirely acceptable for all believers in universal religion:

Day after day the Bountiful One showers His countless gifts. He takes care of His creation. Who can measure the bounties of the Immeasurable! (p. 86).

We count in time. Moments and minutes, days and months, the seasons change. But the Creator remains unchanged (p. 87).

Every day is a day gone out of thy life. Only the knower of God knows that which cannot be told. . . . Know the real purpose of thy being here. And gather up the treasure under the guidance of the True Teacher. Make thy mind the dwelling-place of God. . . . O Thou the Knower of my inmost self! O Thou the Dispenser of destinies! May Thou in Thy mercy fulfil this wish of mine! (p. 90).

Among the teachings of that influential religious teacher, Guru Nanak, which are to be learned from the "Teaching Book," the "Guru Granth," and which represent the Great Divine Being as pre-eminently a teaching God, there is an especially striking declaration of trust in the mercy, as well as in the power, of the omnipotent and beneficent Deity. Such passages, numbering more than a score, are perhaps worthy of report from among the selections from Sikhism's Sacred Scripture:

Before undertaking anything, seek the grace of God (p. 12).

O Thou destroyer of fear, and embodiment of mercy! Bestow Thy grace on Thy servant! (p. 12).

In the morning repeat His True Name. Dwell on His greatness. His grace opens the gate of salvation (p. 22).

Thou are the source of power. Thou art the giver of success. Thou art the bestower of grace. I adore Thee (p. 48).

The adoration of Thy devotees, who win Thy grace, who, imbued with love, adore Thee,—they are the true devotees of the Eternal Master (p. 60).

All the truth, all the austere effort, all the goodness of the perfect ones is Thy gift. Unless Thy grace sets the crown of success, all efforts are without fruit (pp. 61-62).

By the grace of the True Teacher start the upward ascent. With His grace even dry wood sprouts into green leaf (p. 65).

The book under review unfortunately has no Index. However, further instances may be cited of explicit expressions of faith in the divine saving grace, which is available for human beings:

Without the grace of the Almighty God they are of no account (p. 56).

It is by the grace of the Guru the secret light is found (p. 88).

They alone are of low birth who forget the True Master. Without the grace of His Name their status is low (p. 63).

He watches all with His vision of grace (p. 41).

On him on whom Thou casteth a glance of grace,—all his sufferings cease, all his wishes are fulfilled. No evil shadow darkens his path. Wealth and well-being are his (p. 75).

He who thinks he knows Him . . . remains without grace (p. 31).

He who serves Him gains grace (p. 23).

He who sings His praises, gains strength, . . . and receives the gift of His grace (p. 21).

His grace gives the key of knowledge (p. 33).

Through His grace they are exalted (p. 39).

A glance of grace gives everlasting peace (p. 41).

On whomsoever Thy grace descendeth, he getteth the jewel (p. 69).

Drink the nectar of Thy grace, and devote his every breath to Thee (p. 88).

In presenting specific ceremonies together with the relevant citations from the Sacred Scripture, this book devotes its first chapter to the "Installation of the Guru Granth Sahib, The Holy Book." Sikhism might indeed be designated quite aptly as a "book-religion," "a religion of The Book." The common noun "granth" for "book" has, in theological and common terminology, become a proper noun

"Granth" as the most appropriate designation for "The Book" par excellence. Certainly no foreign visitor will ever forget his experience at the central shrine of Sikhism in Amritsar, Punjab, where he can see and hear a "perpetual adoration" of the Holy Book. Underneath the over-arching dome, every twenty-four hours, by relays of official "readers" in half-hour shifts, the entire book is read through aloud in its edition of 1570 pages, as printed at the Government Press, Lahore. The Temple, built of white marble, with its upper part covered with gold leaf, is not so large nor so glistening bright as the famed Taj Mahal at Agra; nevertheless, it is one of the choicest architectural gems in all India. Before being admitted at the stately portal to the marble causeway leading across to the Har Mandir in "The Pool of Immortality," the visitor, whether he be a Sikh or non-Sikh, is required to remove his shoes from off his feet, for, the place whereon he stands is holy ground. [Perhaps the beauty of the lone building in front of him and the manifestly religious associations of the situation help the foreign visitor more humbly and reverently to proceed in public with the required process of removing from his lower extremities that portion of the carcass of a dead animal which most Westerners are accustomed to wear all day.] And when he has entered the Sikh "holy of holies" he witnesses the extraordinary spectacle of "The Book" being reverently worshiped with veritable literalness, even as a living person mounted upon a throne.

In the religious ceremonies in the home also, our author reports that

An altar is improvised by placing a small bed on a wooden Divan under a canopy. The Holy Book is brought in with all reverence. Every one rises to receive it. It is placed on the bed, and its wrappings are arranged round it in proper order; and then the Holy Book is opened and read (p. 1).

Very significant is the following statement:

The Holy Book, as the Voice of the Gurus, is to be respected as the Guru himself. No Sikh ceremony can take place except in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib, The Holy Book (p. 1).

Consistent with Sikhism's doctrines of Teachings and Teachers is the specific designation which is applied to the members of that religious community. The term "Sikhs," as conventionalized in English, means literally "Disciples." Thus, a noteworthy feature of

Sikhism is the simple, yet profound, teaching which may be paraphrased as follows: "To be religious, a person must be a learner."

Along the line of appropriate religious designations in Sikhism, there may be noted some parallels and differences in comparison with other religions. The appellation "Teacher," by which the adherents of Sikhism have been accustomed to designate their sage-founder, is also the most frequent designation for the paramount sage-founder in Eastern Asia. "Confucius" is the Latinized form commonly used in the West for the Chinese phrase "Kung-fu-tze," which literally designates "Kung, The Teacher." A similar emphasis took place in connection with Jesus Christ, as having been especially effective in his teaching of saving truths. So "Teacher" (or, its synonym "Master" in the much used "Authorized Version" of the Bible made in 1611) is the most frequent designation for the titular head of Christianity as reported in its special document, the New Testament. However, Sikhism provides another closely connected designation which is not to be found in the Sacred Scriptures of Confucianism or of Christianity, namely, that God also should be explicitly characterized as the Supreme Teacher or Guru.

Appropriate retribution to be administered consequent upon human doings is a tremendous doctrine of high religious faith, which may be found variously phrased in several systems, for example, in Hinduism's doctrine of Karma. Phrased in a simple and universal agricultural analogy (rather than merely in a more abstract or scientific formula of The Law of Cause-and-Effect), it is taught by Sikhism in the very first section of the Granth:

There is no end of good and evil deeds. People commit them, and carry the seed. What they sow, they reap. Nanak says: "They come and go under His Divine Law" (p. 30, citing Japji 20).

A remarkable verbal similarity may be cited from the epigrammatic teaching of Paul:

Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap (Galations 6:7).

The concepts of God's superlative holiness, of His limitless power, and of His just retributiveness toward human conduct are to be found in several religions. But there is an antithetical and complementary principle of a certain divine redemptiveness, available for frail and

limited humanity, which is to be found in Hinduism, in Judaism, in Christianity, and also in the Granth of Sikhism.

Thou art beyond day and night. Thou art beyond human weakness. Thou art holy of the holiest,—all-seeing, though unseen. Thou humblest the pride of the proud. Thou art destroyer of evil. Thou art redeemer of wrong-doers (p. 50).

There has been no disputing the claims for, and of, the founder of Sikhism, that he undertook deliberately to effect an irenic combination of the best elements in his own inherited Hinduism with the monotheistic element in Muhammadanism, which was its most active rival. But Guru Nanak might easily have extended his syncretistic trend so as to embrace some sympathetic elements from Christianity, which was another contemporary religion in India. We know that, for at least ten prior centuries, Christianity had adherents in India, mostly in South India. We know that shortly after Guru Nanak there arose another active appreciator of religions other than his own, namely, Akbar the Great (1542-1605), who invited Portuguese Christians to come up from Goa, a diocesan city in Southwest India, to preach their religious system to that Grand Moghul. An alluring discovery is awaiting some great scholar,—to prove, or to disprove, any actual interaction between Christianity and early Sikhism; but that task will require a wealth of linguistic, as well as historic, knowledge, and a sympathetic, yet discerning, appreciation of varied religious truths.

In the mean time all persons who are interested in the history of India and also in the potentialities of an inclusive universal religion may well be grateful for this brief description of the religious ceremonies, and for a fresh translation of some choice extracts from the Sacred Scripture of an important religious community of about four million adherents.

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The New Testament in Basic English. Edited by S. H. HOOKE and others. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. viii + 546 pp. \$2.00.

This curious and original version is the American edition of a volume recently issued by the Cambridge University Press in Eng-

land. For Basic English is a Cambridge growth, due to Mr. C. K. Ogden of the Orthological Institute. Another Cambridge scholar, Mr. I. A. Richards, visited the American Cambridge, to press from Harvard the claims of a linguistic novelty, not yet in its 'teens. The general idea of Mr. Ogden and his coadjutors is to present a simplified form of English by way of an auxiliary language for those who do not use English as their usual speech, or for such as find English idiom and grammar extremely difficult. Stripping off superfluous terms and redundant synonyms, for example, the Basic English protagonists agree upon a vocabulary of 850 words, which are considered sufficient for all practical purposes of intercourse in the regions of commerce, science, etc., with special short lists of terms in a given department. A word-book was published in 1934, and tentative experiments have been made even in popular literature, by rendering short tales into Basic English for educational ends. The aim of this book (which by the way is a fine specimen of typography) is to put so widely known a classic as the English New Testament into this new tongue. A committee, indeed two committees, of English scholars undertook the task. They received an extra ration of fifty special Bible words and a hundred "listed as giving most help in the reading of English verse" (whatever that may mean). The vocabulary of these theologians amounts therefore to no more than a thousand words.

"Of heaven or hell I have no power to sing," William Morris once wrote. The Basic Englishman has no power, in verse or prose, to speak of words like "gospel," "promise," "redemption," or "compassion." He is handicapped, above all, by the fact that Basic English allows no more than eighteen verbs, and these do not include "ask," "pray," "praise," "bless," "repent," or "choose." One result is that a few verbs are overworked, like "send," "put," and "give," which have to be employed repeatedly in the circumlocutions. Thus the rich man in the parable "came to his end, and was put in the earth" (Luke 16:22), for no one dies or is buried in Basic English. Nor does anyone "buy"; he "gets" what he wants. Dorcas "was sick" in the Authorized Version; now she "got ill" (Acts 9:37). The translators have been ingenious in adapting their scanty stock of verbs to the situation. Generally they have merely been content to sacrifice style to sense, as in John 19:22, where, unable to use "write," they make Pilate remark, "What I have put in writing will not be changed." But the lack of "cast" or "throw" leads to some unfortunate results, as in John 8:7,

"Let him among you who is without sin be the first to send a stone at her," which is neither standard nor colloquial English. Unluckily there are too many cases of this kind.

Another result is a paraphrastic style which adds to the length of the sentences. Reduce your vocabulary and you expand your text, since you are driven to periphrases. These are frequently flat, if not tiresome. In transmitting scientific or commercial information, this does not matter; facts and figures are unaffected. But the New Testament suffers because of being often great literature, with power and music in its terse Greek. Thus, in Rev. 3:19, four Greek words require merely five in Latin and English ("be zealous therefore and repent"), but Basic English has to call upon eleven for its feeble admonition ("then with all your heart have sorrow for your evil ways"). True, Basic English now and then shortens the English Version, as, for example, in Rev. 7:17, by reducing "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes" to "God will make glad their eyes for ever." Yet the loss is greater than the gain; for this fails to preserve the vivid metaphor. More frequently a terse phrase is drawn out into a thin expansion, till, in a passage like John 5:39-47, we find that 126 Greek words require 191 Basic terms, whilst in the Authorized Version they need no more than 147; again, a single verse like Luke 20:20 goes into the Authorized Version in 36 words, but demands 48 in Basic English. The general result is a surplus of words, compared with the classical English versions. The book of Acts, for example, closes with a ringing adverb, meaning "without hindrance" or "unhindered"; but in Basic English this runs out into "and no orders were given that he was not to do so." This is fairly and sadly characteristic of the version.

"Great trouble has been taken," it is claimed, "to make certain that there are no errors of sense and no loose wording." The reader is far from certain. True, he realizes that he cannot do justice to the achievement of the translators unless he recollects that at every turn they had not a free hand. Allowance has to be made for what resources were denied them by Basic English. Perhaps the most valuable estimate of the version would come from some Japanese or Indian who was unfamiliar with the classical English translation. Yet even those who are by tradition close to the latter and not unfamiliar with New Testament criticism may find stimulus in this tour de force; it is far from accurate, but, at the same time, it contains some happy

touches, new and old, although these are often derived from anything but Basic English itself. Instances of the translators' ability in real English are, "We have made a discovery! It is the *Messiah*!" (John 1:41), "You have the story of Job and the troubles through which he went and have seen that the Lord was full of pity and mercy in the end" (James 5:11), "My life is one long death" (1 Cor. 15:31), "Things are hard for us, but we see a way out of them" (11 Cor. 4:8), and "Because you are not one thing or the other, I will have no more to do with you" (Rev. 3:16). These are specimens of free and faithful English. Similarly "no division between nations," as a substitute for "barbarian, Scythian" (Col. 3:11), may be a paraphrase, but it is by no means ineffective. The same might be said of "Mother, this is not your business" (John 2:4). The Greek term rendered "rust" in Matthew 6:19 is obscure, and it is neat if not convincing to read, "Make no store of wealth for yourselves on earth, where it may be turned to dust by worms and weather." One is interested to find, close to this, an independent move of the translators. The Greek word commonly rendered "stature" is ambiguous; it might mean length of days as well as length of life, but the translators set aside the latter interpretation, which is at present popular, and, like Father Spencer, take it as height ("which of you by taking thought is able to make himself a foot taller?") in Matthew 6:27.

But misprints and errors often occur. "Kept" in 1 Thess. 2:16 should be "keep"; Jewish malignity was more than a memory when the apostle wrote. "Lot" in Rev. 16:8 should be "let." As for 1 John 5:14 ("we have no fear before him that if we make any request to him which is right in his eyes, he will give ear to us"), this seems to say exactly the opposite of what the writer intended. Again, in John 21:15-17, where the translators do not see that the two words rendered commonly by "love" were Hellenistic synonyms, they should have been logical in the climax (verse 17) and made Peter troubled because Jesus asked a third time "Am I dear to you?", not "Have you love for me?" There is no textual evidence for altering "drink" to "take" in the central sentence of 1 Cor. 11:25 ("this do ye as oft as ye drink it"); it is an error of sense to render Rev. 2:20 by "you let this woman Jezebel say she is a prophet," to turn "anchor" into "band" in the famous phrase of Heb. 6:19, to alter "inn" into "house" (Luke 10:34), and to use "envy" in Col. 3:5 for what is either

covetousness or impurity. One finds it hard to understand why "Christians" should be suddenly substituted for "brethren" in John 21:23. This deliberate anachronism must be due to Basic English, as is the banal rendering of Ephes. 5:17 ("Be ye not foolish, but understand what the will of the Lord is) in our new version, "Be ye not foolish, but be conscious of the Lord's pleasure." Again, the Basic exclusion of "promise," in favor sometimes of "undertaking," leads to loose wording, as in 11 Cor. 1:20 ("he is the Yes to all the undertakings of God"), since "undertaking" may mean enterprise as well.

The preface (or Note, as Basic English prefers) might well have been fuller. One infers that the Greek text used is that of the Revised Version, but nothing is said about this. Also, we should have been told on what principle a word or part of a word is printed in italics, like *mustard-seed* (Mark 4:31) and "the great *goddess* Diana" (Acts 19:27), for example; the translators must have had something in mind, but it baffles the reader on page after page. Then capital letters are employed indiscriminately. "Bishop" and "deacon" (even suddenly in Rom. 12:7) are capitalized. But Basic English has no place for "presbyters" or "elders" either in heaven or on earth! They suffer a sea-change into "rulers," which is vague and also employed for another group of ecclesiastical authorities in Heb. 13:17. There is no reason why "synagogue" (plural and singular) should not be capitalized, even in James 2:2. But why not "church," particularly in a passage like 1 Cor. 10:32 ("Jews or Greeks or the church of God")? "Apostle" (singular and plural) is steadily capitalized, though for some occult reason it is cut out in Matthew 10:2 and Mark 6:30, besides being turned into "teachers" in Luke 11:49. Now "Church" is surely as distinctive a creation as "Apostles" or "Synagogue."

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Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century, Especially as Shown in Addresses to the Emperor. By K. M. SETTON (Studies in History, Economics and Law edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. No. 482) New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 239 pp. \$2.75.

This book will be welcomed by scholars in many fields. In "depicting

the patristic attitude towards the person and office of the Roman Emperor in the fourth century," Dr. Setton unfolds before us the genesis of the political problem which has determined the fate of the Western world. Since this is not another study of early Christian political doctrine, one will approve of the strict limitation to the fourth century, even to the exclusion of St. Augustine and St. Jerome. Dr. Setton points out that much of their literary activity lay in the fifth century, and before finishing the book the reader will have reached the conclusion that the decisive ideas in the great struggle of the Church against the State were conceived, *in nuce* at least, before the end of the fourth century.

In his introduction Dr. Setton discusses the early Christian attitude towards the Emperor prior to Constantine the Great. Here one would wish he had gone a little more "under the surface." Christ's "Render unto Caesar" is too firmly rooted in biblical and Jewish political thought, St. Paul (esp. Rom. 13:1-7) betrays the "social" thinking of a Roman citizen too clearly to make Dr. Setton's somewhat circumstantial explanation of these germs of Christian political doctrine entirely plausible. True, this pragmatic tendency which occurs throughout the book could be defended by its author on the evidence of the texts themselves: these reveal in the most striking fashion the influence of personal experiences upon the ideas of the Fathers. The political views even of a St. Athanasius and St. John Chrysostom appear to be shifting and changing as the result of imperial amenity or disfavor. But the biographical angle does not touch the problem of a history of ideas, and a survey of the seven almost monographic chapters of Dr. Setton's analysis yields surprising evidence of the steadiness and inner logic in the development of Christian political thought, despite the vicissitudes of the Church, and the different personalities of her early leaders.

This is already apparent in the chapter on Eusebius, which might almost be described as a well deserved vindication of the Bishop of Caesarea. The magnitude of his task of fixing the Church's attitude towards a suddenly benevolent State becomes evident if we realize that Eusebius had witnessed the worst persecutions under Diocletian, while, on the other hand, he and his time were still imbued with the conceptions of Emperor worship. The parallelism between Christian and imperial symbolism is well known, and the remnants of the latter

in Eusebius are hardly surprising. All the more startling is the truly Christian note struck in the seemingly conventional panegyric on Constantine (*De laudibus Constantini*). In this oration, delivered in the Emperor's presence, Eusebius stresses the complete vanity of all earthly dominion and the Emperor's contempt for it ("he reckons it as little better than the goatherd's"); and he calls virtue the only qualification for the imperial dignity, in the absence of which the emperor is a mere tyrant! A distinction of extraordinary importance which, in the midst of the Arian controversy, occurs again in a curious passage by Gregory Nazianzen (quoted, p. 107) that seems to anticipate certain Jesuit doctrines of the Counter Reformation.

The struggle with Arianism and its imperial protector forced the Church suddenly to revise her attitude towards the State. Prudently sifting the all too scant material we possess on this heresy, Dr. Setton arrives at important conclusions as regards not only the struggle between Athanasius and Constantius, but the political conceptions which Arianism may have nourished. By its very nature Arianism seems to have been Erastian and even servile before the Emperor, thus causing the extraordinarily vigorous assertion of ecclesiastical autonomy on the side of Athanasius. (Indeed the latter's curious charge (quoted, p. 82) that the Arians who deny that the Son is everlasting "have called him Eternal Emperor," may shed new light on the character of this heresy. Was its dualism perhaps the unconscious attempt to reconcile emperor worship with that of the transcendental God of Christendom?)

From the great political and dogmatic struggles of the fourth century the Church emerged in new strength, her position amidst the powers of the world clarified as never before. "The *sacerdotium* was elevated to a higher dignity than the *imperium* towards the last quarter of the fourth century." The two great figures which dominate the second half of Dr. Setton's book are St. Ambrose and St. John Chrysostom. The importance of these two men for the history of the Latin and Byzantine Churches can hardly be exaggerated. Dr. Setton ascribes to "the success of St. Ambrose one of the chief reasons for the great influence of the medieval papacy in the West," while finding "in the failure of St. John Chrysostom one of the chief causes of that imperial erastianism" so characteristic of the Byzantine Empire. Here again, however, it would seem that the author pays too little attention

to the traditions within the Latin and Byzantine Churches respectively. The evidence presented by himself hardly seems to bear out his conclusion that there is "scant difference between the attitudes of the eastern and western episcopacies towards the Emperor, and the views of Ambrose concerning the *imperium* are virtually the same as those set forth by St. John Chrysostom." The great Bishop of Milan, though assigning to the emperor a place "*intra ecclesiam, non supra ecclesiam*," seems distinctly Roman in his political sense for the necessity and ethical function of the monarchy which is "Augustean" rather than Christian. (In this connection Setton's reference to the pagan Symmachus' memorial to Valentinian II is most instructive!) Although Ambrose, like St. Augustine, considers earthly government a necessary evil, he emphasizes that imperial law, if just, is identical with natural law and, very logically, eventually concedes to the emperor "certain rights of a judicial and disciplinary character over the episcopate" (p. 148). This Roman "loyalism," rather than any inconsistency of character, would seem the historically just explanation for the sudden reversal of Ambrose's attitude towards Eugenius after the latter had been outlawed and defeated by Theodosius.

The tragic fate which St. John Chrysostom—and the Byzantine Church—suffered at the hands of the Emperor, on the other hand, appears as the logical result of a spiritual tradition which is noticeable even in the most impetuous denouncements hurled by the Saint against the Emperor; and when he calls the latter "man's fellow slave" or writes to the Empress that the lowliest of man who practices justice surpasses in dignity the emperor, we sense an a-social attitude which, compared with St. Ambrose, offers the same contrast as that between Eastern and Latin monasticism. Dr. Setton's statement that "the patristic attitude towards the *imperium* was basically anarchic" should not be applied to the West, whose political thought is far more complex in its origin and development.

As the subtitle indicates, the author has paid particular, though by no means exclusive, attention to addresses to the Emperor. In this branch of literary production much space is, of course, occupied by conventional and ceremonial phraseology which, however, with all its formalism is by no means without interest to the historian. Symbols of every kind are the most conservative, the least flexible creation of the mind, often surviving long after the idea is dead which has en-

gendered them. (As an example one may cite the extremely lenient attitude of the Fathers in the question of adoration of imperial images to which Dr. Setton devotes an important last chapter.) One should thus perhaps not attribute too much significance to the extremely "reactionary" terminology of court language and its continued use of images which, with the end of emperor worship and in the texts of Christian writers, have lost their true meaning. Yet there are not a few passages quoted by Dr. Setton where even this official terminology strangely reflects the political and ideological disintegration of that age. Thus the mythological "orb of light" visualized by the panegyrist of Maximian Herculus fades into an allegory in Eusebius' oration, until it has become a mere sarcasm in Hilary of Poitiers' jest that the Arian Constantius, being "darkness" himself, endeavors to illumine light. Equally interesting on a similar occasion is Lucifer of Calaris' completely ironical use of attributes of glorification in his attack upon Constantius. Still more significant is the manner in which the "withering away" of the monarchic idea is apparent in addresses delivered in the Sacred Presence. Originally the Emperor appears as the classic Hero in these panegyrics; but in his funeral oration on Valentinian II St. Ambrose, as Setton points out, "is merely holding a mirror . . . up to the perfect prince calling him Valentinian II." Finally, the "statue" of the ideal prince which Synesius of Cyrene sets up before Arcadius, reminding him at the same time that he possesses none of the virtues depicted therein, is pathetic evidence of the death of an institution and a myth. The synopsis of historical and philological perspectives is the great merit of this important book.

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Milton in the Puritan Revolution. By DON M. WOLFE. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1941. xiv + 496 pp. \$4.00.

This Great Argument: A Study of Milton's "De Doctrina Christiana" as a Gloss upon "Paradise Lost." By Maurice Kelley. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941. xiv + 269 pp. \$5.00.

The importance of modern American Miltonic scholarship is seen in its attempts to rescue Milton from the Milton idolaters of the last

generation and to defend him from the unjust accusations and implications made against him by present-day European authors. To achieve this end, it has been necessary to investigate carefully Milton's social, religious, political, and intellectual heritage, and to determine by an examination of contemporary documents and a study of contemporary religious, political, and social trends and movements just what Milton's position and reputation were in his own generation. With these established, a firm foundation is laid upon which to evaluate Milton's importance in his own times and to gauge accurately his degree of influence upon succeeding generations. Mere reputation and tradition must be made to give way before the force of factual evidence. Presenting this evidence and carefully evaluating it are among the chief objectives of modern American Miltonic scholarship. Mr Wolfe's *Milton in the Puritan Revolution* contributes to the realizing of these objectives and is, therefore, a worth-while contribution to American literature on Milton.

In comparison with the *active* Puritan revolutionaries of the period (Goodwin, Lilburne, Winstanley, etc.) who wrote for the common man, and who succeeded in building some semblance of organization to protect and forward his interests, Milton was an *intellectual* revolutionary, without an organization behind him, without a definite platform of principles or system of thought, largely confining his activities to his study, and writing for a select audience of intellectuals whose training and understanding, he thought, would cause them to appreciate his efforts to resolve the evils of the time through logic and reason. Through his superior literary accomplishments and fine expression of Puritan revolutionary principles, Milton, though he made few original contributions to the Puritan Revolution, came to be regarded by later generations as one of the outstanding of the active Puritan revolutionaries; and what had been accomplished by others through active participation came to be linked with his name. What Milton did actually contribute to the Puritan Revolution is largely limited to his superior and often superb literary expression of unorthodox and radical ideas current among the revolutionaries of his day.

Mr. Wolfe, in presenting the parallels, deviations, and contradictions in the thought and writings of Milton and those of Goodwin, Lilburne, Overton, Winstanley, and the other active Puritan revolutionaries, has sought to give Milton his rightful place among the men

of his generation who were participants in the Puritan Revolution. *Milton in the Puritan Revolution* is the result of his efforts, and its contents show its author's success in his undertaking.

Mr. Wolfe's book is carefully organized and is well written. It should prove to be pleasant and instructive reading for the layman, as well as a volume of value to the student of Milton.

Maurice Kelley's *This Great Argument* . . . is also a noteworthy achievement in contemporary Miltonic criticism, and is no less a triumph for the historical approach in evaluating the artistry and genius and in determining the character and source of the ideas of a writer whose works embody the best and most complete expression of the liberal and progressive thought of his generation. Here is one book on Milton whose author is content to let Milton speak for himself, and the value of the book is enhanced thereby.

To certain circles of contemporary Miltonic scholarship and criticism Mr. Kelley's book is sure to be the object of much adverse comment, for the author in developing his thesis goes to some length to point out the fallacies of approach and to refute the ill-founded conclusions of several outstanding Miltonists (Messrs. Saurat, Sewell, Fletcher, Tillyard, etc.); but Mr. Kelley's efforts will be applauded, and his conclusions will be largely accepted by those students of Milton who desire to see Milton correctly placed in his own generation and his achievements and contributions rightly evaluated in the light of seventeenth century conditions and standards. This desire for a just and accurate evaluation of Milton's thought and contributions to his own times as well as to succeeding centuries tends in no way to lessen the degree of the poet's genius or to discount the importance of the man's life and thought; it is prompted rather by the sincere wish to discover and know Milton the man and the thinker, the poet and the prose writer, as he reveals himself in his own works.

The weakness of much current Miltonic criticism, as Mr. Kelley observes in his Foreword, lies in the fact "that the twentieth century finds in Milton attitudes and beliefs that he himself never espoused, and certainly never intended to transmit to later generations." Too many writers on and critics of Milton begin their efforts with preconceived notions and self-imposed conclusions which they seek to attach to Milton by manipulating his text or by drawing ill-based inferences

from his content. Mr. Kelley himself well expresses the standard and the goal for students and scholars of Milton when he writes that "a Miltonist . . . should determine—as far as it is in his power to determine—just exactly what his poet intended to say, and by determining this, make it possible for us to judge the true level of Milton's artistic attainment and significance in the light of his own professed motives and aims."

A fact that has been repeatedly overlooked, with the result that much Miltonic criticism is far-fetched, ill-supported, and lacking in sound judgment and scholarship, is that Milton was an honest writer and conscientious artist who himself most frequently indicated his sources and candidly revealed his thought, and one whose works themselves are the best commentary we have on what he wrote and thought. Thus, as Mr. Kelly suggests, a criticism of any one of Milton's works must primarily be based on the other works of Milton, and the critic would do well to allow Milton, whenever it is possible, to speak for himself. This is just what Mr. Kelley has done in his *This Great Argument* . . ., and as a result of his work takes on an importance that must be denied to such works of Miltonic criticism as have of late years come from such scholars as Messrs. Saurat, Sewell, Fletcher, and Tillyard, however ingeniously conceived and well-written these works may be.

Mr. Kelley rightly stresses the point and in the end proves the fact that *De Doctrina* is the best possible commentary we possess on *Paradise Lost*. Statements in the epic which appear of themselves obscure or ambiguous become clear and consistent when re-read in the light of what Milton has written in the treatise. The treatise complements the epic and makes it take on an added significance as an expression of Milton's theological ideas. In rendering such service to the epic in particular, and to Milton's thought in general, the treatise must assume for Milton students a far greater importance than has heretofore been accorded it. After reading *This Great Argument* . . . no conscientious interpreter of *Paradise Lost* will fail to consult *De Doctrina* on points concerning which questions may arise in his mind.

In seeking to determine the date of the composition of *De Doctrina*, especially in its earlier drafts, it is unfortunate that Mr. Kelley overlooked the pro-Trinitarian agitation and legislation in Parliament during the mid-forties and the anti-Trinitarian activities of such men

as Biddle, for these factors no doubt played a definite part in centering Milton's attention on the question of the Trinity and other matters that are basic in the treatise at a time when he was turning from Calvinism and Presbyterianism to Independency and an individualistic concept of religion and of the interpretation of Scripture. A consideration of these factors would have strengthened Mr. Kelley's contention that *De Doctrina* was not written before 1645 and that it was in its more or less completed stage by 1658/59.

Mr. Kelley's acute analysis of and comments on the manuscript of *De Doctrina*, as presented in Chapter Three, are most satisfying and convincing, though the force of his statements is somewhat handicapped by the excessive controversial matter that he has introduced. It was necessary, of course, to show how and where Mr. Sewell was at fault in his comments on *De Doctrina*; but this could have been done in less space than Mr. Kelley devotes to it. This criticism of Chapter Three also applies to other chapters of *This Great Argument . . .*, where Mr. Kelley seeks to refute in detail (generally successfully) the conclusions of other Milton scholars (Messrs. Saurat, Fletcher, Tillyard, etc.). Mr. Kelley's analyses and conclusions, being so closely based upon the texts of *De Doctrina* and *Paradise Lost*, are adequate and convincing of themselves and hardly need to be bolstered by such detailed refutation and so much controversial matter. The general organization and development of *This Great Argument . . .* would have been improved had this controversial matter been delegated to an appendix or even eliminated altogether.

The parallels which Mr. Kelley presents as being common to both *De Doctrina* and *Paradise Lost* are numerous and impressive. The way in which these parallels are presented and analyzed fully justifies the author's conclusions that the treatise is the most adequate gloss upon the epic we possess, that the epic can be fully understood only in the light of what Milton has written in the treatise, and that much of the commentary that has been written on the epic would never have been written had its authors been better acquainted with the complementary treatise.

Chapter Eight of *This Great Argument . . .*, in which Mr. Kelley sums up the results of his study of *De Doctrina* and *Paradise Lost*, is not only the most adequate answer we have had to date to the claims and conclusions of Messrs. Saurat and Tillyard, but is also one

of the best pieces of positive Miltonic criticism that has appeared in recent years. Stressing the need of employing the historical approach in literary study and criticism in order to arrive at sound conclusions, and pointing out by illustration the absurdities to which less reliable methods frequently lead, Mr. Kelley here has rendered a valuable service to contemporary Miltonic criticism.

This Great Argument . . . is both a worth while piece of Miltonic criticism, especially as regards *Paradise Lost*, and a worthy attempt to bring such criticism back to sanity, common sense, and sound scholarship.

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The Philosophy of Silence. By ALICE BORCHARD GREENE. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1940. xi + 254 pp. \$2.50.

This book is not so much a "philosophy of silence" in the usual meaning of the term "philosophy" as it is a compendium of the methods and aims of religious sects or of movements with a philosophical or psychological basis which have made a practical use of silence. As such it is useful to anyone who wants a rapid survey of the subject as an introduction to further study. The author does not devote enough space to any one movement or person to permit an adequate interpretation. Her aim is rather to show how the practice of silence has possessed meaning and value to many persons in many times and places. She makes good her case that research along these lines is badly needed in our modern over-extroverted West, which is so occupied in transforming the world without that, unlike the East, it has neglected the equally important world within. The gateway to this inner world is Silence.

The capital S indicates that we are not here dealing merely with a lack of speech, but rather with a process, governed by special techniques, which can enable those who are out of balance, because of too much concern with the world around them, to restore that balance through a silent penetration and development of inner depths. Such Silence is the open door to religion as a direct human experience. It necessitates the progressive stilling of the physical, emotional, and mental areas. It therefore requires rigorous preparation and training.

The author combs all history for examples of the use of Silence.

Among instances cited of the group use of Silence are: primitive speech taboos; the Mystery religions of Egypt, Greece, and Rome; the Quietists of the seventeenth century (the author errs in calling them a "Protestant sect" and in attributing to them an influence on George Fox); the Quakers; the Fellowship of Silence in the Church of England; Buchmanism; Rudolf Otto's innovations in the Lutheran church service; and Dr. Fleming's proposed moratorium on preaching. Groups of devotees to silence of a more individualistic type include the Pythagoreans, the Therapeuts, the Essenes, the Hassidim, the Sufis, the Trappists and other Church orders, the Taoists, the Yogis, and the Zen Buddhists. In addition, a number of individual mystics both ancient and modern are quoted. An interesting chapter on "The Growing Retreat Movement" shows that Roman Catholics and Anglo-Catholics have made much progress in this method of blending silence with fellowship, but that Protestantism in general has scarcely made a beginning.

Silence is discussed as a discipline, a source of knowledge, and a source of power. As a discipline, it furnishes the means of controlling and checking the lower nature in order to release the higher nature. As a source of knowledge, it is certain and absolute as contrasted with the relativity of sense perception and reasoning. Such intuitive knowledge is, however, incommunicable through words. As a source of healing and power, Silence releases energy through contact with areas of life larger than those touched by ordinary consciousness. "The theme of all participants in Silence as an instrumentality is its generous contribution to the deepening and enriching of life, to the healing of mental and physical ills, and to the quickening and exposing of latent faculties" (p. 114).

In considering the problems which arise out of a mystical type of religion, the author generally takes a healthy middle position. Thus she is not in favor either of withdrawal from the world or of absorption in it. The first makes one socially ineffective, and the second results in inner conflict and a sense of futility. In the ancient conflict between the individualistic mystic who will not check his revelations with accepted authorities and the institutional type of mind which seeks to bring order out of chaos by imposing standards, the solution is somewhere in between. Quakerism is given too individualistic an interpretation, and the Quaker method of striking the balance between

authoritarianism and individualism is ignored. The practical suggestions in the final chapter concern such matters as times for meditation, posture, breathing, and topics to think about on the lower rungs of the mystical ladder.

This useful book emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences in the various types of mysticism. There is, for instance, little recognition of the difference between a member of some modern meditation cult who struggles for an "enlargement of consciousness" and the Quaker who seeks only to become obedient to the "still small voice" heard within. Yet the similarities are striking and worth attention, for the mystics in all ages are much more in agreement than the scientists in all ages. In an age when outward edifices are everywhere crumbling, Dr. Greene's book is a timely reminder that man has in the past discovered ways of finding strength and serenity within, and that this source of power is still at his disposal, if he is willing to undertake the discipline and devotion which are necessary to reach it.

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"God is my Fuehrer." Being the last twenty-eight sermons by MARTIN NIEMÖLLER. With a preface by THOMAS MANN. New York: Philosophical Library and Alliance Book Corporation. 1941. 294 pp. \$2.75.

These unannotated sermons, in their apparent simplicity and directness, reveal to the one who is not reading them merely for sentimental and political reasons a huge dramatic tangle in which three powers vie with each other: indomitable faith, political solidarity, and an ancient Word. With the publication of these sermons which, we are assured, are translated faithfully from the authentic transcripts of stenographic notes taken down while they were delivered, we are enabled to peer into the church situation in Germany from October, 1936, to June, 1937, on the basis of internal evidence, and thus are in a position to supplement what has been written out of bitterness and spite. These sermons convince us, first of all, of the evangelical zeal of Niemöller, the Vicar, a zeal inherent in the Evangelical-Lutheran tradition itself, which is Word-centric in the double sense of the divine assurance clothed in the biblical Word as the *non plus*

ultra, and the proclamation and "confession" of it as constituting man's obligation. The first renders Niemöller and his followers inescapably fundamentalist to the extent of miracle-affirming, and hence categorically opposed to any mythologizing tendencies; the second brings them directly into a conflict with temporal authority in which such acts as meeting behind closed Church doors, distribution of election leaflets of the Confessional Church (cf. p. 291), collection of offerings, public repulsion of attacks, and public designation of those who seceded from the Church as "deserters" (cf. especially pp. 271-72 and 291) provided the State with material for legal and physical action against pastors and members of the congregation.

It is hinted in the sermons that such a conflict could have been avoided by several means, all of which Niemöller rejected as inconsistent with the Word. There is, first of all, the compromise between liberal church groups who render to Caesar what is Caesar's. This path is blocked by Niemöller who, in his sermon of November 15, 1936, put an unusual interpretation on Matthew 22:15-22. Next, there is the veiling of fundamentalism in obscure phraseology, an expedient to which allusion is made in the sermons and which is repudiated, though taken recourse to, sometimes, in textual exegesis where the parable is clearly made to serve a practical purpose. Then, there is the condemnation of all mythological interpretation in connection with the person of Christ or Christian festivals. The otherness of these views is strikingly brought out in the Christmas and Easter sermons. Niemöller thus refuses to embark on a course similar to that of the great mystics, such as Meister Eckhart, which would surely have alleviated a good many objections, since even Alfred Rosenberg devotes a highly appreciative section to these men in his *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*. More than that, it might have brought Niemöller close to a Hauer who seeks a broader than biblical foundation in the Indo-germanic cultural heritage into which Christian elements play mythologically and symbolically. Furthermore, there is the defiant "either-or," the "nevertheless" attitude which Niemöller stressed from first to last in opposition to the wishy-washy "yes-but" attitude, and his decided stand against neutrality. Most of all, however, Niemöller would not concede that the Word is adaptable. The original message, he believed, stands, and neither compromise nor adaptation to the present situation is permissible. Whereas the Catholic Church

survived centuries and the harrowing influence of different races and countries by adaptation, Niemöller's pulpit had to break because of its inflexibility, because he deemed it a sacrifice too great to stoop to the demands for a German Christendom (cf. pp. 276-77). The Christian message ought not to be tailored to the world around you: it stands as uncompromising now as at the time of the first apostles, and the passage of Acts 5:33-42 which Niemöller took as text for his last sermon, indeed, constitutes not an imaginary but a real parallel.

Particularly fine sermons, in the best of Evangelical-Lutheran tradition, are the ones entitled "Gethsemane" and "Easter." There are not many that are vituperative, though such words as "enemy," "devil," and "foul fiend" are unmistakable in their reference. Niemöller boldly characterized the struggle as one of the devil wrestling with the Redeemer for damnation or salvation, in which man bears the brunt of God's fight.

There are, of course, many doctrinal aspects to the sermons to dwell on which too long would obscure their political importance. The triadic relationship which Josiah Royce envisaged as the central aim of Christianity, is hinted, e.g., on page 92. The complete and irrevocable presupposition for Niemöller throughout is the Gospel. Man must not seek truth and reality first, but the kingdom of God, for, ultimately, all man's knowledge is foolishness (cf. p. 150). In the clash between reason and faith, man must definitely choose faith (cf. e.g., p. 126 and elsewhere). It is in the nature of the acceptance of Christ to be a stumbling-block, to want to be one (cf. p. 239); did not Jesus himself continually create embarrassment for himself, as at the marriage of Cana when he, together with his disciples, occasioned the wine-shortage (cf. p. 124-25)?

In that Christianity is reaffirmed to be a religion concerned with that one great event in the past and the fate of man in the future, Niemöller doctrinally found himself in opposition to the *Weltanschauung* that was and still is upsurging in Germany, dominated as it is by *Lebensraum*, resuscitation and replenishing of vital energy and live individuals, a general *Lebensbejahung* in the spirit of the youth-movement. His belief that a curse lies on the whole of creation (cf. p. 117), that man is lacking in dignity and God must be over-glorified, are attitudes diametrically opposed to the views instilled through National Socialist philosophy. It was a strong and daring thought couched

in words to speak in this connection of "Satan's lies with which he tries to safeguard human dignity" (p. 265). That we are not at home on this planet, but are only on our way (cf. p. 51), is, of course, a doctrine incomprehensible to the aggressive tenor of Germany. For, limit the possibility of attainment to this life-span, and you intensify and strain all efforts to the utmost, whereas the Christian and the Hindu "save up" for enjoyment of a future life, however differently the nature of the ultimate attainment be. Niemöller warns against taking death too lightly (cf. p. 57), for in his theology it is implicated with sin, whereas National Socialism preaches contempt of death.

From all this and the added enzyme of faith, the conflict which spelled Niemöller's doom, was inevitable; for faith to him was not piety merely, but a militant apostolic mission, as fanatical—to borrow the much-liked Hitlerean expression—as the magnitude of the opposition.

The objection to the "Confessional" Church would be relatively unintelligible if we did not remember that its genealogical doctrines are definitely oriented along lines which do not exclude the Old Testament nor the Jewish parentage of Jesus.

There are several crescendoes noticeable between which we really have to interpolate the church-historical events that are here and there alluded to in the sermons. All was not well within the Church itself, though it was threatened externally by de-confessionalization, German Christians, the National Church, and outright paganism, for we find him mentioning the interchurchal fuss and squander (e.g., pp. 135 and 234). Perhaps, at the time, more as an expedient to save the Church itself than as a permanent solution of many difficulties, Niemöller dropped as a last gesture the overstress on denominationalism to plead for a great unity of all churches, including even the Catholic (cf. pp. 240-42).

Although specific orders and regulations and the liberty accorded other than Christian beliefs definitely fixed the blame for the fiasco of the Confessional Church on the present political regime, Niemöller implies that the struggle of the Church is really an ancient one conditioned by the nature of God's kingdom itself, which refuses amalgamation with other kingdoms (p. 226). The decay of religious conscience of the orthodox Christian type had undoubtedly set in after the World War to gain momentum with the downward grade of economic life. To the "enemies of Jesus" he gave the benefit of doubt,

whether they "cannot" or "will not" believe (p. 206). Once he allowed a general pessimism to seize him in regard to the happy ending of the cause of Christianity (p. 205), though his faith has not been allowed to abate even now after years of imprisonment. The question as to why people have lost the faith which sustains him and render everything to Caesar (p. 61), he does not answer. Except for biblical phrases which he hurled at the enemies of the Confessional Church, there is little of the disrespectfulness of a Krummacher answer in these sermons, though the incombatability of all that flows from belief in the Word with National Socialism is emphasized in every line.

The value of the book lies thus not merely in the pathetic, but in conveying an understanding of the ideological presuppositions of Niemöller's fortitude, which constitute a fruitful study for the student of theology and the layman as well. Whoever wishes to make such a study without his blood boiling, should reserve reading Thomas Mann's preface till the end. It is a call to arms to break the prison in which Niemöller is confined.

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Christian Realism. By JOHN C. BENNETT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. xii + 198 pp. \$2.00.

There are three ways to read this book. If one is unduly swayed by the opening chapter and the sections on pacifism, one will conclude simply that it is a tract for the times and is important for that reason. If one emphasizes the strictly theological portions at the expense of the comments on the contemporary scene, one will find a richness of religious insight and permanent theological construction. If one blends these two approaches, one will discover that here is theology which is relevant to our human situation, illuminated by the contemporary scene, and dealing with eternal verities.

(1) As a tract for these times, Professor Bennett's acute analysis of the religio-political situation in Chapter One is certain to upset the complacency of those who are blind to the dangers of Hitler. This lecture was originally delivered in September, 1940, and was changed only slightly in emphasis before publication.

He writes that we have come to the end of the spiritual unity of the West. In the past, even where Christianity was not practiced too

seriously, there was at least the recognition of Christian scruples on the part of others, and this recognition qualified political, social, and military action. But we are learning that "nothing is too terrible to be possible. . . . The combination of political tyranny and military victory is something new in the modern period and the instruments of control made possible by modern technology are new in human history" (p. 4). Our new situation makes us foresee hopelessness, the use of force, and a shackled Church. Yet, there is hope, because the Church learned its lesson in the last war, and the rise of what might be called "Biblical empiricism" in theology points the direction American theology must take.

Our social hope depends primarily upon our beliefs about man. Man is both a sinner and made in the image of God. He is an individual who must live with other persons. This leads us to the idea of the social gospel, refined because it has been chastened by events. The key to the problem of social action is the idea of "tragic compromise." There is reliance on Reinhold Niebuhr here, but the view of man is more balanced, and he can do something about his tragic situation. "The dialectical character of this position is shown by the refusal on the one hand to identify Christianity with political policies and the refusal on the other hand to allow a moral dualism to arise with one standard for private life and another standard for public life" (pp. 96-97).

(2) As a statement of doctrine, Professor Bennett deals with the doctrines of God, man, Christ, and the Church, and adds an appendix on the problem of evil. His insights are balanced, Biblical, and liberal, and with brevity and great persuasion he outlines the essential beliefs of the Christian religion.

His chapter on God underscores four realms of activity: God is creator, righteous, Lord of history, and redeemer. The world is dependent upon God, who is a righteous deity and who judges man by a "moral test." God works in history through judgment and punishment, but not by intervention. He also works through persuasion and love. Above all, God is active in redeeming love, by which he sustains men and the moral order. God's forgiveness (forgotten by liberals of the last generation) is essential to an understanding of social guilt and the inevitability of compromise in moral action.

His doctrine of man shows a debt to Niebuhr, but the positive

emphasis on man's being made in the image of God provides a more balanced view. Divine grace is available to men. "Our hope must always be in God's grace plus the possibilities of man" (p. 55). Man is an individual who also lives in a community, and man is responsible to the community because it consists of persons.

The finest strictly theological writing is to be found in the brief sections on Christ and the Church. He sees Jesus painted against the background of the Old Testament and Palestine. Christology finds its basis in the Jesus of history. There is a *movement* of redemption which finds its center in Jesus, but which goes back to the Old Testament preparation and finds its continuing impact in the life of today. In Christ "we have to do with a union of will or purpose between a human person who was separate in existence and God" (p. 135). As Schleiermacher said, Christ works on us by persuasion and through the Church.

Concerning the Church, the author avoids the usual fuzzy theorizing by saying that the Church is the hope of and the obstacle to salvation. "The true Church of Christ is not coterminous with the Churches. It includes many who are outside the Churches and it excludes many who are inside the Churches" (p. 143). The Church is now in a period of reformation. It is being reformed by enduring persecution, by developing a social conscience, by its theological revival, by its desire for unity, and by its power as an indigenous movement in almost every country of the world. "The strengthening of the world Church is more important than anything else we may feel called upon to do on the political level, for we know that by this means we will preserve and perhaps increase resources for the new world that must come as men are driven by the dread results of war and tyranny to seek ways of organizing their common life which are closer to the intention of God" (pp. 158-59).

(3) Theology is significant only as it is relevant to the human situation and can be communicated. The theology of this book speaks directly to the human situation, and the author understands that situation better than most of us. Without losing the essential balance of the Christian tradition, the author emphasizes those aspects of our religion which are pertinent for these times. When we think of God today, we must account for his relation to the world situation or deny his work in history. To see God as judge and persuasive love, as a

non-interventionist in history and yet Lord of history, dealing with man who has capacities for both good and evil, gives a perspective for religious sanity.

(4) This book must be judged both for its truth and its relevance. On neither ground can it be condemned, and the only criticisms which can be suggested are so minor as to express only the preferences of the reviewer.

The use of the word, "creator," is misleading. The author points out that we know nothing about a specific creation, not even that God is responsible for it, and he uses the word only to indicate that we are absolutely dependent upon God. Would it not be more accurate to call this God a creative power, or order, or process in the world? This would take care of the implications of Professor Bennett's use of "creator," including his careful distinction between the transcendence of God in terms of existence and the Barthian "transcendence of unlikeness."

The emphasis on the "union of two wills" in his Christology suggests the old monophysite heresy. This is an ambiguous use of the word, "union," for the author implies that Jesus' will remains independent, and that therefore there is a *sharing* of wills. Jesus' will is that of a man whose choices and purposes are like God's choices and purposes. If this is what he means, this position is similar to that of Archbishop Temple, and it has the advantage of citing the essentially ethical character of the incarnation and of salvation. What might be called his "low" Christology is strengthened by his appeal to the characteristics of the Jesus of history as the basis of Christology.

No specific doctrine of the Church is developed, except as the functions of the Church are discussed in relation to the world situation. And even among the functions of the Church, he might have mentioned that above all the Church is a worshipping society.

In this brief but incisive treatment of Christian theology, the author's critical and appreciative spirit is much in evidence. It is Biblical empiricism which is not a slave to any tradition, and it steers a courageous, dynamic, and intelligent course in the central stream of American theology. Its relevance to the times gives it a relative permanence.

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Can We Keep the Faith? By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. vi + 218 pp. \$2.75.

Professor Pratt has written a richly valuable book in fulfilment of a plan formed thirty-five years ago, at the beginning of his work as a college teacher. That plan was to sum up, towards the end of his career, what he had learned concerning the religious tendencies of our time and concerning the prospects of Christianity in the years ahead. My first comment would be that, aside from the general structure and conclusions of the book, not the least valuable parts of it are the fine brief summaries of religious experience and Christian faith given at the ends of chapters and elsewhere.

The point of view of the book is that of Christian liberalism. This point of view gives the author's work an important timeliness. For some time liberal Christianity has been under attack from the theological right wing, just as democracy has been under attack from many intellectuals and left-wing groups. But now that democracy is in grave danger, in respect to its institutions and its theories, most of us who have had experience of it realize that it stands for priceless and eternal values. Our actual democracy needs to be reformed and developed, but faith in democracy must never be relinquished. Much the same holds for liberal Christianity, as the author effectively shows. To be sure, a cross-section of what liberal thinkers and churches stood for at the turn of the century was indeed open to attack in many respects. But, says Pratt, "To identify liberalism with a set of particular theological or economic doctrines is to use the word in an arbitrary sense and to fail to see what it is that all true liberals have in common" (p. 75). The underlying principle of liberalism is, negatively, freedom from external authority, and positively, rational thought and action.

Passing from the adjective, "liberal," to the substantive, "Christianity," one finds the author defining Christianity not creedally but historically. "Regarded historically Christianity is a spiritual movement in the life of the race" (p. 27). It is "the Christian tradition" which necessarily grows and changes and which, at the same time, has "certain fundamental traits which are constant and decisive. . . . They are, namely, a characteristic form of experience, of activity, and of belief." In comparison with other religions the Christian experience "is peculiarly characterized by love: love for God and love for man.

Throughout the two thousand years of its existence, Christianity has been among other things an overflowing stream of love, an inner life of love." The second and closely related characteristic is the active helpfulness which springs from love, and which marks Christianity as it does no other religion. Finally, the love which Christianity feels and the activity which it displays "have for their background, and to some extent as their presupposition, a certain kind of attitude towards the universe" (pp. 28 f.). This attitude involves belief in God and in a living relation between man and God.

The vital center of the Christian tradition, which renders these characteristics permanent and ever newly fruitful, is Christ. Professor Pratt does not think that a particular Christology can be made necessarily central. But he affirms: "Christ in some sense or other is the very center of the Christian faith. Ever since He died upon the cross, the thought of Him and the love which his love inspires has been the most effective inspiration for ideal living and unselfish devotion that mankind has ever experienced" (p. 101). As an organic spiritual movement, Christianity has expressed itself through a great variety of emotional and intellectual forms, symbols, and institutions and has been enriched thereby. But that which is most essential to it is the continuity of the Christian tradition in respect to its permanent characteristics and its vital center.

It is for the preservation of the continuity of the Christian tradition today that liberalism, in the sense defined above, is important. Professor Pratt gives examples from the history of religion to show that, once a religious tradition has lapsed for one or two generations, it is most unlikely to be revived. He is far from holding that only those who interpret Christianity in the liberal spirit are Christians. But he does feel that an attack upon the liberal spirit in Christianity endangers the retention of the priceless Christian values.

There are three dangers, in the author's view, which give urgency to the question, "Can we keep the Faith?" One is "direct attack from without, especially from the advocates of an extreme Naturalism." Another is "the unconscious betrayal of Christianity from within," through identifying it with an authoritarian supernaturalism. And the third is a growth of indifference. "Indifference is the greatest danger that Christianity, or any other religion, has to fear." This third dan-

ger the author considers to be, in part, the result of the operation of the other two.

Professor Pratt devotes special attention to resisting the danger of authoritarian supernaturalism as it appears in the "Theology of Crisis" of Barth and Brunner. This he does because this theology discards reason in connection with the ultimate grounding of the Christian faith. It grounds the truth of Christianity ultimately upon a revelation which is wholly supernatural. The revelation, to be sure, must be received by faith, and faith is said to involve a decision; but this decision turns out to be "some kind of passive state of inner audition—in no sense man's act, but God's gift" (p. 65). Hence faith also is wholly supernatural. Revelation, then, is held to come with an authority entirely external to man's inner nature—whether his reason or some form of spiritual experience. One may not appeal to a mystical intuition in justifying the acceptance of revelation, for the neo-supernaturalist utterly rejects mysticism. If such a complete rejection of reason and empirical evidence with regard to the claims of revelation prevails in Christian thought, Professor Pratt thinks that a critical and empirically minded generation will be very unlikely to keep the faith.

The author himself insists that Christianity should be presented as a reasonable faith. He recognizes the need for an element of "decision," but "the decision must be made in the light of such reason and such knowledge as we possess" (p. 84). To the relevant knowledge belong such experiences as the "newness of life" to which Christians have borne witness through the centuries. Of evidential value, also, is the direct sense of the Divine presence, or of the living Christ in the heart. Indeed, in its milder form this mystical sense of presence is very wide-spread, and its evidential value is massively cumulative. But at no point may the use of reason be dispensed with. Pratt recognizes that reason is not a function detached from the rest of human nature. It may be perverted by bias or blinded by passion. Nevertheless, the exercise of reason is indispensable for the correction of bias and the control of passion, and when this exercise is combined with intuitive insight and the fruits of faith, the pathway to cosmic truth and the Divine way of life is opened to us.

"The hope of Christianity lies in some form of Christian liberal-

ism," says the author (p. 81). At the same time, he recognizes that liberal Christianity is especially exposed to the first of the dangers already mentioned—that of an extreme and one-sided naturalism and humanism. Such a philosophy involves "the ruling out of all influence save that of physical causation, and the denial of anything dynamic in the human mind, or the possibility of any larger Mind back of the endless sequence of purposeless mechanical events" (p. 82). Over against this extreme naturalism the author sets a critical empirical naturalism, and from a naturalism of this type the Christian faith has nothing to fear. He has developed this position previously in his book, *Naturalism*. In this latest book, he presents the conception of God as both transcendent and immanent and as supremely revealed in Jesus Christ, and holds it to be—though not a matter of demonstration—yet the most adequate interpretation of the totality of man's experience.

In treating "the Christian faith about man," Professor Pratt points out that, in comparison with other religions, Christianity "lays a stress upon the self as an active chooser which no other religion has laid" (p. 113). As against extreme naturalism, he develops this aspect of the Christian faith into the doctrine of a "substantial" self. As against the New Supernaturalism, he maintains man's real freedom and kinship to the Divine, notwithstanding the sinfulness of man, which springs from the human will and is not to be interpreted as original sin. In other chapters the author maintains the spiritual authority of the Christian ethic as giving valid principles for personal and social life, emphasizes the significance of faith in immortality, and shows the value of the liberal attitude towards the relation between Christianity and other religions.

Having shown by these discussions that we can keep the faith if we will, the author asks in conclusion, "Will we?" Here he turns to the third danger mentioned at the outset—indifference. His answer to the question is a warning and a challenge. "With wise reinterpretation of the ancient symbols and fresh application of the fundamental Christian truths to the new needs of each generation the prospects for the future of Christianity may well appear hopeful and bright." But also this will be true "only if our leaders are wise, and if leaders and followers are devoted and terribly in earnest. . . . Christianity, in some noble form, will live if the Christians of this generation and

their descendants are unalterably determined that it shall. Unremitting effort will be needed, and—who knows—perhaps some of the courage and faith that filled the hearts of the first Christian martyrs” (pp. 199-201).

With its ripe wisdom, its frank searching thought, its direct simple style, and its spiritual insight and earnestness, this new book by Professor Pratt will render a valuable service to religious leaders and laymen who are perplexed by the confusing cross-currents in the religious thought of today.

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The Ideologies of Religion. By GEORGE PERRIGO CONGER. New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1940. viii + 271 pp. \$2.50.

Professor Conger's *Ideologies of Religion* is of considerable interest, for it reveals, as the works of Tillich and others have done, a willingness to wrestle on a fairly rock-bottom level with a variety of conflicting traditions and positions, while seeking to find a way out of our contemporary chaos and failure, that is characterized by novelty. He affirms with a seeming definiteness that “the conviction deepens that sooner or later the problem of religion will have to be faced in a new way, however bold and untried it might be.” He feels that he has been attempting “to understand the situation and to suggest how to deal constructively with it.” With the need for new, bold, and untried ways the reviewer is in thorough agreement. Whether Dr. Conger does understand the religious situation, and whether his constructive efforts are adequate remains to be seen.

Dr. Conger does not use the word ideologies as it has traditionally been used by Napoleon, Marx, and in more recent times, as suggesting the baseless or unreal. Though he does not define ideology, he seems to mean by it simply a body of doctrine. In examining contemporary doctrines, philosophies, or ideologies, he has hit upon a brilliant device for exhibiting them.

With surprising aptness, the principal ideologies of religion can be exhibited as a kind of spectrum, as if the light from some object had been refracted through the prism composed of various historic cultures and schools of thought, each with its atomic individual minds thrown into

vibration, and had cast upon a screen a rainbow image, extending through a range of different wave lengths.

Admitting the procedure to be analogical, Dr. Conger produces the following religious hues: (Occultism), Mysticism, Supernaturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism, Evolutionism, Naturalism, Humanism, (Economic Nationalism). The parentheses indicate infra-red and ultra-violet bands; for many, it is said, "cannot see" Occultism and Economic Nationalism as religious ideologies. The analogy of the spectrum is further developed in an interesting manner. With the exception of a concluding chapter which briefly outlines his own position, he devotes the major part of the book to the presentation of the ideologies in the spectrum and the criticism of the bands by each other! And, also, of course, as is necessary, by Dr. Conger.

Dr. Conger's estimate of the ideologies varies very greatly in extent and thoroughness. His estimate of Occultism remains wholly unclear to me. Mysticism has as its abiding contribution emphasis upon immediacy, totality, and calm fearlessness. Supernaturalism's arguments supporting the existence of God, taken singly or collectively, are insufficient. Its emphasis upon a cosmic trend which "issues at least in some righteousness and makes some goodness" is all that Dr. Conger is able to concede to this once proud and powerful ideology. All that remains of an almost equally proud idealism, after the coincidence of experience and reality is denied, is "the possibility" that "they are analogous." And, in developing his own system, Dr. Conger feels quite sure that the "great Mind" theory will follow the "great Man" theory into oblivion. Pragmatism as a theory of the "relativity of our judgments" is only a half-truth, and its over-emphasis on value and under-estimation of the "structure of the universe" makes it a "cosmetic" rather than a cosmic philosophy; yet, even so, its insistence on linking theories and beliefs with satisfactions "is hard to refute." The best that Dr. Conger can say for Evolutionism is that it is "promising." But Evolutionism has influenced both "Religious Realism" and "Liberal Protestantism" profoundly. Dr. Conger feels that Liberal Protestantism is disintegrating and that Religious Realism is caught within bounds. It can go no farther left than Samuel Alexander. He might have added that it cannot stand still or go right without being mired in tradition; and, also, that while Horton as a Religious Realist may be correct in saying that Liberal

Protestantism is psychologically stupid, sociologically shallow, and politically inept, it also remains to be seen whether Religious Realism is not philosophically superficial and historically myopic.

Naturalism in a sense is of most interest to Dr. Conger, for his own system, it would seem, grows out of an attempt to link the remains of Supernaturalism with a revamped Naturalism. The older dogmatic naturalisms always ended by eliminating from the cosmos an "Object of religious devotion," at which point Dr. Conger's own traditionalism begins to play, and here he will not budge. He must have one. Hence a naturalism emphasizing our imperfect knowledge of the Universe is to him unsatisfactory, for its effort to find a "process or trend" is either weak or is abandoned altogether. Even though it is unsupported by the traditional historic religions, Naturalism could, of course, seek to hew its way into a commanding position without an "Object of devotion" rather than support the vague and dubiously determinable "Object of devotion" suggested by Professor Wieman. So far however, one must admit, the success of Naturalism has been slight. When an Object has been retained and been made definite, as in Economic Nationalism, it becomes offensive to intelligence. Where it is dispensed with, as in Humanism, the result is too often vague and sentimental, and not infrequently downright trivial. Dr. Conger criticizes Humanism for not going independently beyond Evolutionism and Naturalism, and Economic Nationalism for not transcending class and folk. His own position grows finally out of Naturalism and assumes that the future of Naturalism, along with Evolutionism and Humanism, lies in clarifying the "Object of religious devotion." His clarification consists in an essential reaffirmation of his epitomization hypothesis and its application to the "Object of devotion."

Applying once more the spectrum theory, Dr. Conger views man as the potentially proper focus of "cosmic light" so that the epitomization of the Universe in man becomes properly evident in man's philosophic projection of the Religious Object. With the theory itself we need not concern ourselves here, but only with the light Dr. Conger believes it throws upon eight questions he raises about the "Object." They are: "Is the object of religious devotion definite or indefinite? Is it finite or infinite? Is it one or many? Is it changing or changeless? Is it matter (or perhaps energy, but at all events physical) or is it "spiritual"? Is it personal or impersonal? Is it purposive or

mechanistic? And if we grant that it is making goodness, how shall we recognize it?" The Universe itself, be it noted, is not the "Source and Object of religion"; they are to be found *in* the universe.

The object of religion "can be as definite as goodness in the world." And as evil? Dr. Conger does not say. Any "assumed good" he admits is tentative, and for the time being experimental. But how does he know it is experimental only "for the time being?" Nor does the contrasting Oriental "ethics of contentment" help him, for if contentment be temporal, it is open to question, as the history of Indian philosophy shows. If it is not temporal then the epitomization theory should show *that* and *how* it is not, or else deal with the universe in terms other than those of a religion which requires a central "Object of devotion," or one having a special status.

The problem of the finiteness or infinity is solved by forgoing "description" and saying that God is finite, but not weak or lacking in power, and that we "set no limits to God's wisdom." But surely this negative approach is either rhetorical and misleading or tells us only that God's wisdom and power are at least a bare minimum. If that minimum be permanent, then Dr. Conger can maintain at least a good healthy pessimism. The problem of the permanent and the changing, and the one (or One?) and the many are treated very briefly and by means of the principle of selection and neglect, which I believe throws no light on the problem of the "One," however it may illuminate the idea of the "one."

Dr. Conger's solutions of the problem of matter and spirit are also open to ancient objections. The assertions of the "fineness of structure" of modern matter is still open to Socrates' criticism of Anaxagorus. Again, if matter be said to be the condition of health as well as of disease, one may ask whether the good life may not lie beyond disease and health. And finally, if spirit be called "high-test" matter we have more problems of ancient vintage. If high-test gas be no lubricant, but if lubricating oil, when it becomes conscious, prefers, even without power to do so, to become a high-test gas, how then can we say *of the Universe*, as Dr. Conger does, that it "a-mounts" to something? Not for lubricating oil—or for the man of low estate, except by way of a non-rational faith.

Dr. Conger shows some seven ways in which God may be conceived of as personal. Most interesting is his conception of the "Cul-

minate Person," the cosmic process which, as nature and history, culminates in man. He compares it to the Corporate Person. But it may be objected that there is a hiatus between stockholders and workers under Capitalism, between nationals and non-nationals under a Totalitarian regime, and between believers and disbelievers, in the field of religion. The charge of arbitrariness applies in all instances and remains unresolved in Dr. Conger's system. Even more dramatic is his use of the idea that God reveals himself in the religious leader and becomes a "personal culmination in a societal group of persons." This permits him to re-establish Jesus as the leader of Christianity and to develop him as the "pivot" of history, an idea as suggestive as Tillich's idea of Christ as "die Mitte der Geschichte." The unique sacrificial death of Jesus seems to suggest that he was really unique, pivotal. And finally, Dr. Conger wistfully concludes that revering God may mean according awe to the Universe and love to man.

It must have become evident that, quite apart from technical problems inherent in his epitomization theory, Dr. Conger's discussion after leaving the critique of naturalism and its offspring is a wavering between the old and new. Granting that it is true that idealism and pragmatism show serious weaknesses, that the newer liberalisms are as superficial as the orthodoxies are stifling and the new supernaturalisms unreasonable, it yet remains a question whether Dr. Conger's way is new, bold, and untried. The gap between philosophy and theology, between the Universe and the religious object, is bridged only by the affirmation, the implications of which remain unclear, that man lives and adjusts himself to both and that the latter is in the former. But is such an affirmation sufficient to support the dead weight of theology? So far as I can see, the basic principles of Dr. Conger's system could be applied in a non-theistic or non-"theistic" (as he prefers) universe, in which value without theological ado is regarded as a part of the structure of the Universe. To have further developed this idea beyond what Dr. Conger believes to be the limitations of Alexander or of Dewey (or other naturalists) would have seemed novel, bold, and untried. Instead, one progressively feels that, in these days of uncertainty, Dr. Conger looks backward to the securities of yesterdays when Christianity was supreme and Jesus unique and pivotal. Dr. Conger has not moved fast nor far, and, far from boldly

disestablishing old landmarks all at once, he is assisting Protestant Liberalism and the New Supernaturalism in maintaining a truncated Christianity. On the other hand, Dr. Conger could, even while continuing to refine and rework his epitomization theory, transform his halting and nostalgic naturalism into a genuinely new, bold, and untried naturalism.

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Personality: A Study According to the Philosophies of Value and Spirit of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. By ECKHARD J. KOEHLE. Newton, N.J., 1941. xii + 231 pp.

It is seldom that a doctoral dissertation in philosophy represents such solid work and insight as this study done at Columbia University. The author has had the advantage of several years' previous study in theology and philosophy in Germany. It is, therefore, a matter of regret in some ways that he has confined himself to "a merely immanent criticism of the theories under discussion." It is to be hoped that, when he develops his own concept of personality "in a later, positive essay," he will also give us a less descriptive account of Scheler's and Hartmann's theories, and a broad interpretation of their significance in the modern philosophy of spirit and value. For his dissertation suffers somewhat from being too close to the texts he is expounding.

It is well known that Scheler and Hartmann used the phenomenological method of Husserl in making a fresh approach to ethics and anthropology, attacking the naturalistic tendency to identify spiritual with physical reality. What is not so well known is the fact that they interpreted personality ethically, in terms of its direction towards values. Dr. Koehle devotes the first part of his study to the idea of personality in the philosophies of value of Scheler and Hartmann, reserving his treatment of their philosophies of spirit to the second part. This is probably justified, but their concepts of value and spirit are so interwoven that it requires a rather artificial division of the material.

Scheler defines a "person" as a unity of intentional acts of various kinds, which exists only in the process of performing the acts. These acts, which are thus not conceived as inhering in a substance of any kind, are directed towards values. Values are essences which are apprehended primarily in feeling, but, as there is an order of feeling or

"logique du coeur," they are felt as objective and as related in a definite order of rank to each other. In general, Hartmann accepts this analysis, but seeks to guard the objectivity of values by insisting that they are *intuited* as well as *felt*, and that they enjoy a purely ideal and self-existent being in a realm of essence. At this point as at others, Scheler's thinking is more concrete and organic. Values are objective, but objective *for human persons* and as rooted in the *spiritual World-ground*. In criticism of the more Platonic and less Christian view of Hartmann, he writes: "A heaven of ideas and values which is said to exist wholly independently of the nature and the possible performance of living spiritual acts . . . leads back *behind* the living substances of Christianity and its principal discovery of the eternal right of the living subjectivity in God and man" (*Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, p. xix).

The chief weaknesses of Scheler's ethical theory of personality in terms of acts, according to Dr. Koehle, are its denial of any *substantial* basis for the acts which constitute the person—"Scheler actually dissolves the person into his acts, and yet his philosophy of value necessarily presupposes a center of action" (p. 78)—and its rejection of any knowledge of the person *as an object*. However, Dr. Koehle does not suggest any way to meet the objections of modern dynamic psychology to the substance theory; and he seems to go a long way with Scheler's idea that "understanding" (*Verstehen*) of a person as a spiritual agent is possible by the performance of his acts with or after him. The real difficulty seems to me to lie in the relation of the *spiritual acts* of the person to the *states of consciousness* described by psychology. Scheler's view seems to rest upon a sharp dualism between the spiritual person and all psychical states. Even the settled dispositions which make up the *character* are divorced from the *person*.

What distinguishes man from other living species is "spirit" (*Geist*), not (practical) intelligence, according to Scheler. Spirit is characterized by freedom from "the spell, pressure of and dependence upon the organic sphere, upon 'life'"; by self-consciousness with respect to one's psychical nature and experience; and by one's ability through intentional acts to participate in the "Original Being" (*Ursein*) of the world with its ideas and values. Thus, one is able to transcend oneself, for at one and the same time he actualizes his own ideal personality and serves the divine spirit in the process of redeeming the world. This is possible by virtue of an "ascetic" act which stills

the urge of life in ourselves and thus enables us to intuit essence in abstraction from existence. This does not mean, however, that spirit *comes into being* through sublimation of the urges and drives of life, but only that it *derives its energy* from them. Thus, the naturalistic theories which reduce spirit to life are rejected, but vitalism is credited with having shown that the subconscious drives of the soul provide the creative power for man's activity. Dr. Koehle points out that this thesis of the "impotence of the spirit" means a "considerable devaluation of the spirit" in the direction of naturalism, but that what Scheler really wants is a harmony of spirit and life with the former guiding the latter.

Hartmann's concept of spirit (in *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*) supplements Scheler's mainly at four points. (1) Spirit is assigned its proper position in relation to the lower levels of being: it "depends upon" but, at the same time, "rises above" the psychical, as the psychical does in relation to the organic. Thus, "there is no tyranny of one level of existence over another," and "the spirit is powerful in its sphere of gradation, but not almighty in the world." (*Das Problem*, etc., p. 57). The affinity of this view is evidently neither with Idealism nor with Naturalism, but with a Pluralistic theory of related levels. (2) The freedom of the will is defended as both "ethically necessary" to account for responsibility, imputation, guilt, decision, and the like—and "ontologically possible" by the introduction of finalistic determination of the will through principles into the causal nexus of nature. (3) A distinction is made between three "fundamental forms" of spirit, "personal," "objective," and "objectivated." Dr. Koehle acutely criticizes this quasi-idealistic thesis that social unity and cultural products in some mysterious sense constitute an impersonal spirit distinct from personal spirits. (4) An analysis both penetrating and eloquent is made of three kinds of love in the *Ethik*: "neighbour love," roughly identical with Christian love; "love of the remotest," a blend of Nietzschean *Fernstenliebe* and Platonic *eros*; and "personal love," the intimate, creative love of one person. Dr. Koehle does not note the difficulty involved in the relation of these abstract "kinds" of love to one another, and especially in the subtle depreciation of "neighbor love" in favor of "love of the remotest."

Hartmann rejects the "metaphysical personalism" of Scheler, on

the ground that it unduly extends personality beyond its proper sphere. Also, theism tends towards a depreciation of the "dignity of man," his moral values, and his welfare in this world, by subordinating them to the "holy" as the highest value, and to salvation in another world. The best refutation of this ethical humanism and atheism is the fact that, for Hartmann, values are left swinging in the void as mere "essences," and spirit is an inexplicable intruder in a spiritless world. On the other hand, Scheler's religious philosophy in his earlier period (e.g., in *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*), though unsystematic, is full of insights. And though in his later period (e.g., in *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*) he broke with the church and came dangerously near "evolutionary pantheism" in his theory of a limited and developing God, it is not sufficient to dispose of this phase, as Dr. Koehle seems to do, by saying that the more orthodox concept had become for him "too inconvenient in practical life" (p. 186).

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BOOK NOTES

The Hidden Teaching Beyond Yoga. By PAUL BRUNTON. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. 413 pp. \$3.50.

With this volume Paul Brunton definitely bids adieu to the contemplative sphere of Hindu yogis which he entered when, on *A Search for Secret India*, he came under the spell of the living yogi-saint Sri Ramana Maharshi, at Tiruvannamalai, South India. Some readers of Brunton's record of his personal attempts at yoga practice, *Hermit in the Himalayas*, might have wondered how long its author would persist in the pursuit of yogic introversion for which his intellectual and active mind seemed but moderately adjusted; they might have expected this departure of his from the Saint's *âshrama*. The first chapters of this book try to explain why Brunton feels bound to proceed "beyond yoga." They form interesting reading, in as far as they contain somewhat typical reactions of a non-Hindu modern intellectual on tackling yoga without achieving final peace and fulfillment. Brunton found his dissatisfaction with the sheer contemplative attitude of yoga, as he understands it with the Maharshi and other yogis, confirmed through a saying of Sri Aurobindo, "trance is a way of escape, . . . the disadvantage is that trance becomes indispensable and that the problem of the waking consciousness is not solved, it remains imperfect." Yet the most striking and persistent impression one gains from the dialogues and utterances of the Maharshi whose guidance the author forsakes, is that the problem of waking consciousness is completely solved by this saint and some of his pupils through perfection in yoga. With them one feels confronted with a basic experience of transcendent reality expressed with utter clarity, unfailing decision and impersonal simplicity. There is an unmistakable undertone of truth ringing throughout their teachings whatever argument is covered: preliminary problems of psychology, daily worries, questions of everyday conduct, as well as the lofty and recondite experiences of the Self. It is this simple convincing ring, and the qualities which go with it, which are missing in the intellectual pursuit of the author, and his case seems to be just one among many non-Hindus for whom the yoga haven of Hindu souls is not meant.

Some Brahmin drew Brunton's attention to the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Ash-tavakra saṁhitā* and the *Māṇḍūkya-Upanishad* with Gauḍapāda's commentary, as containing a doctrine beyond yoga. In fact, the first and the second among these texts contain passages enjoining an active attitude towards the duties of secular life as the very fulfillment of self-detachment through yoga. Yet fundamentally they are not at variance with the yogic attitude against which Brunton springs his criticism. He styles their teaching as secret, yet they are among the most popular Hindu treatises on release. Gauḍapāda's subtle commentary, again, is a common textbook of

Advaita Vedānta (e.g., for the monks of the Rāmakrishna Order), and Vedānta yogis like Maharshi and his followers agree that it expounds the basic truth of their yoga experiences. The contrast which Brunton establishes between these texts and this new attitude of his on the one hand, and contemplative yoga on the other hand, as embodied through Maharshi, actually boils down to the complex variety of yoga with its various aspects and stages. There is no fundamental antagonism between these texts and the truth voiced and realised by the Maharshi, though the kaleidoscopic interplay of seemingly contradicting aspects which evolve from each other and are harmonized in the aforementioned treatises, tends to mislead the reader.

Inspired by the aim of Vedānta scholastic philosophy on the lines of Gauḍapāda's commentary, Brunton strives after an intellectual representation of Truth or the Real; he aims at "a structure of welded East-West thought built for our own age." For this purpose the main bulk of the volume is devoted to problems as "the worship of words," the "revelation of relativity," the "magic of the mind," the "downfall of materialism," etc. Mr. Brunton is an able writer, commanding an extensive range of reading. Yet the reader is asked not to expect the final solution of the gigantic task which the author has shouldered. He is told "that task demands a second volume, . . . the remainder together with the crowning keystone of the arch of truth which I am endeavouring to construct, has perforce been left untouched." Brunton manages to be bold and modest at the same time. Actually his book, which is not meant to be "a last philosophical will and testament or final credo," is an introduction to critical thought, an approach to metaphysics. Those who accept him as a "truth-seeker" here will find the last "milestone which has been passed, an oasis where I camped for awhile on my journey through the desert of this world in search of a valid explanation of life and reality,"—the inmates of the Hindu hermitage, meanwhile, which Brunton feels himself to have outgrown, might comment on this newest bulletin from his prolonged quest with the gentle Chinese saying, "it is distinguishable from true wisdom."

HENRY R. ZIMMER

Holy Images: An Inquiry into Idolatry and Image-Worship in Ancient Paganism and Christianity. By EDWYN BEVAN. London: Allen and Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. 180 pp. and 4 plates. \$1.90.

These are four of the larger series of Gifford Lectures delivered by the author in 1933 and not included in his volume, *Symbolism and Belief*. Dr. Bevan analyzes the different attitudes to sacred images in Judaism, Hellenism, Islam, and Christianity as revealed in the doctrines and arguments concerning idolatry, iconoclasm, and image worship. He distin-

guishes (1) the prohibition of all images, regardless of their content, as emulation of God or as inferior versions of truth, (2) the prohibition of images of God and divine beings, (3) the prohibition of the worship of or homage paid to images, (4) and the prohibition of the homage to images as distinct from the homage to the sacred beings they represent. In the philosophical and theological defense of images he distinguishes further the admission of images (1) as vehicles to convey doctrine, (2) as vehicles to bring the mind to God or as means of inciting devotion, (3) as actual vehicles of divine grace or power, the image being regarded as inhabited, and homage to it as a way to influence the divinity, (4) as a means of establishing solidarity of the congregation with past Christians through images of the latter, (5) as an aesthetic embellishment of the sacred building.

The value of the book lies in these carefully drawn distinctions. The development of the various ideas is traced dialectically in the course of history, but the author does not undertake to throw light on the reasons for their persistence and influence. Nor does he consider adequately the social operation of images in fixing devotional habits, or the characteristics of the images themselves in so far as they condition or support these habits. In his criticism of image worship, he appeals to the behavior of a modern Protestant: since a Protestant today is brought no nearer to Christ by images, Dr. Bevan cannot credit the old arguments that such may be the effect of images. "The specifically religious use of pictures and images, simply as a means to make more vivid to our apprehension a person in the unseen world and stimulate devotion, is very small indeed." In this judgment I believe he underestimates the original importance of images for popular piety and their effects on imagination and feeling.

The texts and monumental evidence, drawn largely from theological and polemical literature, are handled very well. There are occasional slips, however. The author has interpreted the story told by Gregory of Tours (*De Gloria Martyrum*, I, c. xxiii) as an objection of the community to a painting of the Crucifixion, when it is only an objection to the nudity of Christ in this image; it seems to be an explanation of the type of Crucifixion in which Christ wears the long robe or colobium. He is also probably wrong in accepting the early datings given to catacomb paintings; present opinion knows no works of the first century, and very few indeed that can be assigned to the second. His explanation of the frequency of Old Testament scenes in the early period as due to a shyness in representing Christ or Mary in human form disregards the positive symbolic funerary sense of these Biblical themes as examples of salvation through the help of God. His statement, after Foucher, that it was Greek artists of the Gandhara school who first represented the Buddha has been corrected by Coomaraswamy, who has demonstrated the existence of an older indigenous type of Buddha image.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

The Illustrations of the Manuscripts of the Septuagint. By ERNEST T. DEWALD. Volume III, Psalms and Odes, Part I: Vaticanus Graecus 1927. Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1941. 56 pp. LXXIII plates. \$12.00.

This is the third of Professor DeWald's facsimiles of finely illustrated psalters of the early Middle Ages. He has already given us admirable editions of the Utrecht and Stuttgart manuscripts and now reproduces a Greek psalter of the twelfth century, unique in type and of central interest for the history of both Western and Eastern psalter illustration. Tikkanen had recognized the importance of this manuscript over forty years ago, but DeWald's book makes it available to students for the first time. He has reserved the investigation of the iconography and the style for volume VI of the same series, limiting the present work to an exact account of the psalter and its images, the transcription of the writing that accompanies the miniatures, and the identification of the sources of the latter in the texts of the psalter and the commentaries of the Church Fathers. In a concluding chapter he has summarized the iconographic peculiarities of the manuscript. It is unique in that all the illustrations of a psalm or canticle are gathered together in a single large composition placed at the head of each psalm or canticle. The illustrations are for the most part literal, and although the choice of scenes, especially of the New Testament and the story of David, agrees often with the Greek "marginal" psalters, the conception of the scenes is different. The following are some of the peculiarities isolated by Professor DeWald. David appears as a prophet, teacher, or suppliant and recalls in this respect the tradition of the Rossano Gospels. In the illustration of David's words, Christ is frequently represented. But there are relatively few New Testament scenes: the story of David is central, and among the Old Testament miniatures appear Adam, Joseph, Jonah, the three Hebrew boys and several incidents from Exodus. There are few saints and few of the personifications found in other Greek psalter miniatures. DeWald identifies at least one miniature based on the Heavenly Ladder of John Climacus.

The reproductions and printing are of the same high standard as Professor DeWald's other facsimile editions.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

The Shaker Adventure, an Experiment in Contented Living. By MARGUERITE FELLOWS MELCHER. Princeton, N.J.: The Princeton University Press, 1941. ix + 319 pp. \$3.00.

This account of the Shakers is a well documented, sympathetic narrative of the origins, doctrines, economy, arts and fate of the Shaker communities in America. The author uses mostly Shaker sources and omits some of the critical material available on Mother Ann and the early history. But the story is none the less as authentic as any account of the Shakers

is ever apt to be, and gains much from the author's personal acquaintance with the communities.

The theme of "adventure" is emphasized for a double reason: to bring out the element of pioneering adventure in the Shaker faith, and to point out that when this love of adventure ceased, and the new members sought rather security, the life went out of the movement. The history of the Shaker movement is indicative of this loss of life: at first the dances were vigorous sublimations of energy and sex; then they became curiosities for the entertainment of "the world"; then they became "decorous" according to the standards of "the world"; and lastly they became lifeless rituals. The author regards the whole experiment as an adventurous but persistent pursuit of a perfect life, perfection implying the devotion of the member to the group (family) and of the body to the spirit. The author points out convincingly that a real perfection was attained in their agriculture, architecture, and handicrafts, but that the Shakers had a different conception of "spirit" than the spirit of art implies, and that instead of continuing to adapt their economy and arts to a changing world, they adhered steadfastly to prophetic spiritualism.

Spiritualism and the hope of Christ's coming were both the inspiration and the cause of failure. Irresponsible spirit messages and teachings sowed the seed of distrust. One of the most curious and instructive episodes in the narrative is the enthusiasm for a decade or more in outdoor worship (and dances) on "holy hills."

The list of sources and the information regarding the present state of Shaker properties are valuable features of the book.

H. W. S.

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